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Abstract 
Federated Authentication using the Cloud (Cloud Aura) 
Abdulwahid Al Abdulwahid (MSc) 
Individuals, businesses and governments undertake an ever-growing range of activities online 
and via various Internet-enabled digital devices. Unfortunately, these activities, services, 
information and devices are the targets of cybercrimes. Verifying the user legitimacy to 
use/access a digital device or service has become of the utmost importance. Authentication is 
the frontline countermeasure of ensuring only the authorised user is granted access; however, 
it has historically suffered from a range of issues related to the security and usability of the 
approaches. Traditionally deployed in a point-of-entry mode (although a number of 
implementations also provide for re-authentication), the intrusive nature of the control is a 
significant inhibitor. Thus, it is apparent that a more innovative, convenient and secure user 
authentication solution is vital. 
This thesis reviews the authentication methods along with the current use of authentication 
technologies, aiming at developing a current state-of-the-art and identifying the open 
problems to be tackled and available solutions to be adopted. It also investigates whether 
these authentication technologies have the capability to fill the gap between the need for high 
security whilst maximising user satisfaction. This is followed by a comprehensive literature 
survey and critical analysis of the existing research domain on continuous and transparent 
multibiometric authentication. It is evident that most of the undertaken studies and proposed 
solutions thus far endure one or more shortcomings; for instance, an inability to balance the 
trade-off between security and usability, confinement to specific devices, lack or negligence 
of evaluating users’ acceptance and privacy measures, and insufficiency or absence of real 
tested datasets. It concludes that providing users with adequate protection and convenience 
requires innovative robust authentication mechanisms to be utilised in a universal manner. 
Accordingly, it is paramount to have a high level of performance, scalability, and 
interoperability amongst existing and future systems, services and devices. 
A survey of 302 digital device users was undertaken and reveals that despite the widespread 
interest in more security, there is a quite low number of respondents using or maintaining the 
available security measures. However, it is apparent that users do not avoid applying the 
concept of authentication security but avoid the inconvenience of its current common 
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techniques (biometrics are having growing practical interest). The respondents’ perceptions 
towards Trusted Third-Party (TTP) enable utilising biometrics for a novel authentication 
solution managed by a TTP working on multiple devices to access multiple services. 
However, it must be developed and implemented considerately.  
A series of experimental feasibility analysis studies disclose that even though prior 
Transparent Authentication Systems (TAS) models performed relatively well in practice on 
real live user data, an enhanced model utilising multibiometric fusion outweighs them in 
terms of the security and transparency of the system within a device. It is also empirically 
established that a centralised federated authentication approach using the Cloud would help 
towards constructing a better user profile encompassing multibiometrics and soft biometric 
information from their multiple devices and thus improving the security and convenience of 
the technique beyond those of unimodal, the Non-Intrusive and Continuous Authentication 
(NICA), and the Weighted Majority Voting Fusion (WMVF) and what a single device can do 
by itself. Furthermore, it reduces the intrusive authentication requests by 62%-74% (of the 
total assumed intrusive requests without operating this model) in the worst cases. 
As such, the thesis proposes a novel authentication architecture, which is capable of operating 
in a transparent, continuous and convenient manner whilst functioning across a range of 
digital devices – bearing in mind it is desirable to work on differing hardware configurations, 
operating systems, processing capabilities and network connectivity but they are yet to be 
validated. The approach, entitled Cloud Aura, can achieve high levels of transparency thereby 
being less dependent on secret-knowledge or any other intrusive login and leveraging the 
available devices capabilities without requiring any external sensors. Cloud Aura 
incorporates a variety of biometrics from different types, i.e. physiological, behavioural, and 
soft biometrics and deploys an on-going identity confidence level based upon them, which is 
subsequently reflected on the user privileges and mapped to the risk level associated to them, 
resulting in relevant reaction(s). While in use, it functions with minimal processing overhead 
thereby reducing the time required for the authentication decision. Ultimately, a functional 
proof of concept prototype is developed showing that Cloud Aura is feasible and would have 
the provisions of effective security and user convenience.  
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1 Introduction and Overview 
1.1 Introduction 
There are 7.6 billion mobile subscribers currently in existence and they are anticipated to 
reach 9 billion by 2020 (GSMA, 2016), many of which are increasingly utilising smartphones 
and other devices with a wide range of capabilities. Smartphones are capable of making 
telephone calls, texting, surfing the Internet, checking emails, playing games, viewing 
documents, transferring money, shopping online and storing confidential information. This 
leads individuals, corporations and governments to rely heavily and prevalently on computing 
systems (i.e. PCs, servers, laptops, tablets, phablets and mobile phones) for accessing, storing 
and processing personal, financial, medical and business information that are considered 
sensitive and confidential. This can be realised from the enormous growing number of 
Internet users around the world, 2.4 billion, along with the accelerated rise of 150% per year 
in mobile traffic (Meeker & Wu, 2013). Moreover, IDC (2014) states that the worldwide 
market share of smartphones and phablets is 70% of the total smart connected device market 
and is forecasted to grow to 75.6% by 2018.  Furthermore, this is also proportional with the 
worldwide total number of smartphone users which was 2.1 billion in 2016 and is projected 
to reach 2.87 billion in 2020 as illustrated in Figure ‎1-1 (Statista, 2016). 
 
Figure ‎1-1: Worldwide Smartphone Users 2014-2020 (Statista, 2016) 
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However, unfortunately, these devices, activities, services and information are becoming 
targets of cybercrimes. For example, 35% of CSID (2012) survey respondents’ accounts or 
personal information were compromised or stolen by imposters. In the Symantec Corporation 
(2013) report, it was revealed that there was a 42% increase in targeted attacks. Additionally, 
the average number of identities exposed per breach was 604,826 of which 23% were caused 
by theft or loss of device. In addition, another credible report showed that the use of stolen, 
weak, and default credentials was at the top of the data breach threats and represented 63% of 
the data beach incidents in 2016 (Verizon, 2016). Furthermore, three quarters of financial and 
travel organisations encountered customer impersonation and identity fraud (PwC, 2013), 
highlighting that even those organisations running and holding critical information suffer 
from cyber attacks. 
Therefore, close attention has been drawn to the immense importance to strongly secure them 
from any unauthorised access. To secure any system or information, it is crucial that it must 
fulfil the CIA triad principles: confidentiality, integrity and availability (Furnell et al., 2008). 
In order to maintain the first two, it is paramount for a system to uniquely identify legitimate 
users by an effective user authentication technique, which, if achieved, enables functional 
authorisation and accountability. Thus, it is evident that authentication is a cornerstone of 
information systems security and is a key security control for any computing system, whether 
that is a PC, server, laptop, tablet, phablet or mobile phone. 
Authentication is categorised into three major approaches: something the user knows (e.g. 
password and PIN), something the user has (e.g. smart card and token) and something the 
user is (i.e. biometrics) (Wood, 1977). Whilst various methods of authentication exist, they 
are traditionally poorly served thereby falling foul of a variety of drawbacks (Clarke & 
Furnell, 2007). Knowledge-based authentication has still been the standard means for user 
authentication on computing systems, making up approximately 3 out of 4 of authentication 
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events (TeleSign, 2016). Furthermore, besides using several digital devices, almost half of the 
surveyed respondents stated that they have more than 10 accounts with distinct usernames 
and passwords (Barker, 2016). Consequently, 73% to 84% of TeleSign (2016) and Gigya 
(2016) surveys participants, respectively, use the same password for various accounts to 
mitigate the burden of memorising and recalling numerous different passwords. Nevertheless, 
doing so violates the recent strict password policies, where users are required to remember 
multiple, complex, longer, non-recycled, unshared and changing passwords, which if met 
would augment security control while compromising users’ convenience. Token-based 
authentication seems to solve some password shortcomings; however, they have higher cost 
and fundamentally authenticate the presence of the token rather than the individual. Usability 
also becomes an issue when the user is required to carry multiple tokens for accessing a 
variety of services (Dinesh, 2012; Furnell et al., 2008). Due to these weaknesses, further 
attention has been placed upon the final form of authentication, biometrics. They arguably 
have high availability, strong defence against repudiation and good levels of usability as the 
burden from the user to recall passwords or carry tokens is removed. However, it is not 
impossible to forge single static biometrics, and the likely need for additional reader devices 
and their accuracy are questionable (Clarke, 2011; O’Gorman, 2003). 
The problem is further magnified as users are now in possession of an ever-growing number 
of advance digital devices; each one with its own associated security requirements. As an 
instance, 73% of 470 respondents own smartphone and tablet and 83% would like to have 
seamless experience across all their devices (Salesforce, 2014). Thus, it is apparent that a 
more innovative, convenient and secure solution for user authentication is essential. Some 
attempts have been emerged to counteract the aforementioned weaknesses of traditional 
authentication including deploying two/multi-factor authentication, such as the combination 
of password and token or two/multi-layer authentication, such as the combination of PIN and 
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graphical password (Aloul et al., 2009; Cryptomathic, 2012). However, these techniques, on 
one hand merely augment security, but on the other hand degrade user friendliness. 
Furthermore, it is proven that the aforementioned approaches mostly remain point-of-entry. 
In spite of the fact that re-authenticating the user periodically or as and when needed for 
higher sensitive services is imperative to increase the level of authentication beyond the 
standard point-of-entry technique, it is not viable because of its intrusiveness as they require 
the explicit interaction of the user and thus affecting the users’ experience (Grenga, 2014). 
The potential aim is to use more advanced techniques that would enable periodic or 
continuous re-verification of the user without compromising the convenience. Therefore and 
to enhance these solutions, a number of studies have upheld the need for more innovative 
authentication approaches that endeavour to balance the trade-off between security and 
convenience, such as transparent authentication system (TAS) (Clarke, 2011) and implicit 
authentication (Yazji et al., 2009) (which are introduced in sections ‎2.4.3 and ‎2.4.4, and then 
discussed in ‎3.8). Nonetheless, these technologies merely focus upon individual platforms 
rather than providing a universal and federated authentication approach that can be used 
across different technologies and services. The advent of cloud computing, its universal 
connectivity, scalability and flexibility (Grobauer et al., 2011), offers a new opportunity of 
achieving convenient authentication seamlessly in a technology and service independent 
fashion, thereby deploying it to host a centralised authentication. However, relying upon such 
an environment also introduces a range of technology, privacy and trust-related issues that 
need to be considered in any proposed solution.  
1.2 Research Aims and Objectives 
The proposal builds upon existing research on transparent and distributed authentication, with 
a view of capitalising upon the benefits that cloud computing provide. An authentication 
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system built upon this would provide a more secure, user-friendly, universal and technology 
independent environment. As this proposed framework evolves, further research will be 
undertaken to consider the human-aspects of security, including the privacy of highly 
sensitive biometric data and the operational factors that must be incorporated within the 
architecture to ensure a convenient but highly secure system. 
In order to achieve this, the following research objectives are established: 
 To develop a current state-of-the-art understanding of authentication methods 
including both the problems and available solutions.  
 To investigate the leading authentication technologies provided by various sectors and 
the biometric authentication techniques including its applications in the existing 
research on continuous, transparent and distributed authentication. 
 To explore end-users’ perceptions and attitudes towards security, privacy and 
usability in order to assess the acceptability of such proposal. 
 To validate whether prior TAS models function on real live user data and what their 
actual performance will be in practice. 
 To conduct a series of experiments aiming at evaluating the effectiveness of utilising 
the Cloud for such universal authentication and seeking to identify the attributes 
required for a successful authentication mechanism. 
 To design a novel and holistic architecture that will enhance security, user-
friendliness, universality, and will operate in a technology independent fashion.  
 To develop a functional prototype exemplifying the federated Cloud Aura 
authentication framework to have a tangible understanding of how such approach 
would function in practice. 
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1.3 Research Novel Contributions 
The research has fulfilled the aforementioned objectives and has made positive contributions 
to the field of user authentication, and specifically in biometric identity verification domain. 
The core novel contributions of this research are: 
 Conducting an exhaustive literature survey of the existing research in the domain of 
multibiometric continuous and transparent authentication. 
 Surveying end-users’ perceptions and attitudes towards security, privacy and usability 
in order to assess the acceptability of the research proposal, including their 
perceptions and satisfaction of associated current and alternative authentication 
approaches alongside their usability in addition to their awareness and attitudes 
towards related privacy issues. 
 Developing a biometric data capturing software sought to create a real dataset of a 
significant number of real users for a significant period of time of real usage in totally 
uncontrolled conditions, aiming at employing it in the research experiments. Forty-
seven subjects were recruited and their usage data was collected over 2-week period. 
 Modelling and undertaking a baseline set of experiments to determine the nature and 
performance of the potential contributing transparent biometrics and soft biometric 
data; namely, facial verification and geolocation. 
 Modelling and replicating a well-established framework (NICA) to validate whether 
prior TAS models would function on real live user data, whether they were based on 
valid assumptions, and what its actual performance is in practice. 
 Modelling and developing an enhanced model utilising multibiometric fusion and 
time windowing within a device, aiming at investigating whether employing a fusion 
mechanism that encompasses all available biometric samples at a given time-frame is 
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viable in practice and to what degree it improves the performance from the individual 
unimodal approaches. 
 Conducting a series of experiments aiming at evaluating the effectiveness of utilising 
the Cloud for such a universal authentication approach and seeking to determine 
whether it is viable, convenient and secure to authenticate users based upon their 
digital devices activities and other captured biometrics, so that it would be possible to 
gather a single user profile from the range of devices a single user may use.  
 Proposing a novel federated biometric authentication approach addressing the main 
research gap, thereby shifting the burden of both the authentication processing and 
management responsibility to a centralised Managed Authentication Service Provider 
(MASP). Accordingly, an intelligent, modular and holistic Cloud Aura architecture 
has been designed enhancing system security, user-friendliness, and universality that 
will operate in a location, service, and technology independent fashion.  
 Developing a functional proof of concept prototype exemplifying the federated Cloud 
Aura authentication framework to have a tangible understanding of how such an 
approach would function in practice. 
1.4 Thesis Structure 
This thesis is organised into eight chapters to address the aforementioned objectives, 
commencing by Chapter one that introduces the research problem and outlines the overall 
research aim and objectives and the structure of this thesis. 
Chapter two describes the authentication methods with the aim of developing a current state-
of-the-art understanding of them including both the problems and available solutions along 
with their applicability to the proposed research. It also provides an overview of some of the 
current provided authentication technologies by service providers and devices manufacturers 
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in order to explore whether they solve some issues related to the research area. Furthermore, 
a number of featured authentication frameworks is discussed in terms of the benefits they 
offer as well as their shortcomings. 
Chapter three reviews biometric authentication from a number of perspectives, including its 
system components, requirements, techniques, performance measures and standards, with a 
view of examining its potential to be incorporated in the research proposal. This is followed 
by an intensive literature survey of the existing research on continuous and transparent 
authentication focussing on those employed multibiometrics. 
Chapter four presents the results of a user survey conducted in order to address aspects of the 
problem that the literature has not covered, aiming at exploring their technology usage and 
security practices, and at investigating their perceptions and satisfaction of associated current 
and alternative authentication approaches alongside their usability. Furthermore, it sought to 
analyse users’ awareness and attitudes towards related privacy issues. 
Chapter five seeks to initially establish an experiment exercise to capture and collect real data 
of a set of biometric techniques and coexisting device’ sensors from a real and live usage 
without any environmental or usage constraints. The collected data is utilised in a series of 
studies aiming to eventually investigate the appropriateness and effectiveness of utilising 
them for such a universal solution with a view to identify the attributes required for a 
successful authentication mechanism. Accordingly, three experimental studies were 
undertaken beginning with a baseline set of experiments to understand the nature of 
transparent biometrics and soft biometric data and determine their potential contribution to 
the system performance. Followed by a replication study to explore whether prior TAS 
models function on real live user data and what their actual performance will be in practice. 
The chapter then concludes by an enhanced model utilising multibiometric fusion and time 
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windowing within a device, aiming at investigating whether employing a fusion mechanism 
that encompasses all available biometric samples at a given time-frame is viable in practice 
and to what degree it improves the performance from the individual unimodal approaches.  
Chapter six builds upon the knowledge of Chapter five to introduce a novel federated 
biometric authentication approach that addresses the main research gap thereby shifting the 
burden of both the authentication processing and management responsibility to a centralised 
Managed Authentication Service Provider (MASP). The Chapter continues to examine the 
argument that it would help towards building a better user profile and thus improving the 
security and convenience of the technique beyond what a single device can do by itself. 
Chapter seven presents the architectural design of the Cloud Aura, accompanied with 
description of its key components, functionalities and operational considerations. The 
architecture is designed in an adaptable, modular and scalable manner in order to be 
interoperable considering the divergent platforms of today’s digital devices. A functional 
prototype is developed and elucidated, incorporating a number of the aforementioned 
architectural features to ensure that the system is viable in practice. 
Chapter eight is the final chapter summarising the conclusions arising from the research and 
highlighting the key contributions, achievements and limitations. It also contains a discussion 
on potential areas for future research.  
A number of appendices are supplemented at the end of this thesis in support of the main 
discussion, including experimental ethical approvals, consent forms, and programming scripts, 
in addition to a number of published papers arising from the research programme. 
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2 User Authentication Approaches 
2.1 Introduction 
Protecting any IT system against unauthorised user activities is usually provided via user 
identification or authentication which enable successful authorisation and subsequently 
accountability – these concepts together are referred to as AAA (Conrad et al., 2012). The 
identity of a user is required by a system to authenticate/verify user’s credentials against an 
authentication database to decide whether he/she is the legitimate claimed individual. For 
instance, a username is a way of claiming an identity and a password is one method for 
providing authentication. Proceeding to a successful verification, authorisation is established 
based on the predefined devices and/or services the verified user is allowed to access on a 
system with specified privileges. Accountability provides the means to attribute activities 
each user performs on a system and keeps track of them – usually through logs. 
Therefore, managing appropriate authentication is arguably the pivotal concept for 
implementing information security within an IT system. Achieving a high level of 
confidentiality, integrity, authorisation, and accountability of an IT system would not be 
possible without carefully considering a sensible, robust and usable authentication approach. 
Authentication can be achieved by utilising one or more of the three fundamental approaches: 
something the user knows (including passwords, PINs, graphical passwords, and cognitive 
questions), something the user has (including SIMs, smart cards, certificates, mobile phones, 
and hardware/software one-time password (OTP) tokens) and something the user is 
(biometrics) (Wood, 1977). 
The first two authentication approaches have been employed in most security systems 
surrounding today’s digital society. However, the third one has emerged gradually from being 
research and utilised mainly by governments (e.g. in the context of forensics and borders 
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control), to becoming more available in the public domain (biometrics are now deployed in a 
wide range of applications that can be considered fairly mainstream – passports, mobile 
phones, schools, and police). For better appreciation of various authentication approaches, a 
thorough overview of their conventional and contemporary uses is required. 
2.2 Conventional Authentication Approaches 
This section describes the common authentication approaches aiming at developing a current 
state-of-the-art understanding of them including both the problems and available solutions 
along with their applicability to the proposed research. 
2.2.1 Secret Knowledge-based Approach 
This approach refers to the process where the user has to remember a secret which is a 
particular sequence of inputs, typically made up of numbers only (PIN); numbers, characters 
and/or symbols (password and passphrase); answer(s) to predefined question(s) (cognitive 
knowledge); or images (graphical password) (Zekri & Furnell, 2006). This secret is set 
initially by the user or generated by the authenticating system. Thus, it is known mutually by 
both the user (brain) and the system (database) and there must be an exact match between 
them to be able to have access.  This means that it is a Boolean authentication process – its 
outcome is either one (totally true secret thus allow access) or zero (totally false secret thus 
deny access). As a result, there is an integral reliance on individuals’ memory and ability to 
recall the secret exactly as and when prompted regardless of its length, sophistication, and 
uniqueness. Furthermore, it does not defend well against repudiation  as the so called secret is 
transferable, guessable and can be watched by others through shoulder surfing (O’Gorman, 
2003). 
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2.2.1.1 Personal Identification Number (PIN), Password and Passphrase 
A PIN is considered the simplest knowledge-based authentication technique. It is available to 
be used within mobile phones: for the mobile handset itself (switch on or unlock) and/or for 
the Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) card (to authenticate with the cellular networks) and 
with cash/credit cards. Typically, a mobile PIN ranges from 4 to 8 digits only. As numbers 
only are relatively easier to recall, they are easier to guess and to steel. Passwords, which can 
be longer and are made of some or all of numbers, letters and symbols, mitigate the 
possibility of being predicted. They are believed to offer effective protection if they are 
established and employed appropriately.  
Despite the fact that passwords are still the most ubiquitous authentication method perhaps 
because of its perceived convenience and inexpensive implementation as they are 
conceptually quite simple to design, manage and use, they are vulnerable to be misused by 
users. PINs/Passwords protections are often compromised through the failure or 
unwillingness of individuals to correctly practice the password policy to protect and 
administer sensitive information (Clarke & Furnell, 2005; Kurkovsky & Syta, 2010). For 
instance, 45% of the former survey respondents never changed their PINs. Worse than that, it 
was also revealed in the latter survey of 330 young people aged 18 to 25 that over 71% of the 
participants do not even use PINs or any other authentication methods to lock their mobile 
phones (though these methods are available to them). Furthermore, a recent survey conducted 
by Crawford and Renaud (2014) showed that 30% of the participants do not enable any 
security measure on their mobile devices although sensitive information resides on them. 
Whilst some practice improvements are notable, the small population (30 participants) of this 
survey is an issue but, even so, when factoring this percentage to the worldwide mobile users 
it would be significant. 
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More recently, many digital services create password policies and guidelines to encourage 
good practice, which are adopted by many organisations to be utilised by their employees. 
Some of these policies are difficult to ensure they are being followed and hence they can be 
avoided. For instance, it is possible to violate these policies by using dictionary words, using 
them on multiple systems, writing them down and not or rarely changing them. For example, 
61% of 1200 surveyed respondents reuse the same password on multiple websites, besides 
44% of them change their passwords merely once a year or less (CSID, 2012). Others are 
enforceable, such as the length of password, complexity and its lifetime. Accordingly, when 
users are faced with the need to memorise multiple passwords and change them periodically, 
they tend to forget them, write them down, and select easily guessed ones (O’Gorman, 2003). 
Therefore, the problem is exacerbated as they would become more susceptible to be stolen. 
Moreover, additional administrative costs would be posed by frequent passwords resetting 
(O’Gorman, 2003). The above-mentioned studies also implied that some people would rather 
setup the same but very sophisticated password on multiple accounts; however, this 
exasperates the issue if one of these accounts is compromised, all others may follow, as the 
intruder would be able to reuse the same cracked password to login to them. 
Passphrases come as an alternative endeavour to balance the trade-off between the simplicity 
of remembering a secret by the genuine user and the difficulty of predicting it by intruders. 
Passphrases are a sequence of words built to be used as a credential secret. They are usually 
without spaces but possibly with digits replacing letters or words; for example, “Going for a 
long journey” is transformed to “Going4al0n9journey”. It can be noted that they are similar 
to passwords in terms of usage and appearance except that the former are longer normally 
thus more robust. On the other hand, it is argued that passphrases are easier to remember than 
passwords especially if they carry an associated meaning. However, if they consist of 
common words from a language dictionary, they would be vulnerable to be broken with less 
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effort. In addition, common substitutes, such as “4=for” and “0=o”, render it less secure and 
more confusing to recall. 
Brute-force attack tools (attempting every possible combination automatically), such as 
Brutus and OphCrack, are notorious against most of knowledge-based authentication 
techniques (Shankdhar, 2014). Some countermeasures have been proposed against them and 
to reduce the likelihood of a system or device being abused by imposters during the usage 
session and before it ends. For instance, the account would be temporary blocked or further 
credentials would be requested after three failed access attempts or the user would be 
required to re-authenticate again after specific or lapse time dependent upon the system 
settings or the user’s preference. Even though that this seems to move the PINs, passwords 
and passphrases from being a mere point-of-entry technique, it most probably hinders the 
user due to its constant intrusiveness.  
2.2.1.2 Cognitive Knowledge Question 
Cognitive knowledge which comes in a form of question(s) seeks to alleviate the load of 
users memorising desperate passwords thereby deploying associative question(s) (Clarke, 
2011). These cognitive questions are typically about personal information and can be in two 
forms – factual (e.g. first school, mother’s maiden name, and city of birth) and subjective (e.g. 
favourite colour, food, and teacher). The former are potentially easier to establish than the 
latter. Therefore, it is evident that this technique lacks one of the main characteristics of 
secret knowledge-based authentication approach, i.e. secrecy. By predicting or conducting 
online search or social engineering, it is possible to have the correct answer(s) – the higher 
the possibility of an answer to deduce or associate, the higher it is vulnerable to crack.  
So, it is apparent that this approach cannot be dependable as a standalone authentication 
approach. This could be overcome by requiring a user to answer a group of cognitive 
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knowledge questions or alternatively utilising it besides another authentication approach (as 
explained in 2.2.4). Whilst this solution probably enhances security by adding another layer, 
it potentially increases the burden on the user thereby lengthening the time of authentication 
and requiring them to recall and provide multiple secrets (i.e. the password and the answers 
of the cognitive questions). However, this approach offers opportunities of supporting the 
security level of other than secret-knowledge ones, such as one-time password (OTP) tokens. 
Furthermore, it can be used as a remedial approach for resetting the password when users, for 
instance, forget their password or are locked-out due to exceeding the maximum failed login 
attempts. 
2.2.1.3 Pattern and Graphical Password 
Solutions have been suggested to mitigate the downsides of PIN, password and passphrase, 
some of which solely concern about guidelines promoting increasing the entropy of 
passwords. However, human inability to memorise and remember multiple complex 
passwords is not addressed by them. It has been proven that the human brain is more capable 
to store and remember pictorial information than textual (Nelson et al., 1976). As a result, 
pattern password authentication has emerged, with which a user is required to recognise and 
sequentially draw a pre-set outline on nine (three by three) dots grid that appear on a screen. 
Therefore, it is argued that it will be much more convenient to the user to recognise a pattern 
than an alphanumeric password. In addition, Weiss and Luca (2008) showed and argued that 
repeated entry of pictorial password would be with “lower cognitive load and higher 
memorability” to the user. Mobile devices with touch screens make it reasonably plausible to 
utilise pattern password, which is used in Android devices, to improve the memorability of 
the secret. 
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However, in the current functioning pattern passwords, users are able only to stroke and drag 
(draw a direct line between) two adjacent dots, which in turn limit the number of 
permutations. As a result, the typical application of it is more vulnerable to brute-force 
attacks. Some attempts have been conducted to overcome this shortcoming. For instance, De 
Luca et al. (2012) extend this typical pattern password to allow skipping dots (as 
demonstrated in Figure ‎2-1), thus enhancing its resilience to brute-force attacks by allowing 
more combinations. Nevertheless, its accuracy is quite low (77%) with a 19% false rejection 
rate and 21% false acceptance rate. Furthermore, besides the fact that this approach is still 
secret-knowledge based and hence inherits most of its drawbacks, such as shoulder surfing, it 
is susceptible to a so-called smudge attacks when a secret pattern can be simply determined 
on a greasy screen (Aviv et al., 2010). 
 
Figure ‎2-1: Pattern with the Possibility of Points to be Skipped (De Luca et al., 2012) 
To obtain the most from the advantages of people’s ability to remember graphical over 
alphanumeric secrets, a number of approaches have been proposed. For example, with click-
based graphical authentication, there is a generic image where the user is required to click on 
pre-specified obscured points (Wiedenbeck et al., 2005). Albeit evaluations have 
demonstrated its usability improvement in relation to memorability, it is relatively difficult to 
click precisely on a point, especially if the point space is small and while using finger tips on 
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touch screens. This leads to increase authentication failures that might frustrate the user. 
Moreover, poor selection of background images that have likely selectable points yields to 
being easily predicted, for instance a study by Oorschot and Thorpe (2011) found an average 
of 7–10% of user passpoints (click-based) passwords within 3 guesses only.  
Further to the work on click-based concept, proposals about choice-based or PassImages 
graphical authentication have risen (Charrau et al., 2005; English & Poet, 2011). There are a 
set of images on sequential grids; the secret is among them in a form of a series of images 
that should be pressed or clicked on a specific order, one at each grid. To overcome shoulder 
surfing attacks, the distribution of images on each grid should be randomised. Likewise, 
Passfaces (2007) product capitalises on the psychological theory that human’s brains 
recognise and recall faces better than any other picture or object (Ellis et al., 1979). Users are 
able to use familiar personal photos that are stored on the ones PC or on the web to form a 
passfaces, with which the possibility of forgetting them is very rare. In the login process, the 
user is encountered by a 3 by 3 grid that contains one of the pre-set photos among 8 others. 
Similar to the other graphical password methods, there are three consecutive grids to 
identifying all three faces. The time taken to pass all the steps of graphical authentication 
could be an issue of inconvenience. Additionally, poor selection of photos makes them 
susceptible to be known by imposters. Moreover, given that it is a secret-knowledge 
approach, it can be shared and left not changed. 
2.2.2 Token-based Approach 
To overcome some of the abovementioned downsides of secret knowledge-based approach, 
tokens have been developed. Generally, the token-based authentication approach has various 
applications ranging from physical to logical accesses to systems and services. Based on the 
external appearance and the need for additional devices, they can be categorised into two 
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types: hardware tokens and software tokens (Aloul et al., 2009). With the former type, a 
separate physical device is produced and provided, usually, by the service provider, such as 
bank smartcard and HSBC Secure Key OTP token (HSBC Bank plc, 2014). On the other 
hand, with the latter type, there is a utilisation of a user’s existing device as is, such as when 
sending OTP via SMS to the user’s registered mobile phone, or there is a need to install a 
software (an application) on the user’s smartphone or PC (Aloul et al., 2009), such as Google 
authenticator (Google, 2014). 
A typical authentication token either stores static but complex passwords or generates a one-
time password (OTP) for each session (Furnell et al., 2008). The user is required to enter the 
generated password on the system or service they are authenticating to or it is synchronised 
directly. From one prospective, they have some advantages over the secret knowledge-based 
methods in that they are capable of storing, recalling and generating multiple and 
sophisticated passwords, thus lifting this burden from the human’s brain. However, the 
reliance on the individual is still existent as it is assumed that the token is in the possession of 
the legitimate user – they merely verify the presence of the token not the authorised user. 
Tokens provide compromise detection, for example if three failed attempts threshold is 
exceeded, as well as countermeasure against denial-of-service attacks (O’Gorman, 2003), 
albeit they are not fail-safe – the breach of RSA SecureID tokens in 2011 evidences this 
(BBC, 2011). Therefore, it is evident that this approach cannot stand by itself to be effective 
at inhibiting masquerade attacks. As a result, typically, it is employed with at least another 
authentication factor to form an approach called multi-factor authentication which is 
elaborated in the 2.2.4 sub-section. Having said this, in recent tokens, a PIN is prompted to 
validate the user for a subsequent legitimate use of the token; however, the token can be lent, 
lost or stolen and the PIN can be shared. 
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It is apparent that the cost of issuing, maintaining and recovering them is higher. Simply 
issuing (or reissuing if lost or stolen) SIM, smart cards or hardware tokens is adding an 
additional cost over passwords. This is worsened if specialised devices are required, such as 
card readers. For example, if a bank plans to employ hardware tokens to access its online 
banking, there is a need to purchase tokens/token readers for all its customers, implement and 
maintain them, along with providing technical support and potential replacement in case they 
are lost or malfunctioned. Moreover, time synchronisation between the token and system 
might be difficult with those time-synchronous tokens (Furnell et al., 2008) especially in out 
of coverage areas. Furthermore, users’ convenience is an issue, in particular when users need 
to carry a variety of tokens for different accounts and services from different providers which 
make it cumbersome and probably impractical.  
2.2.3 Biometrics 
In seeking a more reliable and robust authentication approach, attention has turned to 
biometrics. Biometrics-based authentication is commonly acknowledged as a reliable solution 
that provides enhanced authentication over the secret knowledge-based and token-based 
approaches. Unlike the previous approaches, biometrics enables both identification and 
verification processes (Furnell & Clarke, 2005; Woodward et al., 2003). Regardless of 
whether the user has claimed an identity initially or not, the high level of uniqueness 
biometrics offers facilitates the process (Vallabhu & Satyanarayana, 2012). It also removes 
the reliance upon the individual to either memorise and recall complex and various passwords 
or carry and secure tokens. However, whilst the resulting decision of other approaches is (at 
least in theory) with complete accuracy (i.e. a Boolean decision), biometrics results in a 
confidence measure, with a pre-determined threshold deciding on whether the confidence is 
sufficient to accept or reject access. Thus, there is a margin for this decision being wrong; 
either by allowing access to an imposter or denying access of authorised user. Accordingly, 
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the performance of a typical biometric technique is measured based on its error rates, such as 
False Acceptance Rate (FAR), False Rejection Rate (FRR) and Equal Error Rate (EER) (Jain 
et al., 2002; Nanavati et al., 2002). 
Biometrics is dependent upon measurable and distinctive characteristics of an individual. 
They can be categorised based upon their underlying characteristics into: physiological and 
behavioural approaches (Jain et al., 2008; Nanavati et al., 2002). Physiological biometrics are 
those based upon a unique physical aspect of the body, such as a fingerprint, face, or iris, 
whereas behavioural biometrics utilises the distinctive way in which humans behave, such as 
voice, keystroke and signature, to identify and/or verify a user. Both categories are believed 
to uniquely (with a varying level of accuracy) identify individuals, be non-transferable to 
others, unforgettable, cannot be easily lent or stolen, and difficult to reproduce, change or 
hide (Saevanee et al., 2012). As such, they offer a strong defence against repudiation 
(Schouten & Jacobs, 2009). However, biometric systems error rates and cost, together with 
usability have been hindering their widespread adoption (Clarke & Furnell, 2005); 
notwithstanding, recent years have shown that this has been alleviated by significant 
enhancement in biometric systems capabilities (FBI, 2014; Goode Intelligence, 2011). 
Nevertheless, stable uni-biometrics can be forged albeit some with difficulty (O’Gorman, 
2003). For instance, traditional facial recognition can be fooled by a photo of the authorised 
person and voice recognition can be faked by imitation or voice recording. Therefore, they 
can be used in combination with a token that can store the user’s identity or a password (as 
elucidated in the following sub-section) or additional data is required to determine whether a 
sample is alive. Liveness detection have been suggested and implemented to determine 
whether the provided biometrics sample is from a living legitimate user utilising some 
biological indicators, such as blood flow and blinking for iris scan, and temperature and pulse 
for fingerprint systems (Clarke, 2011; Furnell et al., 2008; NSTC, 2011). Whilst these metrics 
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have added a level of protection, some of them suffer from their own weaknesses and hence 
are forgeable. For instance, an impersonator can hold a photo of an authorised person with 
two eye holes, stand behind it and blink (or even hold a video of him/her blinking) in front of 
a facial recognition system (Moren, 2015). However, devising a biometric system deploying 
a set of countermeasures would overcome the downsides and thus making it robust and 
difficult to compromise. Alternatively, multibiometrics would offer a more resilient 
authentication solution (and is discussed in section 3.6). 
2.2.4 Multi-Factor and Multi-Layer Authentication  
To improve and augment the level of protection, two or more authentication techniques can 
be employed in combination. It has, even, been recommended by the European Central Bank 
(2013) that financial service providers should deploy “strong authentication” in all their 
online transactions. It can comprise multiple techniques from the same authentication 
approach (multi-layer authentication), such as password and cognitive questions, or from 
different authentication approaches (multi-factor authentication), such as PIN and smart card, 
password and facial recognition, or fingerprint and OTP generator token. This can then be 
reinforced by elements such as predefined user location which can be based on either the 
mobile cellular network (i.e. cell ID), the global positioning system (GPS) (i.e. longitude, 
latitude) (Conrad et al., 2012), or/and the IP address.  
The multi-layer method lacks adherence to regulations of some sensitive sectors, such as 
banks where it is not compatible with the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council 
regulations that emphasised clearly that these factors are required to be from two or more of 
the authentication categories (Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, 2005). 
Therefore, it can be deduced that multi-factor authentication is considered stronger than 
multi-layer one – that is perhaps why the banking sector has utilised multi-factor 
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authentication in one way or another, such as the bank card and PIN or password and OTP 
token for online banking. On the other hand, although some recent smartphones are equipped 
with a built-in facial recognition or fingerprint sensor, they operate separately as an 
alternative single authentication method not multi-factor, i.e. the user has the option either to 
enable PIN or the fingerprint not both of them together. Hence, to the author’s best 
knowledge no multi-factor authentication method has been utilised to access mobile phones 
thus far. 
Nevertheless, while the aforementioned approaches increase the level of security, they add a 
further burden, from the perspective of the user, and remain at the point-of-entry. Re-
authenticating the user periodically is not viable because of its intrusiveness. Furthermore, 
they increase the cost of provisioning, managing and implementing various authentication 
methods.  
2.3 An Overview of Current Use of Authentication Technologies 
It can be perceived that the integral aim of any IT authentication system is to safeguard 
resources against any illegitimate access. Therefore, service providers as well as device 
manufacturers require or offer a form of authentication technologies to protect them from any 
unauthorised access. Authentication technologies vary perhaps dependent on the data 
sensitivity involved and the users requirements, and each has its own benefits and weaknesses. 
This section investigates some of the available provided authentication mechanisms, with the 
aim of identifying their capabilities for accomplishing the aim of this research. 
A number of service providers and devices manufacturers offer a variety of authentication 
technologies seeking to fill the gap between high protection and usability. Thus, it is useful to 
provide an overview of some of these attempts with the current authentication technologies 
employed with/by a sample of leading service/device providers; namely:  
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 HSBC (HSBC Bank plc, 2014),  
 NatWest (NatWest, 2014),  
 Lloyds (Lloyds Bank, 2014),  
 SAMBA (Saudi American Bank) (Samba Financial Group, 2014),  
 Windows 8.1 Laptop/PC (Microsoft, 2014; White, 2013),  
 Android (Samsung Galaxy S5) (O’Boyle, 2014; Samsung, 2014),  
 iPhone 5S (Apple, 2014; Mogull, 2013) and  
 Google Authenticator (Google, 2014).  
This set was selected because it is believed that they represent a wide range of services and 
providers that offer a variety of advanced authentication methods. Moreover, due to the fact 
that banks hold highly sensitive financial data, they are expected to strive to deploy the most 
advanced robust identity verification procedures. Other less critical and/or less common 
service providers and services are deemed not to utilise such resilient protection tools. Thus, 
half of the selected list is banks in addition to the most dominant operating systems (IDC, 
2016). Google Authenticator is also included for the sake of diversity and inclusion as it has a 
different approach than the remaining listed technologies and it works with many leading 
websites, such as Amazon Web Services, Dropbox, and Facebook (Macworld, 2014). 
Table ‎2-1 reveals an overview of these authentication technologies in order to better 
appreciate whether they have solved and mitigated the issues of traditional authentication 
flaws by enhancing security as well as improving the usability of authentication.  
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 Secret-based Token-based Biometrics-based Point-of-entry Re-Authentication 
HSBC 




 Separate Hardware OTP -   
(New OTP) 
 New payee 
 Transfer money 
NatWest 
 User ID 
 PIN 
 Password 
 Separate Hardware OTP 
(Card-Reader) 
 Digital banking card 
-   
(New OTP) 
 New payee 
 New standing order 
 Change password 
 Change phone 
Lloyds 




- -   
(New OTP with  
Automated call to  
registered mobile) 
 New payee 




 User ID 
 Password 
 Separate Hardware OTP 
OR 
 Mobile (SMS) OTP 
-   
(New OTP) OR 
(ATM login) 
 New payee 
 Transfer money 
Windows 8.1  

















-  Fingerprint   
 Access iTunes 
 New purchase 
Google  
Authenticator 
 User ID 
 Password 
 Mobile OTP -   - 
Table ‎2-1: An Overview of Some of Current Authentication Technologies 
Accessing all of the services mentioned in Table ‎2-1 above requires a form of secret-based 
information, including user ID, PIN, password, pattern, and/or cognitive question(s) all of 
which are needed to be memorised and recalled by users. All of these services except Lloyds 
bank augment their authentication process by offering the option of employing two-factor 
authentication or imposing it.  To be able to unlock an Android (Galaxy S5) or iPhone (5S) 
device, a user selects to provide either a secret (i.e. PIN or password (for both), pattern (for 
Android)) or biometrics (i.e. face/fingerprint, or fingerprint, respectively).  
On the other hand, accessing HSBC and SAMBA online banking systems must happen by 
entering secret information (i.e. user ID and cognitive question or password), in addition to 
having a separate hardware token for either banks, or using the user’s mobile as token that 
generates One Time Password (OTP) or via SMS, respectively. However, two of the services 
employ two-layer authentication for the initial access: NatWest and Lloyds banks. The 
Chapter ‎2 – User Authentication Approaches 
 
25 | P a g e  
 
former asks only for user ID and password whereas the latter adds them with a cognitive 
question to login. Nevertheless, the user will be prompted to provide an additional credential, 
OTP, when a critical service is requested, such as creating new payee. To do so, NatWest 
customers ought to have digital banking card with a separate PIN number to use with their 
Card-Reader to generate the OTP while Lloyds customers will see a OTP on screen and they 
will receive an automated phone call to their pre-registered mobile for confirmation. 
These techniques might be perceived as a sensible trade-off between security and 
convenience. However, they arguably on one hand merely augment security but on the other 
hand degrade user friendliness, or the vice versa. For example, with HSBC, NatWest and 
SAMBA, the user must carry a separate token which only proves its presence not the 
legitimacy of the user. Additionally, logging in Lloyds online banking requires the user to 
recall 3 distinct secrets. Given the difficult users’ experience with remembering secrets and 
tokens, these approaches merely serve to increase this burden. 
The Google Authenticator app can offer an alternative solution as it is available in different 
platforms including iOS, Android and Blackberry and is easier to use than separate tokens as 
smartphones are carried around by users most of the time. Conversely, the backup secrets 
(that can be used if there is a difficulty in receiving the automatically generated code) can be 
stored in the device in an unencrypted text file (Google, 2014). Once it is lost or stolen, the 
service is susceptible to be accessed by the unauthorised holder of the device. 
On the other hand, there are some encouraging signs and endeavours regarding classifying 
the services according to their level of sensitiveness when prompting re-authentication to 
access those ranked higher, such as transferring money to other accounts, adding a new payee 
and purchasing from iTunes. Despite their indication to reflect the reality of fluctuating 
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confidence on the user and services varying risk levels, should this procedure occur very 
often, the user is likely to get frustrated. 
A few other attempts to utilise biometrics to the mainstream appear with some service 
providers and handsets, such as HSBC, Galaxy S7 and iPhone 7S. For example, HSBC has 
declared that they will utilise voice and fingerprint biometrics to access their mobile banking 
systems; however, it would only be available on the mobile banking app and only with touch 
ID-enabled Apple devices, which confines its universal application (HSBC News and Media, 
2016). Similarly, Galaxy S7 and iPhone 7S employ the fingerprint scanner on their home 
button not only to unlock the device but also to purchase from their stores and to access some 
third party websites and apps, such as PayPal and iTunes (Apple, 2017; Guiding Tech, 2016). 
Nevertheless, offering the option of bypassing the fingerprint for PIN or password, even if 
they are enabled, may render the feature not being used at all or render this process to be 
exploited by attackers where the drawbacks of secret codes remain. 
2.4 Featured Authentication Frameworks 
A number of researchers have upheld the need for more innovative authentication methods 
that aim to balance the trade-off between security and convenience. The following sub-
sections discuss a number of these featured authentication frameworks, namely single sign-
on, federated identity, transparent authentication and authentication aura, in terms of the 
benefits they offer as well as their shortcomings. 
2.4.1 Single Sign-On 
An attempt to increase convenience and reduce the burden (of remembering many passwords 
and of entering the user’s credentials on each resource and application) from the user has 
evolved – single sign-on (SSO). SSO provides the user transparent access to all services that 
they have the privileges to access within an organisation after a single successful login 
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(Furnell, 2005; O’Gorman, 2003; Sandhu, 2004). They, therefore, only need to set and recall 
one password to authenticate to a resource and subsequently attain the permission to access 
other services under the same domain without being prompted to authenticate again. A 
popular example is Google with which the account holder is required to enter their credentials 
once to be able to use its services, such as Gmail, Google drive and Google calendar, during 
the same session.  
Besides the usability benefits from the users’ perspectives, SSO is perceived to be beneficial 
for organisations. It induces a level of cost effectiveness thereby reducing the load for 
administrating numerous credentials to access various services. Rather, there is a need to 
administer one single credential for every user regardless of the number of services they are 
authorised to access. Identity Access Management (IAM) systems leverage this process 
(within one domain) which enables user-centric authentication. However, it should not be 
merely deployed to replace all logins with a single password; otherwise, this would be at the 
expense of protection. If this single login is cracked, it would then allow the intruder access 
to all participated services. Therefore, some standard protocols have been developed to secure 
the credentials exchanging between services, such as Security Assertion Markup Language 
(SAML) (Sandhu, 2004). 
Securing the authentication process in the first place is still crucial which, if it is done by 
utilising the aforementioned approaches, would yield to keeping their downsides, such as the 
need for a complex and lengthy unrepeated password as well as the burden of memorising 
and recalling it. Additionally, SSO assumes that the authorised person who has been granted 
access initially is the one continues accessing the service throughout the usage session; which 
is not always the case. Moreover, typical users have other systems that are under other 
autonomous domains and organisations. As a consequence, the encumbrance of cognitive 
memory load and carrying tokens may persist. 
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2.4.2 Federated Identity 
To bridge the gap between separate domains and thus alleviate the burden on users, federated 
identity management has risen thereby extending the SSO concept from being confined to a 
sole domain. It aims at granting access for users of one organisation to resources offered by 
other organisations seamlessly. To achieve this, an inter-organisational trust relationship 
should be established (Clarke, 2011; Stihler et al., 2012).  
Thus, there is a need to ensure the security of these cross-domains credentials whilst they are 
being communicated, which in turn leads to the development and deployment of standards, 
such as OpenID, WS-Federation, and Shibboleth (CSA, 2012; Stihler et al., 2012). Whilst 
some of these standards, in one way or another, act as third party federated IAM providers, 
whereby an identity provider or manager coordinates the authentication process among the 
member parties of the federation which are the services providers (Madsen et al., 2005), 
users’ credentials and some other information might be passed from one service provider to 
another. For instance, holders of Facebook account are able to use the credentials to access 
Yahoo services although they are distinct organisations. Hence, Facebook might send some 
basic information about the user, such as name, email, mobile number and photo. 
Accordingly, user privacy concerns must be overcome so that the user should have the 
discretion to decide which of their data can be shared, with whom and when. 
Equally important, it is argued that federated identity is fragile to breach proliferation if one 
of the associated services providers’ credentials hacked (Madsen et al., 2005); however, they 
claimed that some of the mentioned standards offer mechanism to contain such a breach by 
de-federation. Nevertheless, the time scale until such containment occurs is critical and 
dependent on whether it has been detected. As a result, an efficient federated IAM system 
must provide an effective auditing feature which poses issues on how to manage it on 
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heterogeneous domains. In addition, whereas a federated IAM approach offers promising 
usability advantages, still replacing all passwords with a single password is against good 
security practice of differing passwords for each system. Moreover, it is still performed at the 
point-of-entry leaving the system at risk of misuse afterwards.  Furthermore, it focusses upon 
system/service level authentication – rather than actually looking at what the user is doing. 
2.4.3 Transparent Authentication 
Point-of-entry authentication, which solely and initially establishes identification of the user 
at the beginning of the session but not throughout, has a number of flaws. The vulnerability 
increases when the identity of the user has been verified at login and the device is left on for 
long periods of time. For instance, 85% of mobile phone users who responded to Clarke and 
Furnell (2005) kept their mobiles on for more than 10 hours a day. This can lead to a high-
risk environment in which an imposter targets the device following a legitimate login. If this 
occurs and the device is kept on and active, free and open misuse can be conducted for a 
substantial period of time. It was even pointed out in the original specifications for security in 
third generation (3G) networks that “It shall be possible for service providers to authenticate 
users at the start of, and during, service delivery” (3GPP, 2001) – the emphasis here is on 
authenticating users during service delivery.  
Therefore, it is imperative to increase the level of authentication beyond the standard point-
of-entry technique. The potential aim is to use more advanced techniques that would enable 
periodic or continuous re-verification of the user without compromising the convenience. All 
authentication techniques are considered intrusive as they require the explicit interaction of 
the user. However, biometrics can also be deployed in a more usable fashion that allows the 
samples to be collected spontaneously. They cannot easily be compromised, can be deployed 
in a non-intrusive manner and thus eliminate the potential threat posed by social engineering. 
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Thus, the use of transparent authentication using biometrics would enhance both the 
requirement for a robust authentication mechanism and the user’s need to eliminate any 
inconvenience during the authentication process. For this reason, Clarke and Furnell (2007) 
proposed transparent/non-intrusive continuous authentication using behavioural biometric 
techniques. This approach has the effect of moving away from a Boolean authentication 
result to a more meaningful and appropriate confidence measure. As illustrated in Figure ‎2-2, 
there is a disconnect in current authentication schemes that rather assume authenticity 
wherever an access control decision is made. However, through more closely aligning the 
authentication process with the access control decision, a more reliable and secure decision is 
made (as illustrated in Figure ‎2-3). Furthermore, the approach also takes into consideration 
that all authentication approaches are not equal and they have varying levels of authentication 
performance. 
 
Figure ‎2-2: A Model of Traditional Authentication Security (Clarke, 2011) 
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Figure ‎2-3: A Model of Continuous Authentication Confidence (Clarke, 2011) 
Whilst transparent authentication approach can be appreciated as a solution to effectively 
remove the reliance upon the human aspects to ensure a robust and usable authentication, its 
applicability and universality have to be considered as it is confined to a single device. With 
every device requiring biometric setup and enrolment, user configuration and management, 
risk assessment and continual refinement. 
2.4.4 Authentication Aura 
The number of individuals having several digital devices to carry and/or use concurrently has 
increased. For example, it is common place for people to have mobile phone (in many cases 
more than one), tablet, laptop, PC, and game console. It is likely that similar authentication 
techniques are applied across distinct devices possessed by the same individual. The repeated 
intrusive authentication process for each device is likely to be annoying and time consuming. 
To counteract this burden, communicating the identity confidence between devices would be 
useful. In the one hand, collective identity knowledge controlled by the array of secured 
devices operated by an individual at any given time offers an opportunity to enhance security 
and usability. Accordingly, this has led to the proposal of deploying and sharing the 
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credentials of the individual’s devices authentication confidence in a distributed and 
cooperative fashion, enabling a near field adaptive security envelope to be established and 
maintained around the individual – the user’s Authentication Aura (Hocking et al., 2011). 
Authentication Aura enables the individual and distinct devices to communicate their own 
authentication status and confidence, and hence to establish an accumulative level of 
confidence.  
Distinct devices are likely to employ different methods of authentication as shown 
conceptually in Figure ‎2-4.  For instance, a laptop has an inbuilt fingerprint scanner, a smart 
phone has a PIN number, voice recognition and an inbuilt front camera, and a PDA has 
handwriting recognition. If a user has initially logged-in to a device by any authentication 
technique, the established combined confidence can be utilised to provide specific access to 
other trusted devices within a close proximity via a near field communication (NFC) channel. 
Consequently, the potential case is to acquire consolidating multibiometrics samples, which 
in turn mitigates some of the limitations of uni-modal biometrics by enhancing recognition 
accuracy, security, and usability (Ross et al., 2006). Confidence adaptation and degradation is 
applied over the time of missing or error acquired credentials and based on the un/known 
locales. Locking the system and asking for re-authentication would be necessary to re-
determine the user’s credentials when an inappropriate level of confidence has been reached. 
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Figure ‎2-4: The Potential Intra-Device Relationship and Authentication Techniques (Hocking et al., 2013) 
The approach further improves the level of security being afforded whilst reducing the 
burden of users’ inconvenience. However, the approach to authentication is still disparate, 
with individual authentication approaches being supported on a number of technologies. 
Furthermore, the effective performance being achieved is highly correlated to the biometric 
software – a cheap facial recognition will experience a significantly different level of 
recognition accuracy to an expensive military-grade system. It is therefore not appropriate to 
merely have devices that support biometric capturing but also recognition capabilities with a 
good level of performance. Establishing trust in such an environment is complicated further. 
It also requires each device to support the Aura-framework and thus be capable of supporting 
a level of biometric processing, configuration and management. 
2.5 Conclusions 
Verifying the authenticity of a user to use a digital device or service has become crucial. 
Individuals, businesses and governments undertake an ever-growing range of activities online 
and via mobile devices and unfortunately these activities, services and information are the 
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targets of cybercrimes. Authentication is at the vanguard of ensuring only the authorised user 
is given access; however, it has historically suffered from a range of issues related to the 
security and usability of the approaches. Further to this, they are still mostly functioning at 
the point-of-entry and those performing sort of re-authentication executing it in an intrusive 
manner. 
Research has suggested novel approaches to authentication such as transparent authentication 
and cooperative and distributed authentication. However, these technologies either merely 
focus upon individual platforms rather than providing a universal and federated 
authentication approach that can be used across technologies and services, or require each 
participating device to be capable of supporting a level of biometric processing, configuration 
and management in order to achieve a good level of performance. 
In order to provide the users' digital devices with adequate protection and convenience, 
innovative robust authentication mechanisms have to be utilised in a universal level, so they 
operate in a transparent, continuous and user-friendly fashion. Biometrics can be deployed in 
a usable manner that enables non-intrusive samples capturing. It is non-transferable to others, 
unforgettable, cannot be easily lent or compromised, and thus eliminate the potential threat 
posed by social engineering. Therefore, the use of transparent authentication using biometrics 
would enhance both the requirement for a robust authentication mechanism and the user’s 
need to eliminate any inconvenience during the authentication process. However, devising a 
federated biometric authentication model requires detailed insight about main biometrics 
related aspects in order to take them into consideration. 
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3 Biometric Authentication 
3.1 Introduction  
Having established the need for a novel, secure, convenient and universal authentication 
system that can be accomplished seamlessly in a location, technology and service 
independent fashion, biometrics is envisaged to be the authentication approach that can be 
deployed to serve such a system. Thus, this chapter presents and discusses the use of 
biometric authentication as a potential crucial cornerstone to solving the research problem 
including highlighting its applicability and capability to be implemented in a transparent 
manner. It begins by describing the generic biometric processes and operational modes as 
well as the main components. An overview of the requirements of the biometric system and 
the factors that affect its performance is outlined. Additionally, an analysis of biometric 
techniques is presented, highlighting the features of the deployment of multibiometrics and 
their standards, concluding by a review of some key relevant frameworks and their specific 
applicability within TAS. 
Throughout history, people have been using human traits (biometrics) to identify others. For 
instance, it is possible to identify an acquaintance by recognising their known faces, voices 
and/or odour. Their high level of uniqueness to a distinct person has been adopted for 
identifying and authenticating users accessing environments that require high security, such 
as governments, borders and military. After over 50 years of comprehensive research and 
development of biometric authentication mechanisms, they further have evolved in the last 10 
years to be deployed in numerous daily mainstream applications and devices, ranging from 
smartphones, laptops, keyboards, mice to ATMs and time and attendance. Accordingly, the 
biometrics market is predicted to grow over 304% between 2016 and 2022 to exceed $32.7 
billion (Markets and Markets, 2016). Furthermore, it is anticipated that the market of 
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smartphone biometrics products and services, in particular, would grow from one billion in 
2016 to surpass two billion by 2022 (Acuity Market Intelligence, 2017). 
Nanavati et al. (2002) and Woodward et al. (2003) introduces compatible definitions of 
biometric system that can be consolidated as an automated identification or verification of an 
individual using measureable distinct behavioural or physiological traits. It is apparent from 
the definition that automation of the process involved is fundamental. Generally, any 
biometric system comprises of two processes to perform (Figure ‎3-1). The first stage is 
enrolment, during which a discriminative sample (or perhaps a number of samples dependent 
on the technique used) of an individual’s trait is collected, classified and then stored as a 
template. It is imperative that this process is conducted with a high degree of quality, 
accuracy and assurance that the template created is of a genuine user (Clarke, 2011; Jain et 
al., 2008). During the second process – authentication, the user provides biometrics 
sample(s), which are then classified (and possibly fused with other biometrics) and 
subsequently compared with the stored template resulting on a value of the degree of 
matching between them (Jain et al., 2008). Based on this resultant value and the 
predetermined threshold (i.e. the tolerable degree of dissimilarity), a decision is made 
whether to grant access or not. Determining this threshold is pivotal due to its effect on both 
usability and security; if it is set too low, it would increase security but at the same time 
reduce the usability level as most probably legitimate users would have many access failures 
(i.e. False Rejection Rate (FRR)). In contrast, setting it too high may lead to falsely granting 
access to illegitimate users (i.e. False Acceptance Rate (FAR)). These two errors are 
explained in section ‎3.4. Both enrolment and authentication processes and their underlying 
phases should be conducted in an automated or semi-automated (i.e. when the user 
establishes the enrolment intrusively) manner to comply with the aforementioned definition 
of biometric system. 
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Figure ‎3-1: The Two Processes of a Generic Biometric Authentication System (Saevanee, 2014) 
It is also noteworthy to highlight that there are two operational modes of biometric systems: 
verification and identification (Furnell & Clarke, 2005; Jain et al., 2008; Nanavati et al., 
2002; Woodward et al., 2003).  
 Verification: seeks to verify that a claimed identity is matched with that on the 
database. 
 Identification: seeks to determine whether the identity exists on the database (open-
set identification), or who the person is assuming they already exist on the database 
(closed-set identification). 
During verification mode, the matching process is between sample(s) of claimed person and 
the stored template of that person; thus, it is a one-to-one comparison. In contrast, the 
comparison is one-to-many in identification mode; anonymous sample(s) is compared with 
every stored template to decide whether there is a match. This means that there is a 
possibility that the user’s template does not exist at all in the database. Therefore, the result of 
the former mode confirms that claimed identity is true or false whereas the latter determines 
whether the user is identified or not. 
These two distinct modes are dependent on the application context; if the user has claimed 
having enrolled in the system by presenting an identity, for instance a username or token with 
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a biometrics, the former mode operates, otherwise the latter does so (Vallabhu & 
Satyanarayana, 2012). Moreover, other aspects should be considered when deploying either 
of the two modes – they are different with respects to performance and privacy (Clarke, 2011; 
Nanavati et al., 2002) as well as cost and users’ convenience (Clarke, 2011). Furthermore, the 
time needed for identification is usually longer because it involves more complexity and 
computation. Having said this, it is evident that identification requires higher level of 
system’s accuracy and uniqueness of traits than verification. 
The aforesaid biometric system definition states that it utilises physiological and behavioural 
biometrics. The former category refers to those traits related to people physical appearance, 
such as fingerprint, facial recognition, iris and retina scan, and hand geometry. On the other 
hand, the latter one refers to the way people behave, such as voice and gait recognition, and 
keystroke dynamics. Both categories are linked (with varying accuracy) directly to the user 
alone; with which users cannot deny their responsibility of the access/incidence occurred. 
However, typically, behavioural biometrics are less unique, thus they would not be suitable 
for identification mode that requires a high precision, especially in a large scale application 
(Saevanee et al., 2012). In spite of the effectiveness of biometric systems in guarding against 
theft, forgetting, counterfeit, reproduction, and hiding (O’Gorman, 2003; Schouten & Jacobs, 
2009), they are vulnerable to falling foul in any of these pitfalls if only one modal (trait) is 
deployed (O’Gorman, 2003).  
3.2 Biometrics Requirements 
Selecting a biometric authentication approach to employ is not only dependent upon its level 
of uniqueness and performance, but also upon other requirements, which are important to be 
considered. The appropriateness of the potential biometric authentication technique is 
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determined based on the availability of the following requirements on the associated trait as 
proposed by (Jain et al., 2002): 
 Universality: The utilised trait should be possessed by every individual of users 
population, such as if all users have hand, it would be possible to use hand geometry 
as biometric technique. 
 Uniqueness: The selected trait should have sufficient level of distinctiveness to each 
user proportional to the application environment. For instance, whilst face trait would 
be suitable for accessing a smartphone, accessing military information requires a more 
unique trait such as iris. 
 Permanence: It is imperative for the chosen trait to be constant or less changing over 
time. The more the frequent changing of a trait, the more the need to update the 
biometrics template and hence the cost of maintenance (Clarke, 2011). For example, 
whereas individual retina scan remains invariant, their keystroke behaviour varies due 
to device, mode, and text familiarity. 
 Collectability/Measurability: To decide whether a specific biometrics characteristic 
is suitable for a biometric system, the ease to collect and then measure it digitally is 
critical. Collecting some biometrics is very intrusive – it requires specialised devices 
and/or explicit user interaction, such as retina. Conversely, others can be collected 
easily with normal daily devices and interactions, such as capturing voice samples 
while having a phone call.  
 Performance: The accuracy and scalability of the technologies required to acquire 
the trait’s samples should be considered with their applications and constraints. 
 Acceptability: End-users of an adopted biometrics should be willing to provide their 
traits and utilise the technique, in terms of, for instance, privacy and convenience. 
Otherwise, they would resist or avoid using it.  
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 Circumvention: The degree to which a trait is vulnerable to be forged should be 
taken into account. For instance, iris scan is almost impossible to imitate, unlike 
ordinary facial recognition (which does not support liveness test).  
It can be deduced that a perfect biometrics trait to be deployed in an authentication system 
should meet all the above-mentioned requirements. However, none of them is perfect, but 
depending on the application requirements, a number of them are acceptable to some extent 
(Jain et al., 2008). For instance, even though retina is one of the most unique biometrics, 
permanent and difficult to circumvent, its capturing process requires special equipment and 
user acceptability is an issue due to many reasons such as ease of use and user privacy. On 
the contrary, voice recognition tends to have a high user acceptability and simpler sample 
acquisition; however, its stability and robustness against impersonation are challenges. 
3.3 Components of Biometric System 
In order to achieve biometric authentication, a typical biometric system consists of five 
incorporated components as illustrated in Figure ‎3-2 (Clarke, 2011; NSTC, 2006a):  
 Sample Capturing (Acquisition): The biometrics samples are acquired from a 
genuine user using an applicable capturing device or method. Whereas some 
biometric techniques require specialised sensors, such as hand geometry, others may 
either employ normal affordable separate devices or embedded technologies, such as 
facial recognition using a webcam or mobile front camera.  
 Feature Extraction (Processing): Deploying specific algorithms, the unique 
characteristics of the captured sample(s) are processed aiming at generating a feature 
extraction template. For instance, after a fingerprint sample is captured, a number of 
algorithms are performed to extract its distinctive features, such as the curvature and 
width of ridges, to create the template. 
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 Template Database: It stores the biometric template resulted from the sample feature 
extraction process – perhaps along with other user’s information. This stored template 
is used as a reference in the matching process afterwards. 
 Matching (Classification): When an individual attempts to have access by providing 
current biometrics samples, the features of these samples are extracted and 
subsequently compared to the stored reference template(s) using a matching 
algorithm. Accordingly, a match score is given representing their degree of similarity, 
based upon which the authentication decision is followed. 
 Decision: A comparison between the matching score and the set threshold is 
performed – if the former equals or exceeds the latter, the access is granted; otherwise 
the access is denied or restricted. 
 
Figure ‎3-2: The Components of a Biometric System (Clarke, 2011) 
3.4 Biometrics Performance Metrics Factors 
Having stated that the decision of a biometric authentication process is based on the result of 
comparing the pre-enrolled template of legitimate user with the captured sample(s), achieving 
a precise 100% match is unlikely due to a variety of issues, such as environment noise and 
trait variability (Furnell & Clarke, 2005). This affects the biometrics performance that leads 
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to probability of mislead results which grant access to adversaries or deny access of authentic 
users. These performance metrics are referred to as (FAR) and (FRR), respectively. Jain et al. 
(2002) and Woodward et al. (2003) defined these error rates as follows: 
 FAR (False Acceptance Rate): It measures the rate of biometric technique errors in 
accepting illegitimate individuals.  
 FRR (False Rejection Rate): It measures the rate of biometric technique errors in 
rejecting legitimate individuals. 
 
Figure ‎3-3: Biometrics Performance Metrics Factors (Clarke & Furnell, 2005) 
Based on the pre-set threshold, which controls the tolerable level of each metric, the security 
of biometric systems and the user’s convenience can be determined. As illustrated in 
Figure ‎3-3, these two performance metrics have an inverse relationship. If the threshold is set 
tighter (i.e. requiring a high matching level), it may yield to legitimate users being denied 
access (i.e. FRR), thus increasing the protection thereby minimising the potential of 
unauthorised users obtaining access (i.e. FAR). Consequently, legitimate users might frustrate 
from repeated authentication failure – thus hindering the adoption of such a system. On the 
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contrary, if the threshold is set more relaxed (i.e. requiring a low matching level), it increases 
the likelihood of impersonators being accepted (i.e. FAR). Even though that this tends to 
provide a more convenient authentication process to genuine users by reducing the possibility 
of being rejected (i.e. FRR), it would be at the expense of security. Therefore, a balance 
between system security and user-friendliness should be considered carefully. 
The FAR and FRR are widely accepted as measure factors for biometric systems along with a 
third one named Equal Error Rate (EER) that is also depicted in the same previous figure. 
The EER is the point where FAR curve intersects with FRR curve – i.e. where FAR equals 
FRR – and is used for the comparison between different biometric systems (Clarke & Furnell, 
2005; Jain et al., 2002; Nanavati et al., 2002; Woodward et al., 2003). 
It can be interpreted that the lower EER, the better the overall performance of a biometric 
system. However, the desirable EER would be sought based on users and applications needs 
and capabilities and tolerance slack to both types of errors. For instance, an increased FRR 
could be bearable in accessing financial accounts in exchange for securing them by having a 
reduced FAR. 
On the other hand, in practice, there are other complications users might encounter besides 
the aforementioned error rates. Although they are referred to synonymously in some literature 
such as in (Jain et al., 2008; Woodward et al., 2003), the False Matching Rate (FMR) and 
False Non Matching Rate (FNMR) can be considered subsets of FAR and FRR, respectively 
(Clarke, 2011). The FMR and FNMR measure the performance coming out of the matching 
stage whereas the FAR and FRR measure it at the decision stage. The FAR/FRR metrics are 
more inclusive; in that they also encompass the Failure to Enrol (FTE) and Failure to Capture 
(FTC) rates. 
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 FTE (Failure to Enrol): It shows the rate of unsuccessful biometrics registration 
where individuals are unable to create an initial template (Furnell & Clarke, 2005; 
Jain et al., 2008; Nanavati et al., 2002; Wayman, et al., 2005; Woodward et al., 2003). 
 FTC (Failure to Capture): It is also known as Failure to Acquire (FTA) – indicates 
the rate of biometrics sensor device fails to acquire/capture a biometrics sample and 
locate it on the templates database (Clarke, 2011; Jain et al., 2008; Woodward et al., 
2003). 
The FTE is a consequence of the FTC occurrence but not the opposite as the latter could be at 
a later stage after the initial enrolment. Both errors may be caused by a variety of reasons, 
including but not limited to: missing the main related trait (e.g. missing finger or hand 
completely); poor quality of the biometrics sample that could be attributed to sensor 
deficiency (e.g. those caused by wear and tear); environmental effects (e.g. noise or poor 
lighting); users mistakes (e.g. wrong posture for facial recognition); or inconsistent measured 
pattern (e.g. changing on the way of user’s typing on keyboard).  
Precautious practices might mitigate these errors, such as selecting the most appropriate 
biometric system to the targeted users population where the utilised trait(s) is/are available 
typically as well as consistent; maintaining the sensor periodically; designing the system in a 
way avoiding the impact of surroundings along with a usable interface; and offering an 
efficient and easy method to update templates. 
Given these different performance metrics factors, it is apparent that they, in one way or 
another, affect other biometrics requirements mentioned in the previous section. For instance, 
the FAR provides an indication about the uniqueness of biometrics characteristics (Wayman 
et al., 2005). In addition, quantifying universality can be done by the FTE whereas 
collectability by the FTC (Wayman et al., 2005). Furthermore, all the mentioned metrics (i.e. 
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FAR, FRR, EER, FTE and FTC) contribute to the appraisal of biometric system performance, 
the degree of circumventing the associated trait, and users’ acceptance of employing that 
system. Therefore, envisaging a correlated picture of such a system involving all of these 
metrics gives better understanding of it although it might vary in the real use due to the lack 
of controlled conditions guaranteed during the evaluation process (Clarke, 2011). 
3.5 Biometric Techniques 
As mentioned in the previous section, biometric techniques are categorised into two main 
categories based upon the nature of the deployed discriminative trait: physiological and 
behavioural. Whilst a variety of technologies have been proposed and adopted, those of the 
former category are the most embraced. The Biometrics Institute Industry 2013 Survey 
reveals that the order of which biometrics the respondents are involved in begins with 
fingerprint recognition and then facial recognition, followed by iris recognition, multimodal 
(i.e. the combination of two or more biometric modalities), and voice recognition respectively 
(Biometrics Institute, 2013). Given that voice recognition is the only behavioural biometrics 
of the survey list and it is at its end, it is evident that physiological biometrics are more 
established and hence have the biggest users’ adoption to date.  
This section briefly outlines a number of leading biometric techniques with a view of the 
applicability of utilising them on the research proposal – each has its own pros and cons and 
is more appropriate to and used in specific domains. The list of biometrics provided, 
however, should not be considered comprehensive due to unforeseen suitability of some other 
techniques to the research proposal or due to immaturity of others which are still in the 
infancy stage of being researched and produced.  
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3.5.1 Physiological Biometrics 
Physiological Biometrics methods aim at distinguishing an individual based upon specific 
physical characteristics, such as fingerprint and face, which tend to be invariant, thus 
applicable to be utilised for both identification and verification (NSTC, 2006a). 
3.5.1.1 Fingerprint Recognition 
Fingerprint recognition is the oldest and most prevalent deployed biometric (Biometrics 
Institute, 2013; Jain et al., 2002; Woodward et al., 2003) due to its heritage with forensics 
applications, besides the emerging use in immigration, attendance, and computing/mobile 
systems. These applications encompass both physical and logical access control. This might 
be owing to the fact of extensive research have been conducted and empirically proven that 
fingerprint recognition method has high level of individuality to each finger and thus person, 
matching accuracy, permanence, maturity, and affordable sensors (Jain et al., 2008; Maltoni 
et al., 2009).  
Fingerprint recognition compares ridges, valleys and patterns of an individual fingerprint 
utilising one of the three matching classification approaches: correlation-based, minutiae-
based, and ridge feature-based (Jain et al., 2008; Maltoni et al., 2009). It had been in use 
manually by law enforcement for more than one hundred years (with ink on cards), up until 
the 1960s when it became automated with the Automated Fingerprint Identification System 
(AFIS) (Jain et al., 2002; Maltoni et al., 2009). The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
developed it, in 1999, with respects to response time and capacity as well as including the ten 
fingerprints to be the Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) 
(NSTC, 2006a; Woodward et al., 2003).  
Whilst these applications are used primarily for identification mode by forensics agencies 
where a suspect does not claim or declare an identity, fingerprint recognition has been 
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integrated in other ubiquitous verification based applications where the user claims an 
identity while, for instance, accessing his/her own device, such as laptops (e.g. HP EliteBook 
2570p (HP, 2014)), and smartphones (e.g. Apple iPhone 5S (Apple, 2014; Mogull, 2013) and 
Samsung Galaxy S5 (O’Boyle, 2014; Samsung, 2014)). 
This permeated deployment, notwithstanding; still it suffers from performance and usability 
issues. Fingerprint readers might endure wear and tear effects over time and fingerprints 
themselves might be covered by dirt or have small cuts, for example. This would deteriorate 
the performance by increasing the error rates and accordingly increase users’ inconvenience. 
On the other hand, spoofing attacks (e.g. silicon replicas) were risen as concerns along with 
the possibility of steeling fingerprints of persons from touched objects or even from distance 
using a standard camera (Chaos Computer Club, 2014). However, current fingerprint readers 
are augmented by liveness sensor with which some data are extracted to decide whether the 
sample is taken from a living person (Clarke & Furnell 2005; Maltoni et al., 2009). 
3.5.1.2 Palmprint and Hand Geometry 
Palmprints were employed in 1858 manually with ink on employment contracts in India 
(NSTC, 2006b). Thus, it can be deemed as the second oldest used biometrics in official 
transactions after the fingerprint; however, unlike the fingerprint trait, it has not evolved to be 
automated until 1994 in Hungary (Woodward et al., 2003). Since then different palmprint 
recognition solutions have been developed and adopted gradually within the commercial and 
state domains up until embedding it into the FBI’s IAFIS and subsequently their recent Next 
Generation Identification system (NGI) in which palmprint capability added to it (Mears, 
2013; National Science and Technology Council, 2011). 
Palmprint recognition system identifies individuals based on the unique features of their inner 
hand palm. It shares the comparison criteria with fingerprint recognition system – it compares 
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the geometry features, i.e. sizes, as well as ridges and minutiae features of the palm (Jain et 
al., 2008).  
Therefore, it can be used for identification and verification modes. However, it has some 
shortcomings in addition to those of the fingerprint techniques; for instance, the large 
capturing machine, the relatively larger template size compared to fingerprint, and the 
probability of palms geometry features to change due to aging or weight. 
Similarly, hand geometry measures some of the hand characteristics but from the outer 
surface; in particular, length, width, thickness and surface area of the back of the hand and 
four fingers (Nanavati et al., 2002; Woodward et al., 2003). However, despite the early 
automated implementation (i.e. Identimat) in the early 1970s  and other successive patents, 
hand geometry systems can only be utilised to verify not identify users because these 
characteristics are not very distinctive (Jain et al., 2008). 
It has been utilised for a variety of purposes, including time and attendance, physical access 
and border crossing as a standalone or in combination with other biometrics, such as 
palmprint or facial recognition (Jain et al., 2008). Whilst its use is perceived as 
straightforward, it is intrusive as the user should be cooperative to collect the samples. As the 
hand samples are extracted and generated in a silhouette format, the template size tends to be 
relatively small and so does the memory required. In addition, hand geometry devices are 
typically built to function even in challenging environments, such as outdoors. Nonetheless, 
their current large physical size is perhaps prohibitive to daily use personal computing 
applications (Clarke, 2011). 
3.5.1.3 Facial Recognition and Facial Thermogram 
Recognising and identifying known people based on their faces has been utilised since the 
commencement of creating people; however, it is up until the first semi-automated facial 
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recognition system was developed in the 1960s (Li, 2012). The maturity of its classification 
algorithms have been researched, developed and adopted steadily to be used in various 
scenarios, from passport identification and surveillance applications, to physical/virtual 
access control, to more recently smartphones authentication. It is considered the second 
biometric after fingerprint with respect to users adoption and the sale rate (Biometrics 
Institute, 2013). 
This is, perhaps, attributed to its capability to be utilised in a transparent fashion (i.e. without 
cooperation or interaction of the user) leveraging ordinary camera, such as a webcam, as the 
capturing sensor. The measured characteristics are usually dimensions of the eyes, nose, 
mouth, ears, cheekbones, and distance between most or all of them based on different 
proprietary algorithms (Clarke & Furnell, 2005). The effectiveness of such algorithms vary 
depending upon several factors: the stability of the extracted face features over time, 
surrounding illumination, image resolution, face distance and position from the camera, and 
liveness test provisioning. 
A number of solutions to tolerate or control some of these factors have been proposed. Using 
a three dimensional image might assist in mitigating the effects of face orientation and 
lighting conditions, albeit the need for 3D camera/sensor would thwart its acceptance and 
propagation (Clarke, 2011) as they tend to be more expensive and slower to respond (Jain et 
al., 2008). Furthermore, Clarke et al. (2008) proposed a more sophisticated composite model 
in which a number of user’s face images in different sizes, illumination and orientations are 
collectively stored as a template – when a sample is taken, it will be compared with the stored 
composite template (as illustrated in Figure ‎3-4). Nevertheless, the trade-off between user 
friendliness and security is an issue since the likelihood of rejecting a genuine user declines 
and that of accepting an imposter increases. 
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Figure ‎3-4: Facial Recognition with Various Orientations (Clarke et al., 2008) 
Facial thermogram, also, has evolved as another solution to counter some of the drawbacks of 
facial recognition, such as poor illumination, poor image resolution and lack of liveness test. 
Facial thermogram captures the pattern of facial heat produced by the distinguishing blood 
flow under the skin that forms unique structure of veins and tissues utilising an infrared (IR) 
camera (Woodward et al., 2003). This thermal data that can typically be extracted with 
minimal environment inference and users interaction may enable transparent deployment. 
However, its performance alone has not reached the applicability for identification unless it is 
implemented in combination with other modalities, such as facial recognition with which the 
overall authentication performance would improve significantly (Socolinsky & Selinger, 
2004). Moreover, given that the facial thermogram might disclose some confidential personal 
data, for instance, health conditions from blood liquidity or swelling (Woodward et al., 2003), 
privacy concerns might rise yielding to probable low users’ acceptance. 
3.5.1.4 Iris Recognition and Retina Recognition 
Iris recognition is based upon distinguishing individuals in accordance to their irises which is 
the round coloured tissue formed of many furrows and ridges and surrounding the pupil of 
the eye (Woodward et al., 2003). It is believed the most accurate biometrics method due to 
the very distinctive complex irises patterns that are persistent throughout the life and 
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available in all ordinary people (Daugman, 2004). As a consequence, it can be used to verify 
as well as identify individuals. 
The uniqueness of the iris of each individual had been empirically proposed and proven by 
different ophthalmologists throughout the last century until the patent of Leonard Flom and 
Aran Safir, in 1985 (Flom & Safir, 1987); based upon which a few years later patented 
algorithms were developed founding the automated iris recognition by John Daugman 
(Daugman, 1994).  
Since then numerous iris recognition techniques and applications have been proposed, gained 
trust and put in practice by governments and companies (Roy & Biswas, 2011); ranging from 
borders control (e.g. in UAE since 2001, UK since 2004, Canada and USA since 2011), 
national identity (i.e. Aadhaar India’s UID project since 2009), police (i.e. in USA since 
2010), to websites and apps login (e.g. Eyelock device since 2011) (Markets and Markets, 
2014). Having said that, iris recognition is the third adopted biometrics characteristic 
(Biometrics Institute, 2013) and even it has more growth potential in the next five years 
(Markets and Markets, 2014). 
These optimistic anticipations can be owing to the promising features in terms of protection 
and users’ convenience, coupled with the fact that the digital iris image can be acquired from 
distance without the need for users to have direct physical contact. Yet, some factors may 
lead to reducing the performance, such as blinking, eyelashes/eyelids occlusion, movement, 
and pose from camera. Nevertheless, these factors can be circumvented; therefore, developers 
have been producing a number of novel solutions and extraction classifications aiming at 
utilising any camera regardless of and/or to overcome the aforementioned issues (Daugman, 
2007; Roy & Biswas, 2011). However, the more effective liveness detection solutions would 
require a high quality camera (recognition device), such as those of Chen et al. (2012) and 
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Galbally et al. (2012). The former proposal uses multispectral images that need less user 
cooperation opening the door for employing it in a transparent manner. 
In relation to human eyes characteristics and similar to the accuracy and stability of iris 
recognition or even better, retina pattern distinctiveness was acknowledged in 1935, but the 
automated retina recognition technique was not developed until 1970s and commercially 
available in 1980s (Woodward et al., 2003). Using an infrared camera for illumination at a 
close distance, retina recognition systems read the unique pattern of blood vessels in the back 
of the eye (Clarke, 2011). The secrecy level of the pattern is very high as capturing it is not 
overtly available without special devices and users cooperation. 
Consequently, it is considered very intrusive leading to narrow domains applicability and 
hence low adoption. Furthermore, directing the infrared wave to such a sensitive organ, the 
eye, may raise some healthy issues which might let users hesitant to accept being exposed to 
it. However, it is still useful and used for physical access control to locations of high security, 
such as military buildings (Nanavati et al., 2002).  
3.5.1.5 Ear Geometry 
Ear geometry recognition technique distinguishes individuals based upon the unique structure 
pattern of their ears, including concha, helix, antihelix, and other discriminative features 
(Ross, 2011). The potential of these features in identifying people was considered in 1890 by 
Alphonse Bertillon but has not been empirically proven until Iannarelli (1989) developed his 
system and since then it has been implemented manually in law enforcement and forensics 
domains (Arbab-Zavar & Nixon, 2011). Since then a number of proposed automated ear 
recognition systems and related classification algorithms have emerged, such as Cummings et 
al. (2010) that achieved 99.6% success rate. Therefore, it can be used for identification and 
verification modes. 
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It has been evidenced that the ear unique characteristics are relatively stable throughout the 
life span unlike those of the face that have noticeable effects of aging (Wu, 2011). In 
addition, they can be recognised from distance and they are not impacted by surrounding 
factors (e.g. illumination), apart from varying angles and hair and earrings occlusion which 
can be controlled and normalised (Abaza et al., 2013; Arbab-Zavar & Nixon, 2011). Albeit 
these promising features and high accuracy, there is no any commercial ear geometry product 
(Clarke, 2011; Ross, 2011). However, the aforementioned attributes and the fact that the ear 
is normally universal along with the specifications of smartphones that are equipped with 
front camera could enable its transparent applicability, i.e. when the ear samples can be 
acquired while the user normal call interaction (Clarke, 2011). 
3.5.2 Behavioural Biometrics 
Behavioural Biometric techniques discriminate individuals based upon measuring 
characteristics and pattern of their way of usage, such as speaking and typing on a keyboard 
(Woodward et al., 2003). Despite the less degree of uniqueness and permanence caused by 
the erratic nature of these behavioural traits due to different reasons, such as changing mood, 
health, and environment, they tend to be more universal, transparent, and hence usable than 
the physiological ones (Clarke, 2011). 
3.5.2.1 Voice Recognition 
It can be implied from its name that voice recognition verifies the identity of users by the 
distinctive aspects of their voice. Depending on the employed classifier, these aspects can be 
either of low level, including quality, duration, intensity dynamics, and pitch of the signal 
and/or high level, including rhythm, speed, modulation, intonation, pronunciations and 
education level (NSTC, 2006c). It is also called speaker recognition and voice verification 
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but it is worth noting to differentiate it from speech recognition system in which the focus is 
on what is being said rather than the way of saying (Nanavati et al., 2002).  
Voice recognition operates in two modes: constrained (text-dependent) and unconstrained 
(text-independent) (Woodward et al., 2003). With the former, the user speaks a predefined 
phrase or given number(s) whereas the spoken input is free with the latter. Whilst both of 
them are viable, it is argued that the text-dependent mode offers lower error rates (Woodward 
et al., 2003) though with higher intrusiveness, where the user cooperation is pivotal. 
Gunnar Fant, in 1960, pioneered an x-rays based model for the acoustics of speech 
production (NSTC, 2006c). Since then many related research groups (e.g. the NIST Speech 
Group) have been founded; many related patents have been issued; many studies and 
evaluations have been conducted striving to enhance the voice recognition systems (Jain et 
al., 2008). Accordingly, it is currently the most deployed behavioural biometrics and the fifth 
among all biometrics (Biometrics Institute, 2013). 
Likewise facial recognition, voiceprint recognition, in most algorithms, is able to leverage 
existing hardware on the devices the user normally interacts with, such as smartphone and PC 
microphone. Further to the abovementioned development and the ease of use, the embedment 
of speech recognition technology in the recent smartphones (e.g. Siri in Apple iPhone and 
iPad) may offer a promising future for voice recognition (Huntington, 2012). However, there 
are some issues to consider with it, encompassing those affecting the quality of the sample, 
for instance sickness and ambient noise; and those for enhancing the detection capability of 
imitator or recorded voice. Various countermeasures to vulnerabilities have been produced, 
such as suppressing background noise and incorporating it with another authentication 
method. The latter can be indirect, for example by requesting the user to speak out a 
password, or direct by augmenting it with another biometrics modality. Therefore, it tends to 
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be used to verify rather than identify users. Even so, it may be an effective transparent 
authentication technique. 
3.5.2.2 Signature and Handwriting Recognition 
Handwritten signature and general handwriting are considered as attributes of an individual. 
Thus, handwritten signature has been used commonly for numerous law, official, business 
and financial transactions to certify the identity authority, e.g. signing a contract. According 
to Woodward et al., (2003) and Jain et al., (2008), the first acknowledgment of its potential in 
verification was published by Osborn in 1929, and then evolved from being purely manual 
using  pen and paper to a digitised recognition system in 1980s. Subsequently, the 
proliferation of touchscreen devices has led to apply the similar individuality to handwriting 
verification. 
Verifying the authenticity of the handwritten signature and handwriting can be conducted 
using static (off-line) or/and dynamic (on-line) approaches (Alonso-Fernandez et al., 2009). 
The former is merely carried out by examining the handwriting appearance, i.e. the 
curvatures, angles and patterns of letters or symbols and comparing it with the genuine 
image. On the other hand, information about how the handwriting was generated is involved 
with the latter, including pace, movement changes and pressure (Guse, 2011). 
It is plausible to capturing the samples while a user is entering word(s), e.g. taking notes on a 
tablet PC or signing on a point-of-sale terminal. This makes it a viable candidate of non-
intrusive transparent authentication. Furthermore, a promising performance was achieved by 
(Clarke & Mekala, 2007) with 0% FAR and 3.5% FRR in a controlled environment and 0% 
FAR and 1.2% FRR in a feasibility environment. However, the number of participants of that 
experiment is small and the effect of the written word length should have been focussed upon 
on the experiment. Moreover, although it is more difficult to forge the dynamic approach, 
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given the likelihood of variations in handwriting, even if they are done consecutively by the 
same person, it is still sufficient for verification not identification mode.  
3.5.2.3 Keystroke Analysis 
Keystroke analysis (or dynamics) is meant to verify individuals based upon their 
discriminatory typing patterns on a keyboard or keypad. The patterns data is extracted 
thereby deploying characteristics include: inter-keystroke latency (the interval time between 
two successive keystrokes), hold time (the interval time between pressing and releasing a 
key) (Clarke & Furnell, 2006), and possibly other augmenting features, such as the finger 
pressure on keys (Saevanee & Bhatarakosol, 2008).  
Various studies revolving keystroke analysis have been undertaken since its inception as an 
applicable verification technique in 1970s, using different characteristics (mentioned 
previously) and classification methods (e.g. statistical and neural network) (Bergadano et al., 
2002; Brown & Rogers, 1993; Gaines et al., 1980; Joyce & Gupta, 1990; Leggett & 
Williams, 1988; Spillane, 1975). Most of the studies have presented satisfactory 
performances feasible for verification mode or for identification only and only if combined 
with other authentication methods.  
Analysing the keystroke dynamics can be categorised into (Banerjee & Woodard, 2012):  
 Static (text-dependent): with which the user keystroke behaviour is analysed while 
typing a predetermined text either at the point-of-entry (e.g. username and password) 
or possibly at a later stage during the normal interaction. 
 Dynamic (text-independent): there is no any particular predetermined text, so the 
user keystroke features are analysed whilst typing any text and comparing them 
against the reference template created during the enrolment stage. 
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Despite it may require a greater time and effort to train the classifier, the latter can be 
performed in a non-interfering and continuous manner making it more suitable to transparent 
authentication whilst the user is composing a text message, scheduling a meeting, or typing a 
document.  
As keystroke analysis is claimed to be utilised on those varying devices that have keyboards 
or keypads with different interfaces and involving one or more fingers, a number of studies 
have examined some of these issues, such as (Karatzouni & Clarke, 2007; Saevanee & 
Bhatarakosol, 2008). Further advantage of keystroke analysis is the ability of employing it 
without the need for additional hardware; albeit, deploying the pressure feature may lead to 
the need for a pressure sensitive screen or keyboard which are not available on the ordinary 
ones. 
Although it has been researched since the 1970s, it has not been developed and deployed 
extensively, except a few commercial solutions that incorporate it with other authentication 
techniques, for instance analysing the keystroke of typing the username and password. 
Nonetheless, whereas this may add a layer of security, it inherits some drawbacks of the other 
combined methods (i.e. the password in this example). 
3.5.2.4 Behavioural Profiling 
Behavioural (or service utilisation) profiling classifies the users based upon the distinct 
pattern(s) of their usage of devices’ applications and/or services, such as which specific 
applications and websites they access, at which specific time of the day, for how long (Aupy 
& Clarke, 2005). A profile template is created from the user historical behavioural 
interactions to be utilised, subsequently, at the authentication process whilst the normal usage 
interaction to determine whether it is the genuine user identity or vice versa when the usage 
pattern deviates. 
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Research into behavioural profiling started in the late 1990s. However, the focus has been 
mainly on utilising profiling mechanism in intrusion (IDS) and fraud detection of telephony 
and credit card systems, such as the research of (Stolfo et al., 2000).  This case is also applied 
on the commercial applications; to best of the author’s knowledge, the available solutions in 
the market are limited to IDS and fraud detection system rather than conclusive behavioural 
profiling authentication systems. 
The technique has been researched taking various aspects into consideration, such as 
network-based, device/host-based, desktop or mobile environments, and deploying it alone or 
coupled with other authentication techniques (Aupy & Clarke, 2005; Li et al., 2011; Saevanee 
et al., 2012). The user’s location information also can be incorporated based on either the 
mobile cellular network (i.e. cell ID), the global positioning system (GPS) (i.e. longitude, 
latitude), or/and the IP address. Nevertheless, it might be considered as a fourth approach of 
authentication as proposed by the International Information Systems Security Certification 
Consortium (ISC2) and called someplace the user is (Conrad et al., 2012). Notwithstanding, it 
can be argued that it is under the behavioural profiling biometrics because location alone 
would not be sufficient to verify the user; hence it is an approach rather than a category.  
Although behavioural profiling biometrics has the potential to monitor behavioural patterns 
on most categories of devices without interrupting the users from their typical interaction, 
which makes it a good alternative for transparent and continuous authentication, it suffers 
from privacy and acceptability issues. Fearing from private information leakage that might 
occur during the behaviour monitoring tends to affect the level of users’ acceptance. 
Furthermore, comparative high probability of changing over time along with the low 
individuality of user behaviour (as most of the behavioural biometrics) it is probably more 
feasible to be incorporated with a multi factor/biometric authentication system. 
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3.5.2.5 Gait Recognition 
Gait recognition is based upon discriminating people according to the patterns associated 
with their walking stride. The person’s gait data is initially captured and enrolled to create a 
template, which is consequently used to be compared against; if the samples match it, the 
user is considered legitimate; otherwise, some security measures should be taken. 
Cutting and Kozlowski (1977) were the pioneers in experimenting and proving the 
plausibility of identifying individuals on the basis of their gait. Since then, a number of 
studies have emerged revolving gait recognition from various perspectives, shifting it from 
being utilised mainly for surveillance purposes, to being deployed to authenticating users 
using wearable sensors (Gafurov & Snekkenes, 2009) or on mobile devices (Tanviruzzaman 
et al., 2009). 
For the monitoring purpose, a camera is used to capture the gait motions to be analysed in a 
later stage when needed. This means that it is used from distance and without user 
cooperation. Different sensors are worn in the wearable type depending on the limb where it 
is put, such as on ankles, hip, or arms. In contrast, there is no need for additional equipment 
when smartphones capabilities are leveraged, in which the user’s gait information can be 
collected while they interact with the device or even carry it on their pocket. 
Thus, it is evident how applicable this technique is to non-obtrusive and continuous 
authentication. Nevertheless, its relatively low distinctive level as well as permanence over 
time, affected by many factors (e.g. footwear, health condition, and ground condition), lead to 
conclude that it is not sufficient for identification but for verification combined with other 
modalities. 
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3.5.3 Summary of the Biometric Techniques 
In order to establish an insight about the usefulness of these biometric techniques to a 
universal innovative authentication solution, Table ‎3-1 demonstrates the aforementioned 
biometric techniques against the biometrics requirements discussed in Section ‎3.2 in addition 
to the transparency feature (where H, M and L represent High, Medium and Low 
respectively). At large, whilst it is evident that physiological biometric techniques tend to be 
better in terms of uniqueness, permanence and performance, they fall short concerning the 
collectability, user acceptability, and transparency unlike their behavioural counterparts. 
It is also apparent that none of the biometric techniques outperforms all the others based on 
all requirements and none of them is free from scoring L (low). Therefore, no single 
biometric modality is ideal and fulfils all the requirements. However, dependent upon the 
application and context requirements, a number of them would perhaps be suitable to some 
extent. Moreover, this would be enhanced significantly if a combination of these techniques 






































































































Fingerprint Recognition H H H M H M M L 
Palmprint & Hand Geometry H M M L H M M L 
Facial Recognition H M M H M M L H 
Facial Thermogram M M M H L L H H 
Iris Recognition H H H M H L H M 
Retina Recognition H H M L H L H L 










Voice Recognition H M L M M H M H 
Signature & Handwriting Recognition H M L M M H M M 
Keystroke Analysis M L L H L M M H 
Behavioural Profiling H M L H M M M H 
Gait Recognition L L L H L H M H 
Table ‎3-1: Biometric Techniques against their Requirements 
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3.6 Multibiometrics 
Given the aforementioned presentation of leading biometric techniques, it is apparent that 
they can be offered as a single/uni-modal or multimodal biometrics. It is perceived that 
employing such a system stems some flaws depending on the particular utilised trait and 
classifications – making it probably inadequate for some applications, cases and populations. 
For instance, locations that require high security, such as borders and military bases, do not 
tolerate specific error rates most of uni-modal biometrics methods have. Another example is 
when a proportion of targeted users are not able to provide the utilised uni-trait, either 
permanently (e.g. a wheelchair person cannot have gait samples) or temporarily (e.g. a person 
with broken hand cannot have hand geometry samples). 
These drawbacks can be mitigated by fusing and consolidating the resultant information 
presented by multiple biometrics sources within a system referred to as multibiometrics (de 
Oliveira et al., 2010). A number of researchers have proven that multibiometric systems 
outperform the uni-modal biometrics in improving: matching performance, universality, and 
resistance against spoof attacks (Jain et al. 2005; Ross et al., 2006; Sim et al., 2007), thus 
enhancing the overall system accuracy, reliability and robustness. Nonetheless, typically, 
cost, processing load, and vendor-specific solutions have to be profoundly considered before 
developing and adopting such a system. 
3.6.1 Multibiometric Systems Categories 
A multibiometric system can be one of the following categories based upon the contributing 
biometrics source(s) that are illustrated in Figure ‎3-5 (Ross et al., 2006; Jain et al., 2008; 
Clarke, 2011): 
 Multimodal: multiple biometrics approaches are used (e.g. finger and face or 
keystroke dynamics and behavioural profiling). 
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 Multi-instance: using more than one subtype of the same biometrics (e.g. the right 
and left index fingerprints of an individual). 
 Multi-sensor: multiple sensors are employed to capture a single biometrics modality 
of an individual (e.g. optical and capacitive fingerprint sensors). 
 Multi-sample: a single sensor is utilised to capture more than one sample of the same 
biometrics trait taking account of their potential variations (e.g. frontal and side image 
of an individual face). 
 Multi-algorithm: utilising more than one classification algorithm on a single 
biometric feature to subsequently consolidate the output to have an improved 
matching performance (e.g. minutiae-based and texture-based fingerprint classifier 
algorithms). 
 Hybrid: a subset of the abovementioned categories is employed, aiming at optimising 
the recognition accuracy, for instance combining multimodal and multi-algorithm 
systems (e.g. two voice recognition algorithms integrated with three face recognition 
algorithms). 
 
Figure ‎3-5: Multibiometrics Categories 
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3.6.2 Multibiometric Fusion Types 
This variety of multimodal, multi-instance, multi-sensor, multi-sample, multi-algorithmic, 
and hybrid approaches seeks to optimise the authentication decision. Combining the 
information from these differing sources is called fusion. As illustrated in Figure ‎3-6, a multi-
algorithmic approach would enable utilising a range of biometrics classification algorithms 
(each crafted to focus on differing aspects of the problem) and combine the results through 
fusion.  
 
Figure ‎3-6: Multi-Algorithmic at Matching Score Level Fusion (Clarke, 2011) 
Generally, as illustrated in Figure ‎3-7, fusion can occur at various phases of the 
authentication process; sensor, feature, matching score, and/or decision level (Clarke, 2011; 
Ross, 2007; Sim et al., 2007). 
 Sensor level fusion: The raw biometrics data is consolidated prior to feature 
extraction these data were captured by multiple sensors or by a single sensor 
acquiring multiple samples (e.g. fusing different face images from one or different 
cameras). 
 Feature level fusion: After obtaining multiple samples from one or more biometrics 
traits, the feature vector is extracted from each sample using a variety of algorithms. 
These feature vectors are then fused together to be used in the following matching 
phase (e.g. fusing the feature vectors of the face and iris).  
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  Matching score level fusion: The produced results of multiple biometrics classifiers 
are joined at this level to produce a new accumulated match score to be utilised for the 
subsequent decision process, as depicted in Figure ‎3-6. It is believed to be the most 
accurate and thus the most widely utilised fusion type (Ross et al., 2006). 
 Decision fusion: This fusion occurs when each incorporated biometric system has 
provided its own decision to enable a final authentication decision. 
 
Figure ‎3-7: Fusion Types 
This approach to the optimisation of authentication accuracy provides a very strong indicator 
as to the authenticity of the user. For example, as illustrated in Table ‎3-2, the use of 
multimodal systems can result in a significant improvement in the classification performance 
(Jain et al., 2005). 




Multimodal (Minmax Norm) 2.2 
Multimodal (Tanh Norm) 1.5 
Table ‎3-2: Multimodal Performance using Finger, Face and Hand Modalities 
This substantial enhancement in the whole performance of the biometric system the 
multibiometrics approaches offer leads to developing various large-scale applications, some 
of which will be listed in the following sub-section. However, issues should be taken into 
consideration to be eliminated for use in a TAS, such as overhead computation and potential 
Chapter ‎3 – Biometric Authentication 
 
65 | P a g e  
 
incompatibility between vendor-specific solutions. The former should be examined 
throughout the development process depending on the system/user requirements whilst the 
latter can be overcome thereby abiding by the available standardisation of biometrics (which 
are discussed in ‎3.7). 
3.6.3 Multibiometrics Large-Scale Applications 
The advancements provided by multibiometric systems have driven a number of large-scale 
governmental applications. The United States Visitor and Immigration Status Indicator 
Technology (US-VISIT) system verifies the passports of foreign visitors to the United States 
at the borders utilising fingerprints; it was initiated employing only right and left index 
fingers of a person and extended to all ten flat fingerprints (Ross, 2007). 
Another high profile multibiometrics application is the FBI’s Integrated Automated 
Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) which employs all ten fingerprints to create a 
criminal repository in order to be compared against during legal and forensics cases, or 
employment in sensitive positions (National Science and Technology Council, 2011). It is 
then expanded to include multiple modalities, such as palm, face and iris in its transitioned 
version Next Generation Identification (NGI), seeking to improve accuracy thus improving 
jurisdiction cases. For instance, whereas IAFIS offers an accuracy of 92%, NGI achieves 
99.6%. NGI also deploys advanced matching algorithms which minimised the response time. 
For example, while IAFIS may take 2 hours to give a decision, NGI would not exceed 10 
minutes when comparing against more than 60 million individual records repository (FBI, 
2014; Mears, 2013). 
Another endeavour and perhaps the largest multimodal biometrics identification system to 
date is the India’s Aadhaar programme, aiming to eventually provide a national ID for about 
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1.2 billion Indians. It encompasses fingerprint, face and iris traits and have collected nearly 
600 million multimodal records thus far (Collins, 2014; Onin, 2014). 
Accordingly, as multibiometric systems have improved dramatically in performance and 
scalability supported by intense research in the area, there is a potential to further deploy 
them in large-scale civilian and commercial applications. 
3.7 Biometrics Standards 
Given that each biometric technique has its own differing types of sensors and algorithms 
(each is perhaps developed and offered by varying vendors), it is apparent that implementing 
a multibiometric system (e.g. multimodal and multi-algorithmic) is sophisticated. For such 
multibiometric systems to exist in a vendor- and modality-independent fashion, agreed upon 
standards are essential to be developed and conformed with. Typically, having multiple 
biometrics products each follows different data format, structure and metrics would yield to 
users being locked-in with a specific vendor regardless of the variety of performance and cost 
incurred (National Science and Technology Council, 2011). 
Biometrics standards have been developed nationally and internationally concerning 
particular modality or the overall biometric system, enabling interoperability between various 
systems thereby, for instance, specifying unified biometrics data interchange formats. 
Interoperability is a pivotal aspect for implementing multibiometric systems. For example, 
images attained by one sensor must be compatible with those attained by another sensor 
besides it must be possible that both of them are interpreted by a third provider product. 
One key standard in the arena is the Common Biometric Exchange Formats Framework 
(CBEFF) standard. It is developed by national and international standards development 
bodies (InterNational Committee for Information Technology Standards (INCITS) Technical 
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Committee M1 – Biometrics and ISO/IEC Joint Technical Committee 1 (JTC 1) 
Subcommittee SC 37 – Biometrics) to promote interoperability of multiple biometrics-based 
devices, applications and systems (NIST, 2008), thereby enabling the exchange of biometric 
information efficiently between system components (National Science and Technology 
Council, 2011). Some of the large-scale applications of biometrics have adopted and 
implemented this standard, such as the India’s Aadhaar programme. 
Furthermore, International Standards Organization (ISO) and International Electrotechnical 
Commission (IEC) have introduced dominant standards supporting the generic aims of 
biometrics standards: interoperability and data interchange among applications and systems. 
According to Podio (2011) and JTC 1/SC 37 (2013), ISO and IEC under Joint Technical 
Committee 1 (JTC1) Subcommittee 37 (SC37) determine that the main aspects covered by 
these standards are: 
 common file frameworks (ISO/IEC 19785);  
 biometric application programming interfaces (BioAPI) (ISO/IEC 19784);  
 biometric data interchange formats (ISO/IEC 19794);  
 related biometric profiles (ISO/IEC 24713);  
 methodologies for performance testing and reporting (ISO/IEC 19795); and 
 cross jurisdictional and societal aspects (ISO/IEC 24779). 
Therefore deploying ISO standards such as ISO 19794, 19785, 19784 would avail 
incorporating any selected biometrics approaches – something individual devices would 
never be able to achieve due to prohibitive costs and processing requirements (ISO, 2006a, 
2006b, 2011). 
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3.8 A Review of Continuous and Transparent Multibiometric 
Authentication Systems 
Despite the benefits that biometrics has over conventional counterparts of knowledge- and 
token-based approaches, if they are applied at the point of session entry, they would arguably 
be insufficient to secure sensitive resources. With point-of-entry authentication only, the 
system is left vulnerable to being hijacked or misused afterwards as there is no post-of-entry 
assurance of the authenticity of the user. Continuous authentication has emerged to address 
this issue; however, usability issues have arisen when the user is prompted to intrusively and 
perhaps repeatedly re-verify to the system. Transparent authentication has then been proposed 
as a favourable solution which utilises biometrics to validate the user continuously in the 
background without requiring explicit abnormal user interaction (Crawford & Renaud, 2014; 
Traore & Ahmed, 2012).  
After a thorough analysis of the related literature, a number of relevant search keywords have 
been identified within user authentication domain, i.e. “transparent”, “continuous”, “implicit”, 
“active”, “passive”, “non-intrusive”, “non-observable”, “adaptive”, “unobtrusive”, and 
“progressive” from various eminent academic databases. Accordingly, 93 studies have been 
reviewed, most of which (70%) only employ single biometric. 
However, despite that these frameworks (shown in Table ‎3-3) have arguably contributed to 
solving the flaw of point-of-entry verification only by providing further consideration to on-
going identity confidence, they have merely proposed uni-modal biometrics and hence have 
significant drawbacks. 
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(Bergadano et al., 2002; Dowland et al., 2001; Furnell et al., 1996; Gunetti & 
Picardi, 2005; Hempstalk, 2009; Hossain et al., 2012; Leggett & Williams, 
1988; Mahar et al., 1995; Marsters, 2009; Messerman et al., 2011; Monrose & 
Rubin, 2000; Obaidat & Sadoun, 1997; Roth et al., 2014; Shepherd, 1995; 
Umphress & Williams, 1985)  
Mouse 
(Ahmed & Traore, 2007; Aksari & Artuner, 2009; Feher et al., 2012; Gamboa 
& Fred, 2004; Jorgensen & Yu, 2011; Lin et al., 2012; Mondal & Bours, 2013; 
Pusara & Brodley, 2004; Shen et al., 2009; Stanic, 2013; Zheng et al., 2011) 
Signature (Clarke & Mekala, 2007) 
Gait 
(Derawi et al., 2012; Gafurov & Snekkenes, 2009; Juefei-Xu et al., 2012; Kale 
et al., 2002; Lu et al., 2014; Mäntyjärvi et al., 2005; Morris, 2004; Nickel et 
al., 2012; Tanviruzzaman & Ahamed, 2014) 
Voice 




(Aupy & Clarke, 2005; Jakobsson et al., 2009; Li et al., 2014; Saevanee et al., 











(Clarke et al., 2008; Janakiraman et al., 2005; Klosterman & Ganger, 2000; 
Liu & Chen, 2003; Xiao & Yang, 2010) 
Ear (Fahmi et al., 2012; Hurley et al., 2000; Islam et al., 2008; Rodwell, 2006) 
Finger (Feng et al., 2012; Koundinya et al., 2014) 
Palmprint (Kisku et al., 2012) 
Iris 
(Chen et al., 2012; Du et al., 2011; Matey et al., 2006; Mock et al., 2012; 
Proença & Alexandre, 2006; Sui et al., 2012; Wildes, 1997; Yang & Du, 2011) 
Table ‎3-3: Single Biometric Transparent Authentication Systems 
As each of the above-mentioned models utilises a sole modality, they continue in carrying its 
shortcomings, thus enduring low matching performance, limited universality and higher 
vulnerability to spoofing attacks. Fusing more than one biometric (multimodal) can arguably 
contribute to overcoming or at least alleviating these flaws. As discussed previously in ‎3.6, a 
number of researchers have proven that multibiometric systems outperform the uni-modal 
biometrics. This section reviews the domain, focussing in particular upon the role that 
multibiometrics has and its viability in practice. 
3.8.1 Continuous and Transparent Multibiometric Authentication Systems 
Based upon a comprehensive analysis of the prior art on continuous and transparent 
multibiometric authentication systems, 28 research studies have been specified and are 
categorised into: physiological transparent multibiometric systems; behavioural transparent 
multibiometric systems; hybrid transparent multibiometric systems; distributed transparent 
multibiometric systems; and web-based transparent multibiometric systems. The first three 
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categories are according to the nature of the utilised biometric modalities, whereas the last 
two ones are according to their operational deployments that distinguish them from the others. 
The commentary on the sub-sections that follow describes the key achievements and 
milestones that have taken place. With respect to the performance criteria adopted to discuss 
these studies, they are based on the common declared varied metrics (i.e. FAR, FRR, EER, 
FMR, Matching score, Verification score, Recognition rate) on the results of the studies 
under each category. The concept of intrusive authentication utilised throughout this analysis 
refers to the occurrence when the user is interrupted by a system/application and required to 
provide credentials explicitly, e.g. password or biometric sample. Accordingly, the reduction 
percentage of intrusive authentication is quantified by comparing the number of explicit 
events a genuine user needs to authenticate to access the device explicitly while using the 
transparent framework to that number with a conventional authentication framework. 
3.8.1.1 Physiological Transparent Multibiometric Systems 
Table ‎3-4 demonstrates a number of studies that have investigated utilising physiological 
biometrics only aiming to continuously verify the legitimate user. From this perspective, Sim 
et al. (2007) experimented with the deployment of facial and fingerprint recognition 
characteristics within a biometric system. These modalities were holistically fused using 
Hidden Markov Model (HMM). According to the output of the verification along with the 
elapsed time, the authentication system responds by continuing granting user access, freezing 
some processes, or locking the system. They claimed that the traditional performance metrics, 
i.e. FAR, FRR, EER, are not suitable for such a continuous authentication system due to 
negligence of time within the calculation. Therefore, their system was evaluated based upon 
newly invented metrics: Time to Correct Reject (TCR), Probability of Time to Correct Reject 
(PTCR), Usability, and Usability-Security Characteristic Curve (USC). Nonetheless, to the 
best knowledge of the author, these metrics have not been adopted commonly to evaluate 
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other forthcoming continuous and transparent authentication frameworks making the 
comparison not possible. Although it was experimented using real data on a Windows XP 
desktop computer, the focus was only on testing the usability and it was not extensive enough 
to be generalised – only 11 participants carried out the experiment over 30 minutes each. 
Author(s) Platform 
Biometrics Performance (%) 
Experiment 
Demographics 
Mode  Limitations  Features 
F* FP* I* Match FAR FRR Verification 
Sim et al. 
(2007) 









Azzini and  
Marrara 
(2008) 
PC √ √ - 
48.6-
72.5 






























* F = Face; FP = Fingerprint; I = Iris 
Table ‎3-4: Physiological Transparent Multibiometric Systems 
Similarly, Azzini and Marrara (2008) proposed a multimodal continuous system; however it 
only uses facial recognition for the ongoing user identity verification whereas the fingerprint 
is prompted whenever the threshold of the confidence on the authorised user is not met. 
Given that its achieved matching score ranged between 48.6 and 72.5%, it is evident that it 
suffers from low accuracy as it can, operationally, be considered unimodal. It was not even 
evaluated with real data – it was merely simulation (the same as de Oliveira and Motta 
(2011)) and thus no performance result was revealed. Likewise, although that Kwang et al. 
(2009) obtained a promising FRR of 1% with 90 participants, they had an additional 26-42% 
of processing computation overhead. This might lead to user frustration (if they are left 
waiting for the authentication decision) and/or higher power consumption. Further study in 
this domain was conducted by Tsatsoulis et al. (2012) who examined the feasibility of the 
system using iris and face recognition with 61 real users. They reached a verification rate of 
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84-97% and a FAR of 3%. However, it fell short in achieving a complete transparency due to 
having the user to intrusively login to the system using their iris (which is not checked after 
the login). 
3.8.1.2 Behavioural Transparent Multibiometric Systems 
The hindrance of transparently employing physiological biometrics has been evident; thus, a 
shift to behavioural counterparts was sought (as shown in Table ‎3-5). Further studies within 
the similar context were separately introduced relying only on behavioural biometrics (Li et 
al., 2011; Saevanee et al., 2014). The former study deployed the dynamic user profile of the 
usage of calling, text messaging, and general applications services on mobile phone with an 
EER of 5.4%, 2.2% and 13.5% respectively and an overall EER of 7.03%. The latter, on the 
other hand, disclosed that linguistic profiling, keystroke dynamics and behaviour profiling 
can be used to distinguish users continuously and transparently with an EER of 12.8%, 20.8% 
and 9.2% respectively and an overall EER of 3.3%. It was even claimed that their proposed 
approach reduces the number of intrusive authentication requests of conventional approaches 
by 91%. Despite these promising results, they were fully or partially acquired based upon 
desperate and limited off-line datasets not live ones. Therefore, they did not represent the real 
usage of a user. Although there were thousands of logged activities, the number of 
participants is considered limited. Furthermore, the dataset is dated back to 2004-2005, 
during which a few number of applications were available to users as well as the capabilities 
of the mobile phones were limited. What is more, is that the latter framework’s experiment 
utilised separate datasets simulating that they were for the same users which was not the 
reality. Therefore, they perhaps did not reflect the real time and current practice nor the 
results.  
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Author(s) Platform 
Biometrics Performance (%) Experiment 
Demographics 
Mode  Limitations  Features 











et al. (2006) 
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(2011) 
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Bailey et al. 
(2014) 
PC - √ √ - - √ 2.24 2.1 - 
31 participants 
3 tasks 
Real - - 
* V = Voice; M = Mouse; K = Keystroke; B = Behavioural profiling; G = Gait; T = Touchalytics 
Table ‎3-5: Behavioural Transparent Multibiometric Systems 
In line with providing authentication in a transparent and continuous manner using 
behavioural biometrics, Crawford et al. (2013) and Crawford and Renaud (2014) proposed a 
framework for mobile devices utilising keystroke dynamics and voice recognition. The study 
showed that it enhanced the usability, thereby reducing the number of explicit authentication 
requests by 67% from those of traditional counterparts. However, this explicit authentication 
was configured to be PIN which is secret knowledge not biometrics, thus still the user is 
prone to cognitive burden. Furthermore, no common overall security performance measures 
revealed to allow comparative studies but solely for each individual deployed biometrics – 
EER of 10% and 25% of keystroke dynamics and voice recognition respectively. Equally 
important, it would be ideal if an extensible evaluation was undertaken rather than 
experimenting it involving merely 30 participants with seven tasks. On the other hand, its 
applicability and universality have to be considered as it is confined to a single device – with 
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every device requiring biometric setup and enrolment, user configuration and management, 
risk assessment and continual refinement. 
This is also applied to other studies in the domain (Ahmed & Traore 2005; Pusara 2007; 
Bailey et al., 2014). They investigated the feasibility of using keystroke and mouse 
biometrics to authenticate the user continuously. The first two studies were also featured as 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). Conducting real evaluations on desktop PCs with varying 
number of participants, their performance results were (FAR of 0.651, 14.47 and 2.24; FRR 
of 1.312, 1.78 and 2.10) respectively. Despite augmenting their systems by Graphical User 
Interface (GUI) interactions of the user, the last two experiments undesirably showed lower 
accuracy. This perhaps is attributed to the arguable low uniqueness of the added GUI events. 
Moreover, the real usage and thus performance would differ from those under controlled 
environment where specific pre-set tasks are given to the participants to perform during the 
evaluation. Another related investigation was carried out by Vildjiounaite et al. (2006) fusing 
voice recognition with gait recognition of the user while mobile phone usage. They employed 
31 users to experiment their proposed system offline. Nonetheless, even though they spent 
sufficient differing times training the classifiers of each modality, they accomplished 
divergent performance results (EER 2-12%), rendering it to be unstable. 
All the aforementioned frameworks can only operate on a distinct device (a mobile or PC). 
Given that users nowadays use typically at least one from each of these platforms, extra care 
should be taken to their applicability and universality. 
3.8.1.3 Hybrid Transparent Multibiometric Systems 
Researchers have realised the difficulties of deploying physiological biometrics only together 
with the instability of behavioural biometrics only in a transparent manner, which in turn may 
increase the incidences of users being locked-out and required to re-authenticate explicitly. 
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Therefore, various studies have been proposed deploying a mixture of physiological and 
behavioural or soft biometrics (e.g. colour of face), as summarised in Table ‎3-6. One of the 
early studies that consider employing a set of biometrics for continuous authentication was 
proposed by Carrillo (2003) to safeguard aircraft cockpit and flight deck throughout. Her 
proposal provided two designs with regard to the location of processing: on board or 
distributed verification. However, there was no implementation nor evaluation as it was 
conceptual only.  
Author(s) Platform 
Biometrics Performance (%) Experiment 
Demographics 
Mode  Limitations  Features 
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* F = Face; FP = Fingerprint; V = Voice; M = Mouse; K = Keystroke; B = Behavioural; G = Gait; SB = Soft biometrics 
Table ‎3-6: Hybrid Transparent Multibiometric Systems 
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The frameworks of Asha and Chellappan (2008) and Muaaz (2013) were also conceptual. 
Whilst the former employed fingerprint and mouse dynamics for e-learning environment, the 
latter utilised gait, face and voice recognition on mobile. Altinok and Turk (2003) suggested a 
multimodal continuous authentication system using voice, face, and fingerprint biometrics. It 
focused on the integration of biometrics modalities at a specific time to establish a level of 
certainty (confidence) using a Gaussian model, ensuring that the authorised user is present 
whilst this level degrades over time with absence of biometrics samples. However, there was 
no overall integrated system performance revealed. Moreover, evaluating such a system 
needs to be on the basis of real data not merely simulated as was the case in their work – they 
simulated just 24 virtual identities. Another proposal, without declared performance, 
simulated using the face and its behavioural features to implicitly assure the legitimacy of the 
user after an intrusive login using secret code (Kang & Ju, 2006). 
Clarke and Furnell (2006) proposed a mobile-based system, Intelligent Authentication 
Management System (IAMS), using a combination of the secret knowledge-based approach 
and selected/available biometric techniques to provide transparent and continuous 
authentication. It was framed to operate in both standalone and client-server modes. Although 
it was expected to achieve a desirable performance (a worst case of FAR of 0.00002% and 
FRR of 0.4%), the evaluation was not comprehensive and not based upon real data. 
Furthermore, the flaws of using the secret knowledge-based approach are inherited, given it 
would potentially rely upon it if no other biometrics sample were available. It did however 
propose a general model for all transparent modalities. 
An expanded subsequent implementation of TAS, the Non-Intrusive and Continuous 
Authentication (NICA), was conducted by Clarke et al. (2009). It was built upon the work 
suggested by IAMS utilising a mixture of secret knowledge authentication coupled with 
several chosen available biometric techniques. It is capable of choosing individual biometric 
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techniques to verify a mobile user based upon the configuration of their device. For instance, 
if a mobile device is not equipped with an inbuilt camera, NICA will only choose keystroke 
analysis and voice verification to verify the user. NICA does also consider the assumption 
that different services and data require different security provisions. Through understanding 
the risk associated with particular user actions and services, the protection level required can 
vary from almost none for checking the time, medium for texting, to significantly high for 
online banking. The level of confidence is continuously fluctuating based upon the biometric 
samples captured which is subsequently reflected on the privileges to access services and 
applications, enabling the device to shutdown functionality if insufficient confidence exists. 
Its evaluation was carried out involving 27 participants who completed specified tasks over 
an average of 45 minutes, whereby 60 biometrics samples were collected. As a result, it 
accomplished a performance of below 0.01% EER. However, it was a scripted evaluation that 
sought to understand users’ opinions. It did not collect samples from real-world use. Having 
real participants conducting the trial with real but free tasks for a longer time and interval 
sessions may provide a more accurate insight of the system. Moreover, reducing the threshold 
to alleviate the error rates of deployed in-house biometrics algorithms would impact the 
accuracy of this result. 
Soltane et al. (2010) attempted to overcome this by experimenting with integrating face and 
voice traits of 30 users for 3 separate sessions. The resulting EERs of the face and the voice 
verification studies were 0.449% and 0.003% respectively. These results, however, are 
questionable with the low number of users and even evaluated samples (merely 16 face 
images and 4 voice samples from each user). Interestingly, when using an adaptive Bayesian 
fusion method, the overall EER was 0.087%, that is better than that of face only but worse 
than the voice’s. However, having multibiometrics is still desirable because it would harden 
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the system against spoofing attacks as if a modal is compromised the other one contributes to 
system protection. Furthermore, this result might be affected by the particular fusion method. 
Studies were proposed blending the physical biometrics (i.e. face) with soft biometrics (e.g. 
face skin colour and clothes colour) aiming at providing continuous but passive 
authentication (Niinuma et al., 2010; Khan et al., 2011; Tsai et al., 2014). The last research is 
a successor of the work in Khan et al. (2011), so they are referred to here as one. Both studies 
were experimented on laptops deploying intrusive login (password or face) and then 
constantly comparing the soft biometrics histogram against what was collected at the login 
stage. Niinuma et al. (2010) achieved a zero FAR and 4.17% FRR with a sample of 20 
participants whereas the recognition score of Tsai et al. (2014) using swarm intelligent 
algorithms was 86.88% with only 7 participants. Apart from the relatively small samples that 
would not resemble the reality, the variation of lighting throughout the usage session may 
contribute to frequent need to obtrusive re-verification leading to users’ inconvenience. 
From a different perspective, today’s typical computer/technology users are nomadic and not 
confined to one location, Ojala et al. (2008) presented a prototype of a wearable continuous 
and transparent authentication device – a wristband. Users are authenticated by their 
fingerprints at the login stage and their presence is verified continuously by measuring the 
skin temperature, heart rate and the body capacitance. In spite of the novelty of the proposal, 
it suffers from a number of issues. There is an intrusive login when requesting the user to 
present their fingerprints. Additionally, even though the prototype threshold was set low at 
25%, the matching scores were low (between 40 and 60%). It might be deteriorated further if 
the threshold is increased, thus resulting in an unacceptable performance. Furthermore, it 
does not leverage the available devices capabilities because it requires an additional device 
which is considered a token. As a consequence, the drawbacks of using tokens persist. 
Nevertheless, the breakthrough of mobile devices competencies, such as the heart rate sensor 
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of Samsung Galaxy S5 (Samsung, 2014) would open the horizons of employing them rather 
than additional devices. 
3.8.1.4 Distributed Transparent Multibiometric Systems 
All the aforementioned frameworks did not consider the current fact of a user in possession 
of various digital devices. Therefore, the studies presented in Table ‎3-7 have been conducted. 
An attempt to exploit the advantageous features of transparent authentication method among 
various devices the user owns was proposed by Chowdhury et al. (2010). They presented a 
framework utilising physiological signals (e.g. blood pressure and heart beat) and behavioural 
profiling capable to work in ubiquitous environment, where the probable ratio is one user to 
many devices. Nonetheless, it was just conceptual without feasibility study. Stemming from 
this notion, a progressive authentication framework was prototyped leveraging the 
widespread of inter-devices connectivity to enable the authentication information among the 
user’s devices (Riva et al., 2012). Incorporating the biometrics of face, voice and behavioural 
profiling, alongside proximity to fellow logged-in device(s), the prototype was run on a 
mobile and a PC with 9 users only. From usability standpoint, it was declared that there was a 
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* F = Face; V = Voice; B = Behavioural profiling; PS = Physiological Signals 
Table ‎3-7: Distributed Transparent Multibiometric Systems 
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A similar but more thorough study was conducted by Hocking et al. (2013) – Authentication 
Aura. It enables the separate and differing devices of a particular user within a close 
proximity to communicate their own authentication status and confidence, thus establishing 
an accumulative level of confidence. It is also capable to utilise personal dumb items, such as 
a wallet and car key that are RFID tagged, to incorporate to the confidence level of the user. 
Their experiment involved 20 participants to have their usage observed for 14 days. Even 
though that the sample seems small, the dataset was created based on 1.23 million recorded 
observations. There were no error rates revealed but it indicated that users’ convenience 
would increase as a result of decreasing the number of explicit authentication the user would 
be prompted to by 74% in a typical day compared with the occurrences of secret knowledge-
based authentication. However, its scalability, architecture complexity and processing load 
executed on each participating device have to be examined thoroughly as well as the 
performance. In addition, utilising active communication technologies, such as WiFi and 
Bluetooth, besides the RFID would have contributed to a better viability study of the 
framework. 
3.8.1.5 Web-based Transparent Multibiometric Systems 
Author(s) Platform 
Biometrics Performance (%) Experiment 
Demographics 
Mode  Limitations  Features 
F* V* K* M* FMR EER 
Traore et al. 
(2012) 














Web √ √ - -  
(V) 10 
(F) 2.58 




* F = Face; V = Voice; K = Keystroke; M = Mouse 
Table ‎3-8: Web-based Transparent Multibiometric Systems 
Table ‎3-8 demonstrates alternative solutions that have been proposed to move the potential 
processing burden from the user devices to a web server (Traore et al., 2012; Ceccarelli et al., 
2014). The former combined mouse and keystroke dynamics to ensure the identity of a web 
service user after an initial conventional password login. Their overall EER was 8.21% using 
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Bayesian fusion. The universality of their approach, however, is an issue, in particular when 
users accessing the services on mobile phones where acquiring the mouse/keystroke features 
might be implausible. The latter presented a multimodal biometrics verification protocol 
applied in an Internet system called Context Aware Security by Hierarchical Multilevel 
Architecture (CASHIMA). It is deemed to operate securely in any web service from a variety 
of client devices, utilising available biometrics sensors of fingerprint, voice, face, and/or 
keystroke dynamics samples. It implements a changing level of trust in the user similar to the 
concept of TAS confidence, in that it is determined according to the intervals and quality of 
the acquired samples. The trust level reflects on the subsequent services the user is granted 
access to and the risk level associated to them, leading to relevant reaction ranging from 
allowing access to high sensitive services, restricting access to some services, to locking out 
the system completely and asking for re-authentication. The classification and authentication 
decisions are both performed on the online server side not the client. Thus, privacy issues 
must be given more consideration and assessment. 
Albeit this proposal demonstrated some encouraging features that may contribute to solving 
some of other TAS framework pitfalls, it fell short in proving the feasibility of the solution 
empirically – it was evaluated only on a fully functioning prototype. Additionally, just two 
biometrics traits were incorporated in the prototype: face and voice, which achieved 
independently (not an overall) an FMR of 2.58% and 10% respectively on a smartphone. 
Therefore, some critical issues were not possible to be tested, such as the scalability and 
response time of the protocol and battery consumption of mobile phones. Furthermore, it was 
stated in the proposal that it involves an explicit authentication process at establishing the 
session where fingerprints can be used. This yields not to have a complete transparent 
authentication system. 
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3.8.2 Users’ Perceptions of Transparent Authentication Systems (TAS) 
Clarke et al. (2009) and Crawford and Renaud (2014) investigated the users’ perceptions and 
acceptance of transparent authentication. They found that 92% of 27 participants and 73% of 
30 participants, respectively, believed that transparent authentication provided a more secure 
environment than other conventional authentication. Accordingly, 90% of the latter’s 
participants stated that they would use the transparent authentication technique if it is offered 
to them. Moreover, another study was conducted by interviewing 20 users of both 
smartphone and tablet revealed that they preferred being offered an authentication 
mechanism allowing them to access about 50% of their applications without performing 
intrusive unlock (Hayashi et al., 2012). The relative small samples of these studies 
notwithstanding, TAS can be appreciated as a remarkable solution to effectively remove the 
reliance upon the human aspects to ensure a robust and usable authentication. On the one 
hand, 83% of 470 respondents who owned smartphone and tablet would like to have seamless 
experience across all their devices (Salesforce, 2014).  
3.8.3 Discussion 
It is found that studies have employed a variety of biometric techniques – physiological only, 
behavioural only and both, with the addition of soft biometrics or password. A few systems 
even incorporated intrusive initial login using secret code, fingerprint or iris, rendering them 
not to be complete transparent thereby suffering from intrusive authentication drawbacks. For 
instance, in case of the need for secret credential either at the login or re-login stage, the 
memorisation burden remains along with other documented passwords downsides.  
The operational context also varies, including PC, mobile, wearable, various and varying 
devices, or the Internet and this has a significant impact on the underlying authentication 
techniques that can be utilised and thus subsequently on the performance that can be 
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achieved. Therefore, it is evident that there is a lack of an empirical solution that can be 
accomplished seamlessly in a location, technology and service independent fashion that is 
favoured by the majority of users. Even though that the few studies working on various 
devices and/or the web contexts may present a level of universality, issues of processing 
burden and privacy, respectively, have not been resolved. Despite the fact that most studies 
deployed an identity confidence/trust adaptation, a small proportion of them associated it to 
the differing risk level of a particular data, action, or service. 
With respect to performance, many studies never performed an evaluation; others declared 
heterogeneous metrics (e.g. FAR, FRR, EER, FMR, Verification score, Recognition rate). 
Furthermore, various studies had no overall security performance results revealed but merely 
for each individual deployed modality, making a comparison implausible. The relatively 
small samples most evaluations involved might not resemble the real use of such a system. 
Moreover, the real usage and thus performance would differ from those under controlled 
environment and short durations/intervals where predetermined tasks are performed during 
the evaluation. Therefore, it would be ideal to conduct an extensible evaluation, having the 
participants piloting the trial for a longer time and interval sessions without restrictions in 
order to have a more accurate insight into the system. 
Whilst transparent multibiometric systems have shown enhancement over their intrusive 
counterparts in terms of matching performance and user convenience thus improving the 
authentication decision reliability and robustness, still they are not popular nowadays. This 
can be attributed to the potential endured cost, processing overhead, complexity, and 
acceptability. For instance, the number of possible usage scenarios that are based on the 
availability and type of captured samples would increase the complexity of the system. 
Therefore, these and similar issues have to be thoroughly considered before developing such 
a system. 
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From the analysis, it is envisioned that proposing a successful continuous and transparent 
multibiometric authentication mechanism must address a number of characteristics: 
 achieving a high level of transparency thereby being less dependent on secret-
knowledge or any other intrusive login, e.g. iris; 
 leveraging the available devices capabilities without requiring additional device, e.g. 
token or sensor; 
 incorporating a variety of biometrics from different types, i.e. physiological, 
behavioural, and soft biometrics; 
 deploying an on-going identity confidence level based upon the captured biometrics 
samples, which is subsequently reflected on the user privileges and mapped to the risk 
level associated to them, resulting in relevant reaction(s); 
 functioning with minimal processing overhead in order to have high level of 
scalability thereby reducing the user’s waiting for the authentication decision; 
 providing an architecture capable to operate across a range of digital devices, bearing 
in mind the differing hardware configurations, operating systems, processing 
capabilities and network connectivity; 
 implemented and evaluated extensively on real and live data; 
 having sufficient number of participants conducting the evaluation trial for a long 
time or at least interval sessions with free use in order to provide a more accurate 
insight into the system; 
 and taking into consideration some critical issues, e.g. trust, privacy, and biometrics 
templates management. 
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3.9 Conclusion 
Even though the biometrics outweighs its counterparts of knowledge- and token-based 
approaches, they are still mostly functioning at the point-of-entry, and even those performing 
sort of re-authentication executing it in an intrusive manner. The majority of frameworks that 
were proposed to solve this issue deployed a single biometric to re-verify the user in a 
continuous but implicit fashion. Nonetheless, they have inherited the downsides of the 
utilised modality so they have issues regarding the universality and circumvention. 
Therefore, a serious move towards employing two or more biometric modalities in TAS has 
been taken. However, most of the previous studies in this domain fall short in one or more 
drawbacks in relation to lack of full transparency, universality, interoperability, scalability, 
high performance, and real data on which their validations were conducted. In order to 
provide users with adequate protection and convenience, innovative robust authentication 
mechanisms have to be utilised in a universal level, so they operate in a transparent, 
continuous and user-friendly fashion. 
To conclude, it is perceived that the success of a particular transparent and continuous 
authentication mechanism has the merit of ensuring effective authentication method together 
with users’ acceptance. However, it is paramount to have high level of performance, 
scalability, and interoperability among and with existing and future systems, services and 
devices. Furthermore, all these requirements should be implemented and evaluated 
extensively on real data in order to prove that such a system is viable and should be put and 
deployed in an operational context to measure other key factors that are required for 
successful adoption, such as privacy, users’ acceptance and usability. 
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4 Security, Privacy and Usability – A Survey of Users’ Perceptions 
and Attitudes 
4.1 Introduction 
Users are now in possession of an ever-growing number of advanced digital devices (i.e. PCs, 
servers, laptops, tablets, phablets and smartphones) with a wide range of capabilities which 
are used for accessing, storing and processing personal, financial, medical and business 
information (some of which are often considered sensitive and confidential). Accordingly, 
each device has its own associated security requirements and configurations. Therefore, it is 
apparent that a more innovative, convenient, and secure solution for user authentication is 
essential. 
As perceived throughout previous chapters, most of the undertaken studies and proposed 
solutions thus far endure one or more shortcomings; for instance, inability to balance the 
trade-off between security and usability, confinement to specific device, lack or negligence of 
evaluating users’ acceptance and privacy measures, and insufficiency or absence of real 
tested datasets. 
Hence, it is considered desirable to explore and address related aspects to the proposal that 
the literature has not addressed yet prior to implementing it or any alternative solution; for 
instance, the extent of using the technologies including devices, operating systems, and 
Internet services. To this end, this chapter presents details of a survey that was conducted to 
investigate the current security measures employed and compares these with the desired and 
appropriate protection together with the associated experience. The discussion also considers 
the acceptability of such proposals from the end-user perspective, as this is essential if 
measures are to see sufficiently widespread adoption amongst them. 
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4.2 Design and Methodology 
The survey was designed to explore and assess users’ technology usage and security 
practices, and to investigate their perception and satisfaction regarding current and alternative 
authentication approaches. Furthermore, it sought to understand the usability of these 
practices and to analyse users’ awareness and attitudes towards privacy. This was to answer 
the following research-related aspects: 
 whether users utilise multiple Internet-enabled devices;  
 whether these devices are of diverse types and operating systems;  
 whether users have access to various network technologies and their extent use; 
 whether users employ security tools and maintain them properly;  
 users’ perception of several authentication techniques and associated login failures;  
 and finally their real practices of privacy-related topics along with their acceptance of 
aspects related to the proposed authentication model (i.e. storing biometrics with, 
being monitored by, and passing management of authentication to a TTP). 
The survey was meant to be and conducted over the Internet via an online questionnaire that 
was hosted within the Centre for Security, Communications and Network Research (CSCAN) 
at the University of Plymouth. A set of questions were drafted taking into account the target 
of achieving the survey aims, being understandable by public IT users, being objective, and 
being answered in an average of 10 minutes by about 350 participants. To fulfil this, a 
number of local researchers within the CSCAN were requested to act as participants, have 
pilot turns through the survey, and provide their feedback. As a result, the survey questions 
were repetitively refined and enhanced until they reached the final disseminated version. 
The survey was structured to contain twenty-seven questions comprising a variety of closed-
ended questions including drop down list, multiple choice, and Likert scale with an option for 
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the respondents to comment in some questions where the answer is not listed (Appendix C). 
The questions were divided into four sections, organised as follows: 
1. Demographic: Exploring the participants’ demographic characteristics, including 
questions related to gender, age, education and location. 
2. Technology Usage (Services and Devices): Establishing an understanding of 
persons’ technology usage. 
3. Security Practices and Convenience: Investigating the role and usability of security 
related to the aforementioned respondents’ technology usage. 
4. Privacy: Analysing respondents’ experience and acceptance level of privacy-related 
topics. 
The targeted participants were public users who are 18 years or above and, given that it is an 
online survey, obviously use technology services and/or devices. They were recruited via e-
mail, predominantly targeting students in Plymouth University, staff and colleagues in the 
Faculty of Science and Engineering, as well as friends and relatives. Additionally, it was 
advertised on the International Student Advisory Service website. A news entry on the 
university staff/student portal also was requested and placed. Prior to displaying the survey 
questions, its aims and structure were briefed confirming that the respondents should be 18 
years or older and they are free to withdraw up until the final submission of their responses 
(Appendix C). All of the information has been treated confidentially and respondents have 
been anonymous during the collection, storage and publication of research material. 
Accordingly, it is worth noting that the ethical approval (Appendix B) was obtained ensuring 
that this survey conforms to the ethical principles laid down by the University of Plymouth. 
Chapter ‎4 – Security, Privacy and Usability – A Survey of Users’ Perceptions and Attitudes 
 
89 | P a g e  
 
Due to the resultant ordinal data from the responses of the 5-point Likert scale questions, the 
following arithmetic mean equation is performed to calculate the central tendency of the 









Where R= Response rate, and C= Count of responses/R. 
4.3 Results Analysis 
This section presents details of the survey that was conducted to investigate the current 
security measures employed and compares these with the desired and appropriate protection 
together with the associated experience. 
4.3.1 Demographic 
In total, 302 completed responses were received during a period of 8 weeks that the survey 
was active. This number is within the range of other surveys in the research domain and close 
to the expected and targeted figure.  
An analysis of the survey shows that almost three quarters of the respondents are males 
against the remaining of females, as Table ‎4-1 illustrates. Being within an academic 
institution, nearly 79 per cent of the participants are within the age range between 18 and 39, 
in addition to the fact that the vast majority of them are either students or employed. Even 
though it is likely to skew the results with regard to the group and gender, the survey sample 
shows a proportionate representation of the general population – it is in line with the findings 
of the UK’s Office of National Statistics where the age group (16 to 34) were the top users of 
the majority of the Internet activities with no significant penetration differences between 
males and females (Office of National Statistics, 2013). It can, also, be implied that the 
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majority of respondents are somewhat highly IT literate that entitles them to better 
understand the surveyed issues. With regard to the country of residence, approximately 74% 
of them reside in Europe or Northern America. 
Demographic Factor Characteristic Count Percentage 
Gender 
Female 66 21.85% 
Male 236 78.15% 
Age (in years) 
18-29 113 37.42% 
30-39 125 41.39% 
40-49 48 15.89% 
50-59 14 4.64% 
60+ 2 0.66% 
Employment Status 
Employed 131 43.38% 
Self-employed 14 4.64% 
Student 151 50.00% 
Other 6 1.99% 
Country of Residence 
Europe 192 63.57% 
North America 30 9.93% 
Other 80 26.49% 
Table ‎4-1: Summary of Respondents’ Demographic Characteristics 
4.3.2 Technology Usage (Services and Devices) 
The survey proceeded by analysing the extent of users’ technology usage. Unsurprisingly, as 
shown in Figure ‎4-1, users currently possess an increasing number of digital devices – about 
75% of respondents have 3 Internet-enabled devices or more of which 62% have 4 or more.  
 
Figure ‎4-1: The Number of Internet-Enabled Devices in Use 
These devices represent a variety of models from various manufacturers, thus running a range 
of differing operating systems (OS) (as illustrated in Figure ‎4-2). From the same perspective, 
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in terms of desktop/laptop computers, Windows OS outweighed its counterparts (Mac and 
Linux) by 86%. On the other hand, Apple’s tablets prevail over those of its rivals as 45%, 
preceded by 26% for Android-based tablets. However, the iOS and Android smartphones had 
similar share of users’ usages by 43% and 46% of respondents respectively, in addition to the 
use of other devices with distinct OSs such as game consoles which are used by almost 21%. 
This distribution is not in line with the mobile phones market share that shows 87.6% of it is 
led by Google Android OS (IDC, 2016), making it not representative of the general 
population. Nonetheless, it is not likely to skew the results of this user survey because it is 
out of its related research questions (stated in Section 4.2) to know what the dominating OS is 
but rather to find out how diverse the devices and OSs that are being utilised by users. 
The results of these two figures (4.1 and 4.2) draw attention to the fact that a typical today’s 
user most probably owns/uses many digital devices with differing OSs. This, in turn, 
emphasises the need to consider universal applicability a crucial aspect in any proposed 
authentication mechanism. 
 
Figure ‎4-2: The Digital Devices in Use 
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When it comes to cloud services, Figure ‎4-3 reveals that only a small proportion of 
participants, less than 13%, do not use any cloud service. Having this ubiquitous employment 
of cloud computing, supported by the PwC (2013) survey results (four fifths of their surveyed 
participants store confidential data on the Cloud), it is likely that sensitive information would 
inevitably be involved. This would indicate that privacy concerns about the Cloud (or saving 
personal information remotely) might be diminished or the trust on the measures in place by 
the Cloud Service Providers (CSPs) might be established. Accordingly, this makes the Cloud 
a plausible environment for any solution aiming at broad spectrum of universality and 
acceptability so users are familiar with and able to access it whenever and wherever they 
need. 
 
Figure ‎4-3: Cloud Services Usage 
The high connectivity can be perceived as most of respondents have access to a wide range of 
network technologies, such as home WiFi (97%), public WiFi (61%), and 3G/4G (81%). As a 
result, 53% spend more than half of the day online while nearly 19% are always connected, 
as depicted in Figure ‎4-4. During their online presence, they use diverse services (e.g. 
messaging, email, and online banking) in varying frequencies (e.g. hourly, daily, weekly). It 
can be assumed, therefore, that accessibility to an online authentication solution is likely to be 
positive. On the other hand, as a large number of those questioned are online most of the day, 
securing the used devices and services throughout these long periods of time against misuse 
Chapter ‎4 – Security, Privacy and Usability – A Survey of Users’ Perceptions and Attitudes 
 
93 | P a g e  
 
arises as an issue. Prompting users to re-verify periodically is very disruptive and thus 
apparently inconvenient. 
 
Figure ‎4-4: The Percentage of a Day Spent Online 
4.3.3 Security Practices and Convenience 
Moving forward to exploring the users’ security practices and the ease of use incurred, 
Figure ‎4-5 illustrates that nearly two thirds of users are required to authenticate to 51-100% 
of the services and devices they use. Additionally, 37% of the participants need to enter their 
login credentials several times in a typical day, ranging from frequently (11 times) to too 
many to remember (above 20 times). As a consequence, this added authentication burden 
experienced by the users would lead them to either avoid using it when they have the choice 
whether to enable the authentication feature, or they do not deploy it appropriately. 
 
Figure ‎4-5: The Extent of Authentication Repetition 
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The former is reiterated by the finding that only 49 per cent of the respondents use the 
authentication tool on their digital devices. Furthermore, an example of the latter, i.e. not 
complying with authentication’s good practices, can be seen from Figure ‎4-6; only 9 per cent 
of participants change their password of the most important account on a regular basis 
(weekly or monthly) whilst 27 per cent never changed it. Therefore, it is evident that 
principally relying upon users to secure their IT assets by practising security policies is 
impractical. 
 
Figure ‎4-6: Respondents Changing the Password of Their Most Important Account 
 
Figure ‎4-7: Participants Preferences of Authentication Methods 
Despite the fact revealed by Figure ‎4-7 that PIN/password/pattern authentication methods are 
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related to complying to their good practice measures (security) as seen previously, alongside 
with the inconvenience caused by them (usability) which can be seen in the succeeding 
figures. Interestingly, a high percentage of respondents (82%) preferred not to be without 
authentication. Thus, it can be perceived that users recognise the importance of security. 
Further noteworthy point in this figure is the comparable perception of both physical and 
behavioural biometrics. When combining the responses of ranking 4 and 5 of each category 
and excluding the PIN/password/pattern, the result shows that participants favoured physical 
biometrics the most (29%), followed by behavioural biometrics, graphical password, and 
token (19% each), and cognitive questions the least (16%).  
Figure ‎4-8 demonstrates that about 94% of respondents experienced authentication failure of 
which 22% experienced it several times a week. Accordingly, two thirds of them stated that 
they had been frustrated by those failures as shown in Figure ‎4-9. 
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Figure ‎4-9: Degree of Annoyance Caused by Login Failure to the Participants 
Furthermore, authentication techniques that rely mainly on people to remember or recognise 
secrets or to carry additional devices continue to be the prime contributors to users’ 
inconvenience because most authentication failures are related to them. The results illustrated 
in Figure ‎4-10 show that the prevalent causes of those experienced failures are forgetting 
(67%) or mistyping (55%) the secret code, followed by the absence of the token/mobile 
(11%). This, however, could be proportional with the authentication approaches the 
participants use. The more the users utilise biometrics, the more associated login errors 
perhaps occur. Even so, users might not be the chief responsible cause of them – biometric 
errors can be as a result of sensors, environment, and/or classification issues, which can be 
alleviated in many ways. As a consequence, it can be implied that biometric approaches have 
the potential to obtain users’ acceptance if they offer a less users cumbersome solution than 
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Figure ‎4-10: Percentage of the Reasons of Authentication Failure 
When considering participants concerns about technology-related key aspects, according to 
the arithmetic mean of the responses ranking, respondents expressed that they were most 
concerned about privacy (4.06), followed by security (3.93), abuse (3.66), and then 
convenience (3.62), as demonstrated in Figure ‎4-11. The overall insight of this figure conveys 
clearly that respondents are somehow highly concerned about all these issues closely, 
indicating that an effective authentication solution should vigilantly guarantee all of them. 
Given privacy at the top of respondents concerns implies a reasonable level of privacy 
awareness they have but their according practices compliance are questionable. Hence, 
further exploration about privacy-related issues is needed. These results also suggest that a 
significant proportion of users’ data are considered sensitive to them, thus providing a 
stronger authentication without compromising the ease of use is fundamental. For instance, 
employing intrusive multi-factor authentication mechanism (e.g. password and hardware 
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Figure ‎4-11: Ranking of Participants Concerns about Technology-Related Key Aspects 
Specific questions were asked to investigate users’ usability perspectives regarding the use of 
some authentication mechanisms offered with current devices and services. It seems that 
there was an inclination from the respondents to the notion that those biometrics-based 
authentication mechanisms are more usable and easier to use. Figure ‎4-12 shows that iOS 
Touch ID, which employs fingerprint login on the home button, was rated the second highest 
usable of the alternative mechanisms by achieving 55% of surveyed respondents rated it 
somewhat usable (3), usable (4), or most usable (5), preceded by Android pattern unlock 
(63%) and followed by Amazon 1-Click (52%). Although Android face unlock attained only 
39% of the same rate, it can be considered significant because this relatively low percentage 
might be attributed to the fact that 34% of respondents were not aware about or had not used 
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Figure ‎4-12: Respondents’ Perspectives of the Usability of Current Authentication Mechanisms 
Furthermore, Figure ‎4-13 presents interesting normalised results of the relatively high ratings 
of the approaches once the N/A responses are taken out. iOS Touch ID became the joint first 
most usable with Google Authenticator (79%) followed closely by Android pattern unlock 
(78%). It can also be inferred that users tend to prefer using an authentication method that 
involves minimal effort, with the HSBC Secure Key being considered the least usable. 
 
Figure ‎4-13: The Percentage of Respondents Rated Some Authentication Mechanisms by “Somewhat usable”, 
“Usable”, or “Most Usable” After Excluding N/A Responses 
4.3.4 Privacy 
In relation to participants’ practices and attitudes towards privacy-related aspects, one of the 
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the End-User License/agreement/App permissions (EULAs). Even though privacy issues 
gained the highest concerns of the participants as shown in Figure ‎4-11, the findings in 
Figure ‎4-14 and Table ‎4-2 are perhaps contradictory to that result. 77% of respondents have 
never or rarely read the EULAs. Likewise, 68% of them have never or rarely decided not to 
use/install or uninstalled a service or application due their EULAs despite the fact that some 
of them, for instance, access user location unnecessarily. This contradiction between the 
respondents’ perceptions and real practices can be attributed to various possibilities. It 
perhaps pinpoints the so-called herd behaviour; for instance, there have been a number of 
privacy awareness campaigns and media attention probably as a reaction to some data 
breaches and leakages, making users alerted about the buzzword privacy; however, in 
practice they do not take reasonable care for their privacy or they do not know how to protect 
it. Another possibility could be the fact that users get used to trust specific service providers 
historically leading them to tend to accept any further service or update they may offer. 
Furthermore, other issues may play a role in this negligence, such as cultural tendency 
towards avoiding reading and the annoying design of such licenses and agreements (e.g. very 
lengthy, and full of jargons). 
 
Figure ‎4-14: Frequency of Reading the EULAs 
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Rarely (1-3 times) 30 
Sometimes (4-10 times) 21 
Frequently (11-15 times) 8 
Very Frequent (16-20 times) 3 
Too many to remember 0 
Table ‎4-2: Frequency of Not Using or Uninstalling Services Due to the End-User License/Agreement/App Permissions 
A subsequent question in this domain was about the respondents’ confidence in storing their 
biometrics with a TTP, highlighting that this would enable utilising them to perform 
authentication anywhere to use different devices and services. As appears in Figure ‎4-15, an 
accumulated 41% of participants stated that they are confident or very confident storing their 
biometrics with a TTP, against only 30% who are unconfident or very unconfident. Given 
that 29% had neutral confidence in this issue, the compound result gives an arithmetic mean 
of 3.1 which indicates that there is a slight tendency towards adopting the concept. 
 
Figure ‎4-15: The Confidence in Storing Biometrics with a TTP  
However, Figure ‎4-16 depicts that 57% of the surveyed users would prefer storing their 
biometric templates on their own devices only or together with other locations, i.e. 11% 
prefer storing them with network operators (e.g. ISP, mobile operator) whereas 26% with a 
TTP. On the other hand, there is a low proportion of them (13%) reject the idea of storing the 
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Nevertheless, users already trust service providers with their authentication credentials. 
Additionally, it is likely that recognising the benefits of such a method would shift the 
preference towards keeping the biometric templates with a TTP or both on the device and the 
network operator or a TTP as proposed by Karatzouni et al. (2007). For example, biometric 
templates stored off-board/remotely would remove the processing overhead away from the 
device, hence saving memory and energy, and allowing better universality and applicability. 
On the contrary, storing the templates on-board would eliminate the potential time lag 
introduced through the network traffic. Nevertheless, this is only important if the system is 
waiting for a response (i.e. point-of-entry) – in a transparent mode, this is not typically the 
case. Therefore, having a hybrid approach storing templates between the own device and the 
operator or a TTP is reinforced by the variety of responses and by some of current 
deployments – as already many apps on mobile devices do this (often transparently to the 
user) such as Siri, iCloud, and Dropbox. 
 
Figure ‎4-16: Respondents’ Preferences of the Location(s) of Storing Biometrics Templates 
From a similar perspective, Figure ‎4-17 reveals an interesting result where the respondents 
expressed greater acceptance (58% accepted, leading to an arithmetic mean of 3.6) of their 
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the previous assumption that whenever the benefits of adopting any proposed solution are 
clearly elaborated and justified, it would gain higher level of acceptability. It is even 
supported by the results of two credible surveys (PwC, 2012; Salesforce, 2014), where three 
quarters of respondents were willing to share some personal information in return to the 
benefits they will receive. 
 
Figure ‎4-17: Acceptance Level of Participants’ Usage Behaviour Being Monitored 
Lastly, Figure ‎4-18 shows that when exploring the extent of participants’ willingness to pass 
the responsibility of managing authentication to a TTP, there was a decline compared with 
the outcome of Figures 15, 16 and 17 above (where participants were more towards accepting 
the notion of storing biometrics with and being monitored by a TTP). Only 23% rated their 
inclination to the idea by responding by (willing “4” or very willing “5”) whereas the 
majority (40%) were in the middle of the scale between the willingness and unwillingness. 
Even though these results are not in line with those represented earlier, the preparedness rate 
is not that low given that the arithmetic mean is 2.7. In addition, the way of asking this 
question without any further explanation regarding the potential advantages of doing so may 
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Figure ‎4-18: Willingness to Pass the Responsibility of Managing Authentication to a TTP 
Again, users who better understand a mechanism and the implications involved will more 
likely have a more informed decision about it. Moreover, in the reality, users have been 
delegating the responsibility of managing their login credentials to service providers who run 
Identity Access Management (IAM) systems in many examples either while using SSO or 
federated identity (where in one way or another, one of the participating parties in the 
federation or of the communication standards acts as third party) (Madsen et al., 2005; Stihler 
et al., 2012). 
4.4 Discussion 
The results of the survey are derived from a range of participants’ with a variety of 
backgrounds in terms of gender, age, employment, and countries. It is evident the 
respondents profoundly interact with digital devices, especially those providing Internet 
access which is being utilised for many online services a significant proportion of the day. 
Some of these services are categorised sensitive and confidential. As a large number of those 
questioned are online most of the day, securing the devices and services throughout these 
long periods of time against misuse arises as an issue. Prompting users to re-verify 
periodically is very disruptive and thus apparently inconvenient. It is also found the 
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communication technologies. Therefore, the requirements to protect users’ information have 
come to the utmost importance. 
Although participants state that they use one or more of the security tools on their devices 
(e.g. antivirus), they fall foul in using authentication as less than half of them enable it. Even 
so, they are prompted to authenticate to access their devices as well as services many times a 
day with which the majority of them encounter frequent login errors and have got annoyed by 
that. These errors are caused mainly by secret-knowledge approaches (mismatched and/or 
forgotten secrets) followed by token-based approaches (absence of token/mobile). 
Furthermore, non-compliance with password policies by respondents (e.g. 69% of them have 
never or rarely changed their passwords despite being for the most important account) can be 
attributed to users attempts to avoid the above-mentioned nuisance. There is an apparent 
contradiction between the widespread interest in more security and the quite low number of 
respondents using or maintaining the available security measures. 
It is also perceived that albeit of the high percentage of login failure occurrences, the 
relatively amplified level of frustration caused by these failures, and being the dominant 
reasons of them, secret knowledge-based authentication approaches are still preferred by the 
respondents. This might be due to the fact that most of the users have not been exposed to 
other techniques, such as biometrics, they have used other alternatives but in a very intrusive 
manner, or they have associated them with their leading and historical use in criminology and 
forensics. However, physical biometrics is the second preferred authentication approach by 
29% of the participants outweighing graphical password, cognitive questions and tokens. 
These results along with the significant proportion having the information security on top of 
their concerns show that there is a desire for added but convenient security, which is lacking 
on the most utilised existing authentication technique – the secret-knowledge. It seems that 
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users do not avoid applying the concept of authentication security but the current available 
common authentication technique. As such, a move towards continuous and transparent 
authentication may provide the trade-off between users’ convenience and higher security. 
The plethora of users with many devices and services which each may has its own security 
configurations and requirements, together with the widespread access to a wide range of 
communication technologies and cloud services, yielding to a high success possibility of a 
prospect cloud-based authentication solution. Such solution that centralise the task of 
authentication to a TTP would enable providing it in a device and service independent 
fashion, relieving users of the burden of enrolling and authenticating to each device and 
service separately and the devices of a significant volume of data processing and storage. 
This is also supported by and would even improve the comparatively positive responses 
regarding storing biometric templates with a TTP as well as having usage behaviour being 
monitored. 
4.5 Conclusions  
The survey findings reinforce the observation that users utilise a variety of Internet-enabled 
devices to carry out a wide range of activities, many of which are considered sensitive. 
Whilst the most adopted authentication approach is still the secret knowledge-based, it is 
(followed by tokens) the chief reason of login errors; consequently high proportion of users 
either inactivate it or misconduct its use. For instance, two third of participants never or 
rarely changed the password of their most important account. On the contrary, respondents 
are overwhelmingly concerned about protecting their information, devices and accounts, 
revealing that a disjoint between users’ perceptions towards security and real practices is in 
existent. Therefore, it is evident that users do not avoid applying the concept of authentication 
security but the drawbacks of current available common authentication technique. 
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Thus, alternative security measures are apparently required given that they do not heavily rely 
upon users to secure them. Biometrics may have the merit of providing this as physical 
biometrics is the second preferred authentication approach by 29%. The revolutionary growth 
of personal digital devices’ capabilities may open the horizon to leverage them for biometrics 
capturing.  
The survey also demonstrates that users are online most of the day performing a wide range 
of sensitive tasks that are required to be secured throughout the usage session. The 
respondents incline towards storing biometric templates with a TTP as well as having their 
usage behaviour being monitored. Advanced connectivity technologies and cloud services are 
capable to be deployed for a novel authentication security solution managed by a TTP to 
offer a federated, transparent and continuous authentication in order to be used on multiple 
devices and services. Nevertheless, such mechanism must be designed attentively ensuring 
various related aspects, such as the security of biometric templates on and during the 
transmission to the Cloud.  
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5 Real-World Analysis of TAS 
5.1 Introduction 
It is evident from the literature survey conducted in ‎3.8 section that prior research has 
suggested various novel approaches to authentication such as transparent authentication and 
cooperative and distributed authentication. For instance, Clarke (2004) proposed a mobile-
based model called (IAMS) for continuous and transparent authentication and then extended 
and enhanced it in a number of studies (Clarke & Furnell, 2006; Clarke et al., 2009) to 
surface the NICA frmaework. Subsequently, Karatzouni (2014) undertook experimental 
modelling on NICA. However, these studies amongst the others were evaluated based upon 
simulated or semi-simulated off-line data so most of the systems were experimented on 
virtual user data. In addition, to the best of the author’s knowledge, even those a few studies 
that experimented on real data, they evaluated it on a small number of users, short durations, 
specified tasks, and controlled environments. As a result, there is an apparent lack of publicly 
available multimodal dataset acquired in a real-world unconstrained environment over a 
reasonable period of time. Thus, there is a need to implement these models with real data to 
understand how they work in practice for different users.  
A few previous studies (i.e. those of Ceccarelli et al. (2014), Clarke and Furnell (2006), and 
Clarke et al. (2009)) also did take into account the risk levels and authentication requirements 
of the actions being carried out and services being accessed by users. Consequently, this 
renders it difficult to understand and appreciate the dynamic between the real use and 
authentication and security requirements. Furthermore, they merely focused upon individual 
platforms rather than providing a universal and federated authentication approach that can be 
used across technologies and services in a convenient fashion. Building upon existing 
research on TAS, a cloud-based solution would offer these premises but before moving to 
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what it might look like, establishing an empirical understanding basis about whether these 
existing models might work and how well in real practice using real life data (captured for the 
purpose of this research particularly) is needed.  
Having stated this, a number of derived research questions need to be addressed and 
investigated experimentally. Accordingly, three experimental studies were developed to be 
carried out with the aim of resolving them. These are the experiments and the related 
questions they sought to address:  
 Experiment 1 – A baseline study on transparent and soft biometrics: a baseline 
set of experiments to understand the nature of transparent biometrics and soft 
biometric data and determine their potential contribution to the system performance. 
 Experiment 2 – A replication study: a replication of a well-established previous 
study (i.e. NICA) in order to validate whether prior TAS models function on real live 
user data and what their actual performance is in practice. 
 Experiment 3 – Multibiometrics-based continuous authentication decisions: an 
enhanced model to utilise multibiometric fusion and time windowing within a device, 
aiming at investigating whether employing a fusion mechanism that encompasses all 
available biometric samples at a given time-frame is viable in practice and to what 
degree it improves the performance from the individual unimodal-based approaches.  
Therefore, this chapter seeks to initially establish an experiment to capture and collect real 
data of a set of biometric techniques and coexisting device’ sensors from a real and live usage 
without any environmental or usage constraints. The collected data is employed in a series of 
studies evaluating the appropriateness and effectiveness of utilising them for such a universal 
solution with a view of identifying the attributes required for a successful authentication 
mechanism.  
Chapter ‎5 – Real-World Analysis of TAS 
 
110 | P a g e  
 
5.2 Experimental Methodology 
This section presents the scientific methodical approach followed while conducting the data 
collection along with each of the aforementioned three experiments. 
5.2.1 Methodology of Data Collection 
In general, the research seeks to explore how users’ profiles can be constructed and 
intelligently utilised for authentication based on the biometric features captured during real 
and live unconstrained use of the mobile device. A biometric data collection exercise was 
sought to create a real dataset of a significant number of real users over a significant period of 
time of real and totally uncontrolled use. It was apparent that a software would be required, 
so a biometric data collection software was developed (described in detail in ‎5.2.5). 
With the biometrics requirements in mind (in particular universality, collectability and 
acceptability discussed in ‎3.2), four modalities were selected to be incorporated in the 
software; face, voice, app usage, and gait, along with the location information. The utilised 
traits should be possessed by every participant, easy to collect by normal daily devices and 
interactions, and accepted to be provided in terms of, for instance, users’ privacy and 
convenience. Another reason for this selection is the fact that they represent a variety of 
biometric techniques – physiological (face), behavioural (voice, app usage, gait), and soft 
biometrics (geolocation), offering a better insight about the system and its potential 
enhancement. 
Those biometric samples were planned to be automatically, continuously and transparently 
collected and stored on their devices’ local storage without any interference upon 
participant’s normal activities (i.e. without the need for any additional actions from the users 
and without interrupting them) for 2 weeks to get as much data as possible. Furthermore, 
looking at it pragmatically, getting both weekdays and weekends data to show the different 
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nature of the user behaviour to draw the research model for different usage scenarios was 
deemed important. However, there was also a need to trade this off with being able to 
encompass the data collection exercise in an appropriate time-frame. Therefore, it was felt 
that 2-week worth of data was a super volume of data to base this upon. After several 
refinements, specified capturing intervals of the aforementioned biometric modalities data 
were decided (elaborated in ‎5.2.5) aiming at avoiding the substantial battery drainage might 
be encountered by participants and hence thwarting them from taking part in the study.  
Accordingly and prior to the recruitment for participation, 6 users were asked to undertake a 
pilot study by having the developed application installed on their smartphones and tablets to 
examine the application functionalities. After a number of refinements (resulted from the 
pilot study) and ensuring that the application is working as required, ethical approval was 
acquired from the university’s Research Ethics Committee (Appendix D), and participants 
were sought and invited to participate in this biometric data capturing experiment. In order to 
facilitate a meaningful analysis, the targeted total number of subjects was 40 as a minimum 
which is considered a sufficient baseline based upon other previous research that were 
conducted using similar sample sizes (Beautement & Sasse, 2010). They were briefed about 
the nature of this research and probed to ask any questions regarding the experiment, 
followed by giving them the consent form at the beginning of the study (Appendix D) should 
they wish to carry out the study. In order to ensure meeting the stated requirements of the 
targeted dataset being a true representation of natural usage pattern, the following were 
confirmed to be followed:  
1) Participants were not given any specific task to carry out.  
2) No specific usage environment or conditions was specified so it should be totally 
uncontrolled. 
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3) All participants had the software installed on their own devices to eliminate effect 
of hardware change. 
Once participants gave their consent, the application was installed on their Android 
smartphones (and tablets where appropriate). Upon completing the experiment duration, the 
captured biometric samples were generated in a database format files on the participants’ 
devices’ local storage. The data was shown to the participant – once they were happy to 
transfer it, the files were taken by the principal investigator. They were then anonymously 
and securely stored within the Centre for Security, Communications and Network Research 
(CSCAN) at the University of Plymouth in a way that introduces an element of abstraction 
and/or encoding to be converted to specialised measurements and feature vectors, only to be 
analysed anonymously by a machine.  
It is not the purpose of this research to examine whether executing the concerned algorithms 
on the devices themselves or on a server/cloud is practical. Therefore, upon the completion of 
the data capturing process, the pattern classification analysis of all these studies was 
implemented on the collected dataset offline (i.e., not on the participants’ devices themselves). 
5.2.2 Methodology of Experiment 1 
Prior to undertaking the second and third experimental studies that are going to incorporate a 
single modality or a combination of individual’s modalities within the dataset, a baseline set 
of experiments needed to be conducted to determine the nature and performance of the 
potential contributing modalities. These can be physiological/behavioural biometrics and/or 
soft biometrics. In a transparent mode, the nature of biometrics works in a different way than 
it is in the conventional intrusive mode. Therefore, fundamentally, there is a need to 
understand what the values of these individual biometric techniques are and what the sensors 
additional information may provide. However, it was out of the scope of this PhD research to 
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create and evaluate a unimodal biometric technique of each of the biometrics that could be 
used in the proposed system. Hence, a couple of preliminary investigations were designed 
and undertaken on an example of one of each category – the most available and highest 
performing biometrics (i.e. facial recognition) in terms of biometrics, and GPS information in 
form of soft biometric information. An evaluation of those within the transparent 
authentication context would aid to gain an insight about how useful they may be.  
As reviewed in Section ‎3.8, there were prior studies on the performance of transparent facial 
verification and geolocation. However, they were calculated in this research because it is 
believed that the published studies may differ when they are applied on such a dataset of real 
and un-controlled live usage data with all varying conditions, including illuminations, 
orientations, distance, and capturing times (to name but a few). On the other hand, despite the 
geolocation is arguably considered as a distinct authentication approach (Conrad et al., 2012), 
there have not be any study investigating its performance separately (to the best knowledge of 
the author). In this research, it is not counted as an independent biometric technique but it is 
an example of how information could be used to help provide better discrimination. 
Moreover, just for better understanding, it was calculated in what would be the EER for 
location to suggest that it is actually quite discriminative. As such, it is presented as a 
measure of similarity to understand how unique it is and whether if it is augmented by other 
pieces of information, it will add to the process constructively. Thus, it is regarded in this 
research as a smart information source or soft biometrics that can be utilised to improve the 
robustness of such federated cloud-based authentication model. In addition, in terms of 
moving forward with the other experiments, published EERs from the prior literature were 
used in addition to the results of these preliminary experiments to provide a basis for them. 
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5.2.3 Methodology of Experiment 2 
The ultimate aim of this research project is to build upon existing research on transparent and 
distributed authentication (which albeit exist, they have not been used on real data). Most of 
the previous TAS frameworks were scripted evaluations on simulated data (without 
collecting samples from real-world use) and controlled environment/parameters, which might 
not resemble the real use of such a system. Moreover, the real usage and thus performance 
would differ from those under controlled environment and short durations/intervals where 
predetermined tasks are performed during the evaluation. Therefore, it would be ideal to 
conduct an extensible evaluation of one of the previous TAS framework at which this 
research is built upon, having the participants piloting the trial for sufficient period of time 
without restrictions in order to have a more accurate insight into the system. 
Had this research proceeds with another piece of simulated work based on the assumptions of 
a previous simulated model, there would be a risk of building it upon inaccurate or biased 
parameters, assumptions and/or results. Furthermore, it would be difficult to generalise 
findings from experiments because they might not be true to real-world dynamics. In the one 
hand, establishing the empirical feasibility investigation and analysis on real data would be 
useful to provide a fair insight about the performance. Thus, it would be wise to start with 
replicating one of the previous studies (i.e. NICA) in order to establish a knowledge on 
whether they work, to investigate the real performance and to understand what actually 
happens in practice with real data. Moreover, it would aid to assure the previous results are 
reliable and valid, and to determine whether extraneous variables exist to consider in the 
research novel model, such as the drop value of degradation function. 
With the aim of aiding the performance evaluation of the NICA framework utilising the 
collected real dataset thereby replicating its functionalities in practice, vital data inputs are 
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required – i.e. the risk level of each application the user accessed and their related security 
requirement levels (i.e. integrity level). For the experimental purposes, there should be a 
benchmark scientific method to set various risk levels for different used applications/services 
in the dataset for each user. Furthermore, the risk level of a common application among the 
participants should be consistent to avoid any skewness in the results (though this might not 
be the case in reality as every user has their own security perceptions and needs). The 
rigorous study of Ledermuller and Clarke (2011) that proposed a risk assessment model for 
mobile devices was adopted (demonstrated in Table ‎5-1). 
Asset Category Risk Level 
E-Mail (corporate)  8 
E-health 8 
E-banking 7 
Remote access (corporate) 7 
Stored business documents 7 
Remote access (private) 6 
Voice communication 5 
Physical device 5 
Personal information (online synchronised) 4 
E-Mail (private) 4 
Web access (browser) 4 
Messaging 4 
Social networking 3 
Personal information 3 
Stored documents Maps 2 
Maps & Navigation 2 
News client 1 
Utilities 1 
Table ‎5-1: Device’s Asset Categories and their Associated Risk Levels. adapted from Ledermuller and Clarke (2011) 
They stated that each mobile application category has its distinct associated risk level 
dependent upon a number of measures, e.g. their asset values, threat levels, and vulnerability 
levels. Accordingly, the security requirement can be applied for each application based upon 
their risk level – the higher the risk level of an application, the higher the associated security. 
That is, the applications/services that are associated with private information or expensive 
services would require a high level of security whereas the normal applications/services 
would require a low level of security. For example, the online banking app is assigned level 
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7, voice call is level 5, and 1 for weather forecast app. If the integrity level (IL) is greater than 
or equal to the specified associated security level, a transparent access is granted, otherwise 
an intrusive authentication request is required in order to proceed with the service. Thus, all 
applications used by the participants in the acquired dataset were ranked based upon the 
afore-mentioned risk assessment model in order to be the baseline thresholds to feed the 
algorithms and to compare against in this and all subsequent studies. 
5.2.4 Methodology of Experiment 3 
Going beyond the results of the replication study, another thorough study using 
multibiometric fusion approach would provide an empirical validation whether it offers a 
better level of security and users’ experience, and whether it is more appropriate to an 
innovative authentication architecture. 
As the biometric samples can be captured by one or different biometric techniques, the 
following approaches are implemented so one or a set of them is applied as appropriate 
(elaborated in ‎3.6.1): 
 Multi-Sample approach: deploying multiple inputs of the same modality in order to 
have a more informed identity verification decision and to offset the existence of 
samples of low quality. 
 Multimodal approach: deploying a single sample of multiple modalities to alleviate 
the malfunction of some incorporated biometric techniques or sensors. 
 Hybrid approach: dynamically deploying single or multiple samples of multiple 
modalities. This would fine-tune the algorithm in order to achieve a desired 
performance, crafting a more multi-layered method. 
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Referring to the review in ‎3.6.2, these samples need to be fused effectively at certain phase of 
the biometric system: sensor, feature, matching score, and/or decision level (Clarke, 2011; 
Ross, 2007; Sim et al., 2007). The approach to be adopted in this experiment is the decision-
level fusion of available multimodal and multi-sample decisions. Even though it is not the 
most accurate multibiometric fusion type (Ross et al., 2006), the decision-level fusion 
approach is the most appropriate one for the available information of the captured dataset and 
it also has the merit of encompassing any number of classifiers without the need to re-train 
the system. This objective aims at producing such a scalable, flexible and dynamic 
framework, thereby enabling multiple diverse classification schemes, in order to have a more 
robust authentication decision. 
The implemented multibiometric authentication system is tasked with taking the binary 
decisions and subsequently performing an accumulative decision taking into account the 
variability factors of the biometric information. This fusion can be as max, min, median, or 
majority vote combinations (Kittler et al., 1998). However, security needs more consideration, 
e.g. single biometrics should not have much value. In order to produce a balanced decision 
considering the effect of the inputs from modalities of different EERs yet different accuracies, 
consideration needs also to be given to the weight each individual contributing technique has 
on the fused decision. 
Probability fusion can be an option but unlike the matching-level fusion, the adopted 
decision-level fusion lacks the richness of information that can be used as probabilistic inputs. 
However, there is an approach that can be implemented at the decision-level fusion whilst 
taking the proportional different verification performance of the contributing biometrics into 
account – the weighted majority voting. For instance, typically, the facial verification 
performs better than the gait recognition and thus would have a greater weight and effect on 
the final fused decision. This would also support the flexibility and dynamic of the approach 
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when employing classifiers/biometrics of changing nature, based at which their weights 
would be updated accordingly. 
Therefore and for evaluation purposes, MATLAB scripts were developed to investigate the 
Weighted Majority Voting Fusion (WMVF) of facial verification, voice verification, gait 
recognition and behavioural profiling. 
Given enough time in samples, any combination of multibiometric systems could potentially 
exist. In order to manage the data, this weighted majority voting formula is devised; knowing 
that the weights are assigned to the individual biometric techniques inversely proportionate to 
their EERs – the lower the EER, the higher the weight than those of high EER. 










Where: i= the number of the biometric technique;  
N = the total number of available biometric techniques within the specified time 
window; 
x = the number of the sample of the biometric technique; 
M = the total number of samples of the same biometric technique within the specified 
time window; 
D = the decision of the biometric sample; 
W = the weight of the biometric technique. 
Based upon the existence of the samples, the Alert level algorithm would correspondingly 
respond taking into account their number, confidence level(s), weight(s), and individual 
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classification decision(s). The result of this formula is compared with the threshold associated 
with the risk level of the accessed application/service. 
An investigation tool was required to facilitate the pattern classification processing of these 
studies. Hence, the specialised mathematical modelling software package MATLAB (R2015b 
release) that is developed by MathWorks was employed on a Windows 7 Enterprise 64-bit 
Operating System with Intel Core i5-4310 CPU, 2.7 GHz and 16 GB RAM. It is utilised 
extensively for the modelling and validation of the studies of this research because of its 
common use and well-acceptance throughout scientific and engineering communities in the 
analysis of mathematical problems. A number of scripts were written and then generated in 
order to perform a variety of tasks to implement the experiments (Appendix F). In all these 
studies, the data of each participant was split into two datasets: 60% for training the 
classifiers and generating the user profile and 40% for validation and testing the performance. 
Accordingly, the latter was performed considering one participant acting as the valid 
authorised user whilst the remaining other participants as imposters and then repeating to 
ensure all users have the opportunity of acting as the authorised user. Results are then 
averaged across the population sample.  
5.2.5 Data Collection Software 
The contemporary digital devices (e.g. smartphones and tablets) are capable of capturing 
multiple biometric modalities alongside other pieces of information from built-in sensors (e.g. 
GPS) without affecting the users’ normal interactions. In order to facilitate the subsequent 
experiments set to evaluate and determine potential and feasible attributes to prove the 
research concept using a wide real dataset, a software utilising these smart devices was 
needed to be developed for biometric data collection purpose. 
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Even though the findings of Section 4.3.2 demonstrate that the utilisation of the iOS slightly 
outweighs the Android by the surveyed users, Android environment was selected because:  
 Most of the data to be collected may be considered sensitive so the software and data 
need to be installed and collected off-line. Not all respondents of that user survey are 
accessible to meet face to face for the installation and collection procedures. 
Accordingly, a preliminary pilot study of those reachable potential participants 
showed that about two thirds of them use devices running Google Android OS.  
 It is currently dominating the mobile phones market share by 87.6% (IDC, 2016). 
 It is an open source and easy to manipulate. 
 Its security model details are publicly available. 
 Unlike iOS, it enables access to device detailed sensors data from background 
services without the need to root/jailbreak the devices (it is unlikely for the 
participants to accept that). 
This would enable recruiting more participants on the data collection process and offer a 
reasonable opportunity to acquire data from different sensors unlike other locked platforms. 
As a consequence, a mobile application was developed using Android Studio development 
environment in order to be installed on participants’ devices (both an Android smartphone 
and a tablet where appropriate) for a real data collection. This application is devised to 
capture the biometric samples from the users and store them as templates on the participants’ 
devices’ local storage in order to analyse and utilise them in developing the subsequent 
authentication model and prototype.  
It was crucial to develop the software in an appropriate way to capture the information 
required in an efficient and convenient fashion. Thus, there were no additional sensors or 
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equipment required for the data collection other than the personal participants’ devices. 
Those devices should have the following minimum specifications: 
 A smartphone and/or a tablet operating an Android OS version of 4.0.3 and above; 
 A front camera; 
 GPS location feature. 
 
Figure ‎5-1: Cloud Aura Data Collection Software Architecture 
As illustrated in Figure ‎5-1, the following 5 biometrics are captured and stored on an SQLite 
database on the local storage of participants’ both smartphones and tablets (if available): 
1) Facial recognition  
Images samples are captured at the initiation of the Cloud Aura app and then every 3 
minutes (if a face is detected) – i.e. when there are no face features captured in the image, 
it is discarded in order to eliminate database memory unnecessary overload. These 
images are to be compressed and stored along with their timestamps in the SQLite 
database. Instead of storing their raw versions, they are pre-encoded in Base64 String 
format in order to simplify the database structure and thus their generation overhead is 
decreased. Moreover, they are prepared for future analysis work where the encoded data 
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will be easier to check for integrity and unlikely to be modified in transit. Furthermore, it 
adds a level of obfuscation making it not easy for human’s observation – it is only read 
and analysed by machine. 
2) Voice recognition  
Voice samples are captured at the initiation of the Cloud Aura app and then every 3 
minutes. However, linking it with actions such as phone calls would have been more 
practical but this was avoided in order not to put participants away from taking part in 
such an experiment due to privacy concerns. A noise cancellation method is applied to 
reduce the unwanted surrounding sounds. The captured samples are to be compressed 
and stored together with their timestamps in the SQLite database. Similar to face samples, 
instead of storing their raw versions, they are pre-encoded in Base64 String format in 
order to simplify the database structure and thus their generation overhead is decreased. 
Moreover, they are prepared for future analysis work where the encoded data will be 
easier to check for integrity and unlikely to be modified in transit. Furthermore, it adds a 
level of obfuscation making it not easy for human’s observation – it is only read and 
analysed by machine. 
3) Apps Usage  
All device’s applications usage of a user are captured as soon as they are accessed based 
on their associated timestamps and then are stored in the SQLite database accordingly.  
4) Gait (Walking pattern)  
The Cloud Aura app counts the number of steps the user walks together with the distance 
they cover in each specific hour of a day, and then stores these figures in the SQLite 
database accordingly. 
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5) Geolocation (GPS)  
The Cloud Aura app monitors and captures the geographical location (from either the 
GPS sensor or the WiFi hotspot) of the device as soon as it is in use and the location 
changes per specific hour a day. The captured GPS coordinates (longitude and latitude) 
are stored in the SQLite database accordingly. 
All related capturing packages were encapsulated in one single Android Application Package 
(APK). Native Android was used to develop the Could Aura application whilst XML to 
design its graphics and user interface, Java for the front-end app development, and SQLite as 
the app database. Enabling the software to capture the above-mentioned information was 
facilitated by employing and deploying a number of Android APIs (apart from other 
supplementary basic APIs) as follows (Appendix E): 
 Android Media API – Face Detector  
 Android Hardware Camera2 API 
 Android Media API – Audio Manager 
 Android App Usage API 
 Android User Availability API 
 Android Hardware API – Sensor Manager 
 Android Location API 
 Android Database File Upload API 
5.3 Experimental Results and Analysis 
This section seeks to firstly outline the gathered experimental data. A thorough discussion 
and analysis of the results of the three set experiments is then performed and presented. 
5.3.1 Overview of the Acquired Dataset 
Cloud Aura biometric data capturing software was initially installed on the devices of 58 
subjects, 11 of which were removed from the inclusion in the final dataset for various reasons, 
such as incompatibility frequent crashing, odd battery drainage, and lack of generated core 
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files. As a result, as shown in Table ‎5-2, the data captured from the 47 participants (4 users 
have 2 devices each and 1 user has 3 devices) can be considered rich enough to enable a 
meaningful analysis. Even though the recruited subjects were asked to let the software run for 
14 days, some had above than the requested period and a few less. 
Total Number of All Users 47 
Total Number of All Devices 53 
Total Number of Days 761 
Average Number of Days per Users 14.36 
Total Number of Usage Hours 1,005 
Table ‎5-2: The Overall Final Captured Dataset Statistics 
The participants’ devices also represented a wide range of manufacturing devices (e.g. 
Samsung, Sony, HTC, Google, Motorola and Huawei) as well as Android OS versions 
(ranging from 4.0.3 to 6.0.1), thus giving a better reflection of how the real world practice is. 
Designing and developing such a solution must be performed taking into account 
compatibility and interoperability. 
Table ‎5-3 demonstrates the total logs and samples of each captured biometric modality. The 
15,322 face samples counted are those timestamped images taken while a user using the 
device. This includes all those images taken throughout the day, in all environmental 
conditions, orientation angles and even those not of the authentic authorised device user (in 
case it was used by for instance a colleague during the study). The only exclusion was those 
images with no face exists, such as when the front camera facing the ceiling. This was 
applied to avoid over consuming the devices’ available memories as the storing database 
resides on the devices themselves at the data capturing stage. 
Furthermore, geolocation and gait timestamped logs were utilised in full for this study 
without any erroneous issues. Nevertheless, despite having applications usage, there were 
many daily hours without any logs from these two modalities (i.e. geolocation and gait) 
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caused by a number of possibilities, such as disabling the GPS and the WiFi concurrently and 
remaining seated during these hours. However, this is not considered a shortcoming as this is 
expected in the normal daily smartphones use.  
Total Number of Face Samples 15,322 
Total Number of Voice Samples 10,810 
Total Number of Apps Usage Logs 46,204 
Total Number of Geolocation Logs 11,625 
Total Number of Gait Logs 1,128 
Table ‎5-3: Statistics on Each Captured Modality 
It can also be noticed from the above table that the final dataset contains a rich amount of 
applications usage information having the total number of its logs (46,204) is the highest 
amongst all other collected modalities. This number is assumed to be the number of the total 
authentication requests the users were prompted to when they accessed the applications. 
Therefore, it is used in a number of calculation metrics throughout the forthcoming 
experiments, especially when calculating the number of transparent and intrusive requests. As 
depicted in Figure ‎5-2, the number of days during which the data was collected for each user 
were roughly analogous with an average of 14.36 days per user. Conversely, the total apps 
usage over that period and thus the average number of apps usage per day for each user vary 
markedly, signifying the diversity of usage interactions between users. This observation is 
more noticeable with those participants having multiple devices – perhaps due to the fact that 
solely one device is utilised as primary whilst the others are for secondary use. 
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Figure ‎5-2: The Overall Statistics of the Final App Usage Dataset 
The breakdown of the final app usage dataset in Table ‎5-4 illustrates its immense diversity 
and size, offering the opportunity to utilise it as a behavioural profiling modality given the 
detailed information it provides. Based upon it, the information of how a digital device is 
operated can be identified, including the name of the application, the time, frequency and 
duration at which it was accessed – and then all those can be linked with the geolocation at 
which it was used (if available). 
Avg # of Apps per User 29.87 Avg # of Used Unique Apps per Device 26.49 
Avg # of Apps Usage per User 983.06 Avg # of Apps Usage per Device 871.77 
Avg # of Daily Usage hours 18.96 Avg # of Apps Usage per Day 61.68 
Table ‎5-4: The Breakdown of the Final Apps Usage Dataset 
The average number of applications used per user (983.06) is utilised as a distinctive basis 
between the high active users and low active users, yielding to what Table ‎5-5 demonstrates, 
27 participants are categorised as low active (below average) and the remaining 20 are high 
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Usage Level Participants’ Numbers 
Low Active 
2, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 
17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 
31, 33, 34, 36, 38, 43, 45 
High Active 
1, 3, 4, 5, 9, 19, 23, 28, 29, 30, 32, 
35, 37, 39, 40, 41, 42, 44, 46, 47 
Table ‎5-5: Users Categories based upon their Apps Usage Levels 
It was observed that the majority of device usage/interactions occurred between 6 A.M. and 
midnight; with a very few interactions outside this period of time by a few participants which 
can be attributed to being their usual sleeping time or any other personal reasons. The usage 
data during this relatively idle period was deemed insignificant with regard to the 
experimental analysis. Therefore and to avoid any data inconsistency and to aid un-skewed 
interpretation and representation, this period was not considered during the experiments, 
including calculating the system integrity, user confidence as well as their illustrative plots. 
As it is not practical nor beneficial to present the user interactions of all subjects during all 
experiment days, Figure ‎5-3 and Figure ‎5-4 depict examples of the 18 hours of user 
applications usage associated with their risk levels excerpted from User 31 (a low active user) 
and User 4 (a high active user). The high degree of variation in the number of applications 
used throughout the day and their security requirements indicating the need for considering 
this diversity in any proposed authentication solution. Furthermore, examining these figures, 
which represent the whole experiment population, it is evident that more observed 
interactions with the device were conducted after the working hours (i.e. 17:00) despite 
accessing the apps of the highest risks during the working hours. Even though this was not 
overwhelmingly the case with all subjects, it was quite common observation, implying that 
the time and location at which users utilise their devices may have a major effect on their way 
of use. 
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Figure ‎5-3: Apps Usage Requests throughout a Day for User 31 (Low Active User) 
 
Figure ‎5-4: Apps Usage Requests throughout a Day for User 4 (High Active User) 
5.3.2 Experiment 1: A Baseline Study on Transparent and Soft Biometrics 
The succeeding two sub-sections outline and analyse the baseline set of experiments 
undertaken to determine the nature and performance of the potential contributing modalities; 
namely, facial verification and geolocation. 
5.3.2.1 Facial Verification Performance 
All 15,322 face samples from the collected data set (an average of 333 images per user) were 
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noting that due to the malfunctioning of the front-facing camera of the mobile phone of User 
27, there were no face images from this subject. It is therefore not included in calculating the 
average performance of face verification though it is to be considered with other modalities 
elsewhere in these experimental series. As previously mentioned, a face detection tool was 
applied prior to capturing any image, making the dataset almost free from images with no 
face exists. Adopting a MATLAB Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (CVPR) toolbox 
running Fisherfaces face recognition method – which tends to tolerate large illumination 
variations – the feature vector was generated. It derives a low-dimensional space and then 
uses pixel intensities in the face images as identifying features (Belhumeur et al., 1997). 
Subsequently, the orientation of each facial image was corrected and the enrolment was 
performed and the verification performance was calculated. 
To ensure that the classifier could cope with the variabilities in angles of facial orientation, a 
customisation was deployed on the script enabling it to accept a group of facial images as an 
enrolment template. Accordingly, five randomly selected facial images were utilised to create 
the template, against which the remaining images of that participant were compared. 
Specifying this number was due to what is likely to be in real practice where having such a 
lengthy enrolment process would inhibit the users’ acceptance (Clarke et al., 2008). Images 
of other participants were used as imposters while measuring the algorithm accuracy. That is, 
the images of all remaining 45 subjects were considered imposter samples and used to 
calculate the FAR. This was subsequently repeated with each user taking the role of the 
authorised user. 
Figure ‎5-5 demonstrates that the average face verification EER varied markedly between 
participants ranging from 0 (for Users 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 16, 32, 37, 40, 42) to between 18 and 20 
(for Users 11, 15, 17, 34, 36, 41, 44, 46, 47). As far as the extent of use of these 2 extreme 
subsets is concerned, they also differ significantly so no correlation was observed between 
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them and the endured EERs of the same users. For instance, whilst the number of 
applications used by Users 7, 13 and 16 are quite similar to those of Users 11, 15, 34 and 36 
(i.e. both groups are of low active users), their EERs are divergent completely – with the 
former being of the lowest EER and the latter being of the highest EER. Therefore, there does 
not appear to be a correlation between the EER achieved and the number of applications used. 
 
Figure ‎5-5: Average Face Verification EER & Total Apps Usage for each User 
The level of user identity confidence was calculated continuously based upon the face 
samples captured and their associated verification decisions when compared against the 
template. The decision can be a number between zero and one. No degradation was applied in 
this experiment so the confidence fluctuates only depending on the facial verification 
decision of the coming samples at the time.  
Figure ‎5-6 illustrates that the face authentication confidence levels did not reveal significant 
difference dependent upon the level of usage. Taking examples of one high active participant 
(4) and another low active one (31), they both experienced constantly high identity 
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attributed to factors other than the usage degree such as differences in camera resolutions, 
personal way of use, environmental and lighting conditions, and occlusions. Another 
observation on the same figure is that the face verification technique performed well in such 
un-obtrusive and continuous fashion. 
 
Figure ‎5-6: Face Authentication Confidence (High & Low Active Users) throughout a Day 
The overall resultant EER was 6.05%. Despite being slightly higher than other published 
facial verification EERs, the nature of capturing the dataset (un-constrained and task-free) 
makes this result closer to reality. For example, whilst facial recognition approaches are well 
accepted, they are designed to operate within very tight environmental conditions (i.e. 
specific levels of illumination and facial orientation). Such assumptions in a transparent 
application are unlikely to hold true – implementing it on a mobile phone, it would be 
expected to capture a user’s face in a variety of orientations and during differing times of the 
day. Equally so, if this biometric is fused with other modalities while mapping the fused 
decision with the security requirements of the applications accessed and actions performed, 
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relative high EER may also be due to the high possibility of the dataset having numerous 
partial images, affecting the features matching with the templates of complete images to be 
difficult to perform well.  
5.3.2.2 Geolocation Performance 
A fair number of geolocation samples were collected with a total of 11,625 logs from 44 
subjects, yielding to an average of 264 GPS samples per user (as seen in Table ‎5-6). Albeit 
the participants’ devices were all equipped with GPS sensor and had access to WiFi, the 
collected dataset had no geolocation information at all from only 3 participants (Users 4, 12 
and 28). This might be attributed to the fact that there were no restrictions what so ever on 
users (i.e. participants were not instructed to enable the GPS/WiFi all or at specified times). 
Another issue found upon investigation of the GPS data that there were portion of certain 
days missing for some users. Although it was unclear why exactly this was the case, speaking 
with participants confirmed that this was because they might switch the GPS off or put their 
device on flight mode for a period of time for personal reasons. A possible reason for the 
tendency to disable the GPS could be the high power consumption might be encountered by 
some participants when turning it on all the time. Nonetheless, taking this into operational 
consideration would alleviate the issue of missing geolocation data thereby, for instance, 
deploying a periodic GPS capturing or utilising a more efficient location API such as the 
Google location services. This however, does not remove or minimise the capability of doing 
a meaningful analysis and model given the distribution of captured data between users. 
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User ID Total of GPS User ID Total of GPS User ID Total of GPS User ID Total of GPS 
User1 416 User14 116 User25 140 User37 476 
User2 75 User15 182 User26 114 User38 144 
User3 287 User16 147 User27 102 User39 403 
User5 448 User17 250 User29 271 User40 496 
User6 124 User18 91 User30 553 User41 598 
User7 177 User19 303 User31 182 User42 577 
User8 78 User20 135 User32 628 User43 151 
User9 331 User21 93 User33 160 User44 315 
User10 76 User22 140 User34 151 User45 78 
User11 151 User23 537 User35 314 User46 350 
User13 212 User24 173 User36 181 User47 698 
Table ‎5-6: Number of GPS Captured Samples for each Participant 
To avoid having unreasonable high error rates, the data for each user were pre-processed to 
eliminate those periods when no GPS data recorded as the geolocation classifier ideally 
should not be triggered without inputs. They were consequently aggregated based on the 
timestamps at which they were collected. The coordinates captured were represented on 
decimal format, such as 50.3758239, -4.1413622 where the former number is the latitude 
decimal degree and the latter is the longitude decimal degree. These can be converted to 
degrees, minutes, and seconds (DMS) when required prior to entering the classifier.  
The Mobility Markov Chains (MMC) model was adopted successfully for similar purposes in 
prior art (Gambs et al., 2012; Mahbub et al., 2016). Thus, MMC was utilised for this 
experiment to be able to predict the next location of an individual based upon a number of 
observations of their mobility behaviour over the previous period of time and the locations 
they have visited on particular time-frames. It produced a probability score after comparing 
each geolocation pair with the historical and predicted locations of the concerned user. Not 
only that, consideration was also taken to the marginal differences between the GPSs of close 
proximity to tolerate. For example, the GPSs captured on Monday between 15:00 and 16:00 
are slightly different than those on Tuesday of the same time (e.g. by 10-20 meters) which is 
an accepted margin and would not deteriorate the probability score sharply.  
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As conducted in face verification, the geolocation dataset of each subject were divided into 
60% for training the classifier and creating the user template and 40% for testing and 
validation. Figure ‎5-7 exhibits that a significantly wide range of geolocation performance was 
calculated with 2.60% of User 32 being the best and 24.22% of User 14 being the worst. It 
was found that 5 participants (Users 31, 32, 37, 40 & 42) achieved an EER of less than 10% 
each whilst another 6 (Users 2, 5, 9, 13, 14 & 27) accomplished an EER of more than 20% 
each. Only one subject of the former was categorised as low active user whereas, in contrast, 
a sole subject of the latter was high active user. Therefore, a closer analysis encompassing the 
whole dataset was required to comprehend whether a relation existed between the usage level 
and the geolocation performance. 
 
Figure ‎5-7: Average Geolocation Verification EER & Total App Usage for each User 
Table ‎5-7 shows that the 26 low active subjects had an average EER of 17.95% even though 
that the 18 high active subjects had a better EER of 13.61% (with a difference of 4.34%). 
This could be due to the enriched acquired samples on which the classifier was trained, 
making the decision made more reliable. Furthermore, those high active users perhaps tend to 
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Usage Level Participants’ Numbers Average Geolocation EER% 
Low Active 
2, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 
18, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 31, 
33, 34, 36, 38, 43, 45 
17.95 
High Active 
1, 3, 5, 9, 19, 23, 29, 30, 32, 35, 37, 
39, 40, 41, 42, 44, 46, 47 
13.61 
Table ‎5-7: Average Geolocation EER based upon the Usage Level 
The overall classification resulted in an EER of 15.78%, making it a positive smart 
contributor to accomplish a well-informed authentication fusion system.  Even though it is 
not a biometric and cannot be used alone, it was included and measured in biometric terms 
just to understand how unique it is. For instance, being used as soft biometric so additional 
information being used as part of the decision-making process of a wide biometric system or 
it can be used as a feature within a particular modality such as behavioural profiling where it 
is utilised along with other features to understand the nature of individuals’ behaviour. 
5.3.3 Experiment 2: A Replication Study 
A framework called Non-Intrusive Continuous Authentication (NICA) was selected for 
evaluation because it is believed to be very close to the approach of this research, it has the 
virtue of taking part in tackling aspects of the research problem, besides the fact that it is 
well-documented allowing a straightforward replication (as reviewed in 3.8.1). 
5.3.3.1 NICA Theoretical Foundation 
NICA is a mobile-based solution that utilises a mixture of secret knowledge authentication 
coupled with several chosen available biometric techniques to provide transparent and 
continuous authentication despite the cognitive intrusive initial login (Clarke et al., 2009). It 
can be configured to choose what to include for classification from individual biometric 
techniques. NICA does also consider the assumption that different services and data require 
different security provisions. Through understanding the risk associated with particular user 
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actions and services, the protection level required can vary from almost none for checking the 
time, medium for texting, to significantly high for online banking. The level of confidence is 
continuously fluctuating based upon the biometric samples captured which is subsequently 
reflected on the privileges to access services and applications, enabling the device to 
shutdown functionality if insufficient confidence exists. 
In order to establish the device’s security provision and the system usability, the Integrity 
Level (IL) and the Alert Level (AL) are regarded the pivotal operations of the NICA 
framework to be defined and mapped with confidence levels. As Table ‎5-8 demonstrates, 
confidence levels are aligned with the FAR of the incorporated authentication techniques. 











+ OR - 
Value 
Max IL 
B0 10-20% 0.5 2 S0 PIN/Cognitive NA NA 





IL set to 0 
NA 
B2 2-5% 1.5 4 
B3 0-2% 2 5 
Table ‎5-8: NICA Confidence Levels and the Corresponding IL 
On the other hand, the corresponding Integrity Level (IL) of the system ranges between -5 
and +5 – where -5 is the lowest IL and +5 is the highest IL. The IL changes based upon the 
result of the authentication requests, the confidence level of the utilised authentication 
technique, and the time that has elapsed between them. A specific value is assigned to each of 
the confidence levels to be added to or deducted from the current IL dependent upon whether 
the identity verification is successful, up to a predefined maximum system IL (as also shown 
in Table ‎5-8). With the aim of alleviating the risk of misuse while the device is idle, a 
degradation function is enforced thereby decreasing the IL periodically – 0.5 drop every 30 
minutes for frequent users and 50 minutes for infrequent ones. 
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With regard to the Alert Level (AL), it is run by the authentication manger which is invoked 
every 10-25 minutes and decides which is the most recent sample with the best performance 
within the specified time window to be used for authentication and what the subsequent 
action to take, as illustrated in Figure ‎5-8.  
 
Figure ‎5-8: NICA Alert Level Algorithm (Clarke et al., 2009) 
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Depending upon each authentication decision/request made by the AL, the IL is utilised when 
the user triggers a request to access a service/app that the system has set to be protected. 
NICA provides the protection capability to certain services/apps by associating an integrity 
value as a threshold not to be broken in order to grant the user access to them. Hence, if the 
IL is sufficient to access the service/app, then access will be authorised, otherwise the user 
will be prompted with an intrusive request. 
5.3.3.2 NICA Integrity Performance - Authorised User 
The main contribution of this thesis is not to develop new biometric classifiers/algorithms or 
optimise a specific one, but rather enhancing the mechanism of managing the biometric 
signals received to have a more informed identity verification decision in a more convenient 
and secured manner. Therefore, the performance of selected well-established studies 
(reviewed in Chapter 3) were adopted along with the EERs resulted from Experiment 1 to be 
incorporated as inputs in this and forthcoming experimental studies (as presented in 
Table ‎5-9) whilst mapping them with the associated actual recorded timestamps of the 
dataset.  
Category Biometric Technique EER % 
Physiological Biometrics Facial Verification 6.05 
Soft Biometrics Geolocation 15.78 
Behavioural Biometrics 
Voice verification (Woo et al., 2006) 7.80 
App Usage (Behavioural Profiling) (Li et al., 2011) 7.03 
Gait (Derawi et al., 2012) 20.10 
Table ‎5-9: The Biometric Techniques Performance (EER) to be Employed in the Following Experiments 
In this study in particular, the EERs of 4 biometrics are used – i.e. face verification, voice 
verification, behavioural profiling, and gait. The core focus of evaluating the NICA 
framework is on the concept of transparent user authentication at an operational level – where 
in case of misuse by an impostor or insufficient confidence in the authorised user, an 
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intrusive authentication is requested, otherwise, the user is not interrupted. In addition, no 
consideration to the action(s) resulting in failing intrusive authentication is given in this 
evaluation – a successful authentication is assumed and the AL is reset to Level 1 whereas for 
an impostor it would lead to lock the device. 
As explained in the preceding sub-section, the NICA framework was conceptualised to 
operate the AL time window to be 10-50 minutes and the IL time window (of the degradation 
function) to be 30 minutes for heavy users and 50 for light ones. Although these time 
windows would enhance the usability of such system from the end-user perspective, it might 
be relaxed in terms of security due to being susceptible to misuse in between the triggering 
times. Therefore, varying smaller time windows were configured for this evaluation in order 
to investigate their effect on the framework operational performance and, if possible, 
determine whether a specific combination perform better with specific type of users. 
However, as the combinations of these timings (i.e. AL and IL) can be infinite, just 4 
combinations were tested; namely, AL 2 min/ IL 10 min; AL 5 min/ IL 5 min; AL 5 min/ IL 
10 min; and AL 5 min/ IL 20 min. 
There are many ways to analyse the data but a set of them are to be followed to help explain 
the nature and dynamic of the model. Evaluating the NICA framework is set to assess its 
security and usability on previously mentioned time windows based upon the averages of all 
users, the worst and best cases, and in relation to the different accessed apps risk levels. The 
former focuses on measuring how the integrity level is maintained with an authorised user as 
well as an imposter besides how long it takes to identify and lock out an impostor at differing 
levels of AL whilst the latter focuses on examining its transparency through the frequency of 
interrupting the user to request them to perform an explicit authentication. 
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The primary focus of this sub-section is to gain a better insight into how system integrity 
would be maintained and vary across each time window as a means to determine how secure 
the NICA framework is. Preserving a fair level of integrity while the device is in use by an 
authorised user is an indication of the robustness of the system. Table ‎5-10 demonstrates the 
average system integrity (out of 5) of all authorised users over the differing time windows. 
NICA 
Time Windows 
AL 5 min  
IL 5 min 
AL 2 min  
IL 10 min 
AL 5 min  
IL 10 min 
AL 5 min  
IL 20 min 
Average Integrity 3.51 3.69 3.71 3.85 
Table ‎5-10: NICA Average Integrity over Different Time Windows (Authorised User) 
It is apparent that the average integrity of the NICA framework is less in lower time windows 
as triggering the AL and IL at short intervals increases the probability of not having samples 
in between and thus does not allow for keeping or even increasing the integrity. As a result, 
the FRR would be higher with shorter windows. Although the smaller windows (AL=5, 
IL=5) can be considered performing well with an integrity average of 3.51 out of 5, it is 
increasing with the greater time windows – the significant difference is noticed with changing 
the IL. This performance can be attributed to the fact that during the larger window (i.e. 
IL=20) the integrity is sustained as the degradation function is not called other than thrice an 
hour. Notwithstanding, this might be at the expense of exposing the device to un-authorised 
access before the next IL drop. 
 A further investigation was conducted to see how divergent the accomplished integrities 
were across these time settings. As shown in Table ‎5-11, User 44 had the worst calculated 
average integrity throughout all time windows whilst three different participants (Users 45, 9, 
and 18) scored the best cases. Even though the performance spectrum looks wide ranging 
from 0.94 to 4.87, almost 60% of participants experienced an average integrity of above 3, 
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enabling granting the legitimate user access to those applications of risk levels above 3 
resulting in a fair degree of transparency. 
NICA 
Time Windows 
AL 5 min  
IL 5 min 
AL 2 min  
IL 10 min 
AL 5 min  
IL 10 min 
AL 5 min  
IL 20 min 
Worst Case Integrity 
User ID 
1.17 1.05 1.08 0.94 
44 44 44 44 
Best Case Integrity 
User ID 
4.85 4.75 4.86 4.87 
45 9 18 18 
Table ‎5-11: NICA Worst and Best Integrity Cases over Different Time Windows (Authorised User) 
Another observation here is with respects to the extent of user interaction revealing that no 
direct correlation existed between it and the achieved integrity across all participants. For 
instance, from those users of worst and best cases, whilst Users 44 and 9 were of the high 
active users, the former was the worst case and the latter was the best with the AL of 2 
minutes and the IL of 10 minutes. Despite the possibility of the lack of available samples 
while utilising small time windows hence causing constant dropping integrity due to the 
degradation function, the framework still achieved quite acceptable positive integrity. In a 
nutshell, the role that varying time windows play in the process of the framework is evident 
and can vary from one user to another.  
5.3.3.3 NICA Integrity Performance - Imposter User 
Having investigated the NICA framework with the authorised user regarding maintaining a 
representative confidence on the user, the security aspect of the framework needs to be 
further examined considering an impostor exploiting the system. 
The average integrity of the system for an impostor across the four time windows is shown in 
Table ‎5-12. The lower the integrity of the system, the higher the security. With integrities less 
than (-4), the user would not only be rejected from accessing applications/services of high 
risk levels but also from accessing those of low risk level, leading to barring the whole 
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device. The shorter time windows outperform the longer ones albeit this might be in favour of 
security but not usability as this would increase the FRR. Therefore, a balanced trade-off 
between security and usability based upon the user requirements and preferences together 
with the risk nature of data/apps/services is needed. 
NICA 
Time Windows 
AL 5 min  
IL 5 min 
AL 2 min  
IL 10 min 
AL 5 min  
IL 10 min 
AL 5 min  
IL 20 min 
Average Integrity -4.84 -4.67 -4.64 -4.41 
Table ‎5-12: NICA Average Integrity over Different Time Windows (Imposter User) 
In order to further examine the system integrity against the illegitimate access, worst and best 
cases were recalled besides the average time of detecting and locking out the imposter 
(Table ‎5-13). The worst and best integrities with imposter were comparative to those with 
authorised user, but with 3 other participants (Users 20, 32, and 35) getting the best results. 
Even so, the absence of direct relation also occurred between the usage level and the 
performance – given that half of the reported best cases are categorised as high active (Users 
32 and 35) and the other half as low active (Users 20 and 45). 
NICA 
Time Windows 
AL 5 min  
IL 5 min 
AL 2 min  
IL 10 min 
AL 5 min  
IL 10 min 
AL 5 min  
IL 20 min 
Worst Case Integrity 
User ID 
-1.47 -1.33 -1.35 -1.17 
44 44 44 44 
Best Case Integrity 
User ID 
-4.99 -4.86 -4.95 -4.97 
35 32 20 45 
Average Detection Time (min) 5.670 2.155 5.360 5.166 
Table ‎5-13: NICA Worst, Best Integrity Cases and Detection Times over Different Time Windows (Imposter User) 
The results of the table also presented that the system security was sound being able to 
identify and prevent the imposter from accessing the applications/services within a few 
minutes proportionate to the operated AL time. The acceptability of these detection times is 
dependent upon the user requirements and utilised applications risk levels. Furthermore, it is 
envisaged that these times would be reduced if the imposter starts by requesting a high risky 
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application which is higher than the system integrity at the time, at which the imposter will 
have an immediate failed authentication leading to a quicker integrity drop. 
5.3.3.4 NICA Usability Performance 
Although it can be deduced that the framework manages to maintain a certain level of 
transparency, a closer look into the extent of intrusive authentication requests is desired. 
Therefore, the percentages of these intrusive requests of each user throughout the usage 
period were averaged to get the overall system usability performance. In line with the 
security results, Table ‎5-14 elucidates that there is a correlation between the IL and the 
number of explicit authentication requests. As the time windows rise and the better the 




AL 5 min  
IL 5 min 
AL 2 min  
IL 10 min 
AL 5 min  
IL 10 min 
AL 5 min  
IL 20 min 
% of Intrusive 
requests 
% of Intrusive 
requests 
% of Intrusive 
requests 
% of Intrusive 
requests 
46,254 19.85 16.16 15.79 12.99 
Table ‎5-14: The Average Percentage of Intrusive Authentication Requests of NICA 
It can be interpreted that longer time windows introduce fewer intrusive authentication 
requests on average as invoking the degradation function in short intervals is not as frequent. 
This supports the conclusion that the degradation function has a noticeable effect on such a 
framework. Moreover, taking merely the most recent sample and ignoring the rest of samples 
and the ceiling being posed on the confidence level of each biometric (to which this sample 
belongs) to contribute towards raising the integrity above certain levels (elicited in the NICA 
model) besides the short time between AL requests might be the cause of enduring more 
intrusive requests. 
The performance results of the NICA framework (ranging from an average of 12.99% to 
19.85% intrusive requests of all requests to access applications) show that it offers a fair level 
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of security and usability. However, these numbers being averages mean that there were cases 
achieved worse results so it is worth investigating the effect of including more or all available 
samples (rather than only one in NICA) within the time window to calculate the 
authentication decision and thus the integrity level and how this would be reflected on the 
performance. 
A further analysis was pursued to appreciate which category/categories of 
applications/services risk levels spawned more intrusive authentication requests, and thus 
affected the users’ convenience. Table ‎5-15 illustrates the differing app risk levels that signify 
the required level of user’ confidence alongside the percentage of intrusive authentication 




AL 5 min  
IL 5 min 
AL 2 min  
IL 10 min 
AL 5 min  
IL 10 min 
AL 5 min  
IL 20 min 
% of Intrusive 
requests 
% of Intrusive 
requests 
% of Intrusive 
requests 
% of Intrusive 
requests 
0 0 0 0 0 
1 0.45 0.37 0.36 0.30 
2 1.43 1.16 1.14 0.94 
3 2.07 1.69 1.65 1.36 
4 4.11 3.35 3.27 2.69 
5 11.78 9.59 9.37 7.71 
Worst Case 
User(s) ID 
59.66 56.60 54.47 49.26 
44 44 44 41 
Best Case 
User(s) ID 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2 2 2 2 
Table ‎5-15: The Percentage of Intrusive Authentication Requests of NICA based on the App Risk Levels, Worst and 
Best Cases 
The table shows that the majority of the highly risk apps generated more intrusive 
authentication requests while with lower app risk levels the system became way more 
transparent, i.e. very less intrusive authentication requests. Whereas the average percentage 
of intrusive requests reached more than 50% of the total app requests in the worst cases (with 
Users 41 and 44), the highly secured apps that require trust level of 5 produced the majority 
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of them.  However, the apps with trust required 4 and less acquired gradually descending 
intrusive requests to nearly complete transparency whilst the best case reached that – User 2 
had no intrusive requests at all.  
Given that more than two thirds of the users encountered less than 20% obtrusive requests, it 
is evident that the model is capable of accomplishing rational high levels of integrity for the 
period of usage whilst retaining a reasonable level of users’ convenience although higher 
levels of system integrity and thus transparency are desirable. 
5.3.4 Experiment 3: Multibiometrics-based Continuous Authentication 
Decisions 
Given the aforementioned experimental findings on the NICA model, it is evident that it 
solely incorporates single sample neglecting the capabilities of capturing many samples 
within certain periods the contemporary advanced digital devices have. Whilst it is envisaged 
that this can be mitigated by making use of these capabilities and combining them in a way to 
enhance the overall performance, this needs to be validated empirically in order to propose a 
more robust approach than the NICA framework. Such a fusion must be executed in a 
constructive rather than destructive fashion. 
The use of multibiometric approaches augments the authentication systems to rely upon more 
than one biometric technique or more than one sample of the same technique. This should be 
dynamic and intelligent in the method of selecting what modalities to encompass in the fusion 
process and how. For instance, when acquiring a face image is not possible, gait, voice and 
behavioural profiling would be able to accomplish an adequate level of security. As discussed 
in ‎3.6, the reliability of utilising multibiometrics would counteract the spoofing and 
circumvention risks. Accordingly, this experiment deploys a novel multimodal/multi-sample 
fusion method of facial verification, voice verification, gait recognition and behavioural 
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profiling in order to appraise the effectiveness of applying multibiometrics-based continuous 
authentication on the framework of this research. 
The use of various classifiers might result in divergent data and outcomes subject to the 
activities the user is carrying out, thus enriching the decisions of multiple classifiers (Sim et 
al., 2007). All settings of the above-mentioned replication study were followed in this 
experiment with the addition of considering the inclusion of all available biometric samples 
within the specified time-frame.  
This multibiometric fusion model is analysed by first looking at the average system integrity 
of the system over the whole experiment duration across various AL’s and IL’s including the 
users obtained the worst and best results with authorised and imposter user data comprising 
how long does it take to identify and shut out at impostor. Likewise, the integrity is calculated 
after reducing the degradation value and even disabling it completely. Finally, further 
analysis is undertaken to count the number of transparent versus intrusive authentication 
requests along with a breakdown based upon the different levels of app risk. 
5.3.4.1 Weighted Majority Voting Fusion (WMVF) Integrity Performance - 
Authorised User 
Using the same dataset of the previous experiment, Table ‎5-16 depicts the results of the 
average system integrity after the deployment of the Weighted Majority Voting Fusion 
(WMVF) fed by the data of the genuine user.  
Weighted Majority Voting Fusion (WMVF) 
Time Windows 
AL 5 min  
IL 5 min 
AL 2 min  
IL 10 min 
AL 5 min  
IL 10 min 
AL 5 min  
IL 20 min 
AL 2 min  
IL 10 min  
(-0.25 Drop) 
Average Integrity 3.91 3.77 3.85 4.07 3.84 
Table ‎5-16: Average Integrity of Weighted Majority Voting Fusion (WMVF) with Degradation Function (Authorised 
User) 
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As seen above, the WMVF achieved trust levels on the legitimacy of the user outperforming 
NICA albeit not significantly on all windows except (AL 5 min and IL 5 min) where the 
improvement was about 0.4 point (i.e. from 3.51 with NICA to 3.91 with WMVF). This quite 
better performance can be attributed to the inclusion of all available samples. However, being 
not that large can be due to various factors, such as bad captured samples stemming false 
decisions; the available samples that passed the decisions are of low confidence biometric 
techniques; the extent of usage; and the degree by which the integrity drops when the time set 
for degradation function passed without samples inputs. 
Paying a closer attention to the worst and best cases in Table ‎5-17, there is an increase in the 
former compared with the NICA outcomes as much as 0.4 in shorter windows up to full 1 
level jump in the longer ones.  For instance, whilst the worst case achieved by NICA was 
0.94 (with AL 5 and IL 20), it is improved to be 1.92 with the WMVF. This would minimise 
the intrusive requests significantly with those low risk levels apps (to be further investigated 
in section ‎5.3.4.3). In contrast, despite the improvement on average, the best cases diminished 
slightly across the different time window. Nevertheless, this is expected and accepted as the 
inclusion of all available samples within a specific time-frame would incur the probability of 
including low quality samples or even less accurate techniques. 
Weighted Majority Voting Fusion (WMVF) 
Time Windows 
AL 5 min  
IL 5 min 
AL 2 min  
IL 10 min 
AL 5 min  
IL 10 min 
AL 5 min  
IL 20 min 
AL 2 min  
IL 10 min  
(-0.25 Drop) 
Worst Case Integrity 
User ID 
1.56 1.42 1.51 1.92 1.01 
41 41 41 41 41 
Best Case Integrity 
User ID 
4.51 4.36 4.45 4.70 4.76 
43 43 43 18 15 
Table ‎5-17: Worst and Best Integrity Cases of WMVF with Degradation Function over Different Time Windows 
(Authorised User) 
Further investigation is thus required to establish the consequence of changing the drop 
degree of the degradation function which was set originally at (-0.5). It was modified to be (-
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.025) and the script was re-run on (AL 2 min and IL 10 min) in order to provide a further 
insight of whether this would affect the operation and balance the transparency and 
robustness of the model. As depicted in Table ‎5-16 and Table ‎5-17, compared to the average 
integrity of the same windows but original degradation degree, the new degree produced a 
slight higher averaged integrity (3.84 vs. 3.77) whereas the worst case deteriorated (from 1.42 
to 1.01) albeit the best case was enhanced (from 4.36 to 4.76). Such variance reveals that 
determining the amount of the degradation function is an influential aspect on the system 
performance. Therefore, the most appropriate drop degree depends on the user requirements, 
how they utilise their device(s), and the device(s)’ capturing capabilities. 
Dependent upon the above differing results of different time window settings, it is worth 
exploring the effect of deactivating the degradation function completely. Therefore, the 
model and thus the script were modified and tested accordingly. This setting was for the 
system to have the decision without considering (adding to/subtracting from) the previous 
historical integrity, i.e. independent IL. This means that whenever the user attempts to access 
an app or service, the authentication system will look for the available biometric samples 
within the set time window and calculate the integrity of the system based on the 
authentication decision in a weighted fashion. If the calculated integrity outweighs the risk 
level of the requested app/service, the access to it is granted and then the integrity is reset to 
zero waiting for the next app/service access request. Otherwise, if the access is denied, the 
integrity will drop below zero by 0.5 until it reaches -5 at which the user will be locked out 
completely and prompted to provide other information such as a specified high secure 
obtrusive authentication. It is apparent from Table ‎5-18 that the use of not updating the IL 
every specified time and resetting it to zero raise the confidence on the authorised user to a 
quite higher level, which is arguably interpreted in high levels of security. 
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Weighted Majority Voting Fusion (WMVF) without Degradation 
Time Windows 2 min  5 min  10 min 
Average Integrity 4.11 4.13 4.08 
Table ‎5-18: Average Integrity of WMVF without Degradation Function (Authorised User) 
The worst and best performance cases (demonstrated in Table ‎5-19) disclose that the lowest 
integrity accomplished by User 41 who had high interactions. Although this was also the case 
with activated degradation, the integrity here was far less than that with degradation. On the 
one hand, looking at the middle window (5 min) which achieved the highest overall average 
and best case integrity, it was noticed that only 2 participants (Users 41 and 44) were below 2 
of average integrity and both were high active users. However, these 2 participants can be 
considered as special cases at which they had poor performing biometric modalities (i.e. their 
facial verification EER were about 18% and 20% respectively). Given the face samples were 
the second most contributing modality of the dataset, this will have a considerable impact on 
the fused result and hence relying only on the level of interactions to determine the 
appropriateness of a specific method might not be sufficient.  
Weighted Majority Voting Fusion (WMVF) without Degradation 
Time Windows 2 min  5 min  10 min 
Worst Case Integrity 
User(s) ID 
1.01 1.01 0.92 
41 41 41 
Best Case Integrity 
User(s) ID 
4.80 4.81 4.71 
18 18 18 
Table ‎5-19: Worst and Best Integrity Cases of WMVF without Degradation Function over Different Time Windows 
(Authorised User) 
On the other hand, about 55% of those achieved an average integrity above 4.5 were of the 
high active users. Having said that and knowing that they represent 43% of the dataset, this 
method of independent IL and no degradation, arguably, tends to be more suitable for 
frequent users. This can be attributed to the fact that they would have such a rich set of 
samples which are utilised to verify them every time the IL is triggered and/or an app is 
requested. On the contrary, the original configuration with the degradation function might 
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suite the infrequent users who lack the activities on the device and samples, so they are in 
need to take the historical samples/decisions into account. 
5.3.4.2 WMVF Integrity Performance - Imposter User 
In order to investigate the capability of this fusion model to thwart an imposter from 
accessing sensitive applications and within how long, the script was run with the data of 
participants other than the genuine one. The results presented in Table ‎5-20 show that 
WMVF security levels when the device is in use by an impostor are proportional to and better 
than those of NICA with the differing time windows. The enhancement was obvious with AL 
5 and IL 20 where which it was about a complete half level point (from -4.41 to -4.91).  
The amendment of the degradation degree also has a slight positive outcome on security 
though it is envisaged to reduce the security by not allowing the integrity to drop enough 
keeping it high even if the device becomes on illicit hands but it would be for the sake of 
higher usability. 
Weighted Majority Voting Fusion (WMVF) 
Time Windows 
AL 5 min  
IL 5 min 
AL 2 min  
IL 10 min 
AL 5 min  
IL 10 min 
AL 5 min  
IL 20 min 
AL 2 min  
IL 10 min  
(-0.25 Drop) 
Average Integrity -4.98 -4.84 -4.73 -4.91 -4.89 
Table ‎5-20: Average Integrity of WMVF with Degradation Function (Imposter User) 
Table ‎5-21 displays additional details with regard to the calculated worst and best cases and 
the average detection time to shut out an imposter. In line with the imposter average integrity 
and those of the authorised user, the worst and best cases were improved proportionally. 
Likewise, the detection time was reduced at all different levels of AL/IL especially in AL 5 
min and IL 5 min at which the reduction was almost half a minute, which would mean a lot 
when it comes to an unauthorised access. 
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Weighted Majority Voting Fusion (WMVF) 
Time Windows 
AL 5 min  
IL 5 min 
AL 2 min  
IL 10 min 
AL 5 min  
IL 10 min 
AL 5 min  
IL 20 min 
AL 2 min  
IL 10 min  
(-0.25 Drop) 
Worst Case Integrity 
User ID 
-1.76 -1.55 -1.70 -1.99 -1.14 
41 41 41 41 41 
Best Case Integrity 
User ID 
-4.99 -4.77 -4.98 -4.90 -4.99 
43 43 43 18 18 
Average Detection Time (min) 5.092 2.113 5.167 5.016 2.073 
Table ‎5-21: Worst, Best Integrity Cases and Detection Time of WMVF with Degradation Function over Different 
Time Windows (Imposter User) 
There is a link between the AL and the average detection time. That can be the reason of the 
shortest average detection time of an imposter was with the AL2/IL10 (2.113 and 2.073 
minutes). The system even would not wait for the AL to be invoked when the imposter 
immediately attempts to access a high risky app whilst the confidence at the time is not 
sufficient for it. In such a case, the imposter will be prompted to submit an intrusive 
authentication, which would high likely fail causing the integrity to drop and the AL to be 
triggered accordingly until the system decides that it is an imposter and lock down the device. 
Furthermore, the outcomes of running the script on imposter data excluding the degradation 
function (to have a standalone WMVF decision) were comparative to those of the authorised 
users as illustrated in Table ‎5-22. Accomplishing average integrities very close to the 
maximum (i.e. -5) renders the system to be considered robust against misuse. Nonetheless, a 
breakdown of the results is needed to validate this and to examine the other side of the results. 
Weighted Majority Voting Fusion (WMVF) without Degradation 
Time Windows 2 min  5 min  10 min 
Average Integrity -4.92 -4.94 -4.88 
Table ‎5-22: Average Integrity of WMVF without Degradation Function (Imposter User) 
Table ‎5-23 shows the best cases comprised both high and low active users leading to the 
same previous outcome that the suitability of such a model is reliant upon individuals’ nature 
of use, the performance of operating biometrics and their availability. Moreover, better 
intrusion detection times were achieved because by following this method there will be less 
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opportunity of misuse left open whereby eventually lessen the access probability to 
apps/services that required high level of integrity.  
Utilising this method would enable the system to start reducing the integrity as soon as the 
impostor attempts to access an app of high risk – the independent standalone integrity check 
that is triggered from the bottom line of zero would instantaneously recognise that the 
calculated integrity of the imposter is less than the requested app requirement and then it 
continues to decline according to the specified AL until containing this by locking out the 
imposter from using the device. The inclusion of the authorised samples which have been 
collected during the time window prior to the access request (as in the main configuration) in 
the WMVF decision, would delay the detection of an imposter if they highjack the device 
straight after an authorised user, unlike using this independent WMVF approach that would 
increase the likelihood of denying the impostor access in a shorter time. 
Weighted Majority Voting Fusion (WMVF) without Degradation 
Time Windows 2 min  5 min  10 min 
Worst Case Integrity 
User ID 
-1.08 -1.08 -0.94 
41 41 41 
Best Case Integrity 
User ID 
-4.98 -4.99 -4.83 
39 7 18 
Average Detection Time (min) 2.034 5.058 10.249 
Table ‎5-23: Worst, Best Integrity Cases and Detection Time of WMVF without Degradation Function over Different 
Time Windows (Imposter User) 
On the other hand, if it happened to be a false rejection at the beginning whereby a legitimate 
user is the one utilising the device, the following AL decision should have the potential to 
recover and correct that. This would essentially better establish the trade-off between the 
system robustness and users’ convenience than that of degradation function in particular with 
those of more interactions, thereby not exposing the access of sensitive apps/services whilst 
not restricting access to the vast majority of non and low sensitive apps/services of the device. 
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However, consideration should be paid to the scenarios where merely one sample exists when 
an authentication decision is needed to be made. With the standalone WMVF, it might be 
risky to rely upon this single sample especially if it is from a low confidence biometric 
technique and a level 5 app is requested. In contrast, employing the continuous confidence 
taking into account the previous integrity and authentication decisions would recover this risk, 
thus providing a more reliable mechanism. 
5.3.4.3 WMVF Usability Performance 
Triggering the AL too frequently may perhaps lead to overwhelming authentication and 
hence inconvenience consequences. This would be due to the intrusive manner of such a 
system when samples are not available. It arguably establishes the security of the framework 
but at the expense of relative usability. 
As shown in Table ‎5-24 besides the previous experiments, the more often the AL algorithm 
gets initiated, the more intrusiveness endured because the integrity will be constantly updated 
before the degradation function is triggered unless in case of inactivity. Moreover, comparing 
the percentage of intrusive requests of AL 2 min and IL 10 min (14.69%) with the same 
windows but of 0.25 drop (13.23%), it presents that the less the integrity degree drops, the 
more convenience can be established. This further highlights the effect of the degradation 
function on the model. 
Weighted Majority Voting Fusion (WMVF) 
Total  
Requests 
AL 5 min  
IL 5 min 
AL 2 min  
IL 10 min 
AL 5 min  
IL 10 min 
AL 5 min  
IL 20 min 
AL 2 min  
IL 10 min  
(-0.25 Drop) 
% of Intrusive  
requests 
% of Intrusive  
requests 
% of Intrusive  
requests 
% of Intrusive  
requests 
% of Intrusive 
requests 
46,254 11.87 14.69 13.01 8.53 13.23 
Table ‎5-24: The Percentage of Intrusive Authentication Requests of WMVF with Degradation 
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Looking deeper into the role this effect played on the various levels of apps risk, Table ‎5-25 
emphasises this although the difference can be considered insignificant compared to the total 
requests. However, the effect is getting more noticeable with higher app risk levels 
accordingly. The result of the worst cases underlines the evident consequence of both time 
windows on system operation. For example, the averaged percentage of intrusive requests of 
AL 5 min were 37.79, 50.04, and 33.87 with IL of 5 min, 10 min, and 20 min respectively for 
the same user. Albeit these percentages seem large, looking at the other side of the coin 
would show that there were considerable reductions of the supposed intrusive requests 
without operating this model. In addition, the best case of no intrusive requests at all gives an 
indication the system has the ability to achieve full transparency in specific circumstances. 
Weighted Majority Voting Fusion (WMVF) 
App Risk 
Level 
AL 5 min  
IL 5 min 
AL 2 min  
IL 10 min 
AL 5 min  
IL 10 min 
AL 5 min  
IL 20 min 
AL 2 min  











% of Intrusive 
requests 
% of Intrusive 
requests 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0.27 0.33 0.30 0.19 0.30 
2 0.86 1.06 0.93 0.61 0.95 
3 1.24 1.54 1.36 0.89 1.38 
4 2.46 3.04 2.70 1.77 2.74 
5 7.05 8.72 7.72 5.06 7.85 
Worst Case 
User(s) ID 
37.79 46.55 50.04 33.87 50.25 
44 44 44 44 41 
Best Case  
User(s) ID 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2 2 2 2 2 
Table ‎5-25: The Percentage of Intrusive Authentication Requests of WMVF with Degradation based on the App Risk 
Levels, Worst and Best Cases 
On the other hand, a substantial improvement in decreasing the number of explicit 
authentication requests is apparent in Table ‎5-26 without degradation function. The minimum 
intrusiveness was experienced when triggering the AL mechanism at the intervals of 5 
minutes. Furthermore, Table ‎5-27 shows the distribution of these obtrusive requests across 
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the levels of accessed apps/services. It is perceived that the system achieved a reasonable 
level of low intrusiveness with apps/services required lower security (less than 1% intrusive 
requests on risk levels 1, 2, and 3). 
Weighted Majority Voting Fusion (WMVF) without Degradation 
Total Requests 
2 min  5 min  10 min 
% of Intrusive  
requests 
% of Intrusive  
requests 
% of Intrusive  
requests 
46,254 7.83 7.40 8.47 
Table ‎5-26: The Percentage of Intrusive Authentication Requests of WMVF without Degradation 
Full transparency could also occur as can be seen with a number of participants – 26%, 32%, 
and 23% of participants with the use of the time windows 2 min, 5 min, and 10 min 
respectively. Notwithstanding, this is not mandatory on such model thereby which the 
deviation between the confidence on the authorised user and the apps/services risk levels is 
continuously observed and acted upon when the latter outweighs the former in order to secure 
them. Thus, an acceptable number of intrusive authentication prompts can be tolerated 
especially with higher risk apps/services. Regarding to the extent of interactions, those users 
of best cases are mix between high and low active, meaning that such an approach cannot be 
suitable to merely specific category of users but rather many factors can affect that, such as 
the pattern of life, the multitude of operated devices and their capabilities, and the 
performance of the contributing biometrics. 
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Weighted Majority Voting Fusion (WMVF) without Degradation 
Time Windows 2 min 5 min 10 min 
App Risk Level 
% of Intrusive 
requests 
% of Intrusive  
requests 
% of Intrusive 
requests 
0 0 0 0 
1 0.18 0.17 0.19 
2 0.56 0.53 0.61 
3 0.82 0.77 0.89 
4 1.62 1.53 1.76 
5 4.65 4.40 5.03 
Worst Case 
User(s) ID 
49.31 49.31 54.20 
41 41 41 
Best Case 
User(s) ID 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 10, 13, 
14, 16, 17, 20, 43 
2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 
14, 16, 17, 18, 20, 43 
2, 4, 5, 8, 10, 13, 14, 
16, 17, 20, 43 
Table ‎5-27: The Percentage of Intrusive Authentication Requests of WMVF without Degradation based on the App 
Risk Levels, Worst and Best Cases 
5.4 Conclusion 
Given the aforementioned WMVF results, it can be concluded that the security as well as the 
transparency of the system is improved compared to those of NICA. The reason is the fact 
that NICA takes the most recent sample and ignore the rest of samples whereas WMVF 
makes use of all samples using multimodal and multi-sample approaches to fusing them. 
 In addition, the time windows appear to notably affect the operation of the framework as the 
frequency of authentication provides a trade-off between security and usability. Furthermore, 
both degradation degree manipulation and deactivation have considerable impact on the 
framework performance. Exploring their impact on the number of intrusive authentication 
requests, it can be suggested for the time windows, the degradation function and the drop 
degree to be configured dynamically and adaptively depending upon the extent of usage, the 
availability and performance of biometric techniques.  
Still, the problem of not having full transparency exists although it is not the aim and it is 
difficult to achieve while balancing all requirements and therefore a certain intrusive level 
due to higher risk is expected and accepted. As such, further investigation could be sought to 
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determine how adding additional smart information about the genuine user (e.g. usual 
geolocations and security status of other user’s devices) could improve upon security and 
usability as well as to reconsider the degradation function and its effect on the framework. 
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6 Federated Authentication using the Cloud (Cloud Aura) 
6.1 Introduction 
Having achieved promising experimental results in the preceding chapter validating the 
feasibility of utilising various multibiometric information in order to assure risk-based 
continuous identity confidence within a transparent context; however, there are a number of 
issues that would make their operational use challenging. With the current implementations, 
each user’s digital device would need to establish and maintain separate biometric profiles 
and the required intelligent management infrastructure. In a world with a multi-device 
environment (surveyed in Chapter ‎4), this would result in each device requiring the feature 
extraction and classification algorithms for each contributing biometric technique which in 
turns would increase the licensing costs if credible and well performing solutions are sought. 
This would also pose an increased processing and storage overhead on each incorporated 
device – thus placing a significant configuration and maintenance burden upon the users 
especially with the extensive use of high sensitive information and services. 
Furthermore, the invaluable rich information that can be obtained from other devices owned 
and utilised by the user is wasted unless a centralised approach is created and employed to 
facilitate disseminating the accumulated user confidence – thus relieving the burden upon 
these devices and providing highly secure, robust, multi-device and intelligent handling of 
every authentication decision. Therefore, further enhancements in terms of balancing the 
security and usability and making a more reliable authentication decision are envisaged to be 
viable thereby encompassing more smart information and operational improvements. 
Before going to design a full architecture, this chapter proposes the concept of federated 
authentication using the Cloud (Cloud Aura), models it, and experimentally validates whether 
the philosophies behind it would work, and then proceeds to build the information system for 
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it in the subsequent chapter. This chapter pursues to develop a novel authentication 
mechanism, with a view of capitalising upon the benefits presented by cloud computing, its 
universal connectivity, scalability and flexibility. These promising features offer a new 
opportunity of achieving convenient authentication seamlessly in a technology and service 
independent fashion. The approach introduces a new dedicated authentication provider – the 
Managed Authentication Service Provider (MASP) – that is able to provide state-of-the-art 
centralised verification of user authenticity. 
The chapter then continues to discuss an analysis of a number of experiments that were 
performed on a customised model (refined based upon the results of the previous experiments) 
with the augmentation of information from smart sources such as multi-devices and 
geolocation. The analysis seeks to determine whether it is viable, convenient and secure to 
authenticate users based upon their digital devices activities and other captured biometrics, so 
that it would be possible to gather a single user profile from the range of devices a single user 
may use. From the results of these experimental studies, expanded attributes of Cloud Aura 
will be identified for further architectural design and prototypical development. 
6.2 Cloud Aura – A Novel Authentication Approach 
Whilst transparent authentication can be appreciated as a solution to effectively remove the 
reliance upon the human aspects to ensure a robust and convenient authentication, its 
applicability and universality have to be considered as it is confined to a single device. With 
every device requiring biometric setup and enrolment, user configuration and management, 
risk assessment and continual refinement, the necessity for transparent, universal and 
federated authentication approach that can be used across technologies and services is 
becoming more apparent. Thus, the aim is to have a federated continuous authentication that 
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can be managed centrally to work over user’s devices to enable access to services seamlessly 
in a location, technology, and service independent manner. 
As illustrated in Figure ‎6-1, the MASP is hosted on the Cloud and receives biometric signals 
from and control the verification decision of the subscribed user’s devices. These devices can 
benefit from the confidence level of each other as they are fused on the MASP and 
communicated to those participating devices. This accumulated identity confidence status is 
utilised in both device and service domains as MASP would verify the user identity 
continuously and transparently whilst they access services on the device or online depending 
upon their determined risk levels. For example, had the user logged into his smartphone using 
a fingerprint, they would, within specified period of time and proximity, automatically logged 
into their registered laptop transparently without having to re-enter their biometrics unless the 
user confidence status is below the risk level of the requested service. 
 
Figure ‎6-1: An Overall View of Federated Authentication using the Cloud  
The concept of federated authentication using the Cloud (Cloud Aura) is to centralise the task 
of authenticating an individual to a Trusted Third-Party (TTP). Through providing a device 
and service independent authentication approach, the centralised authority benefits from 
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specialisation, enabling it to provide the most appropriate authentication technologies and 
essentially removes duplication as the user no longer needs to enrol on each device, configure 
each device and authenticate to each device. Instead, the user has a single authentication 
profile within the Managed Authentication Service Provider (MASP), where they are able to 
manage and monitor their profile. Any MASP-enabled device or service will merely send a 
request to the MASP and be informed of its current real-time identity confidence. In this 
manner, individual devices themselves are relieved of a significant amount of data processing 
and storage, including a large volume of duplicated activities that would be occurring with 
TAS and Aura enabled systems.  
Federated authentication is similar to federated identity in that it extends the concept of 
authentication beyond an organisation or domain like single-sign-on does for federated 
identity. However, federated authentication is focused solely on the provision of 
authentication and not access control (as federated identity is). Indeed, combining the 
functionality of federated authentication with federated identity would provide the usability 
of multi-domain access control but with an increased and continuous level of trust upon the 
authenticity of the user. As such, extending the concept of the Authentication Aura (Hocking 
et al., 2011), this approach permits devices and services that are not biometrically enabled to 
benefit from stronger authentication approaches. For example, current password-based web 
services, such as Gmail, would now be able to transparently verify user’s identity – requiring 
the user to merely access the web page and the background services will check whether the 
identity confidence is sufficient to provide immediate access. In cases where the confidence 
is not sufficient, the user would be asked to verify their identity. 
An advantage of a centralised cloud solution is the ability to unify all authentication 
information, providing an in-depth understanding of what the user is doing (in terms of 
devices and services) and thereby providing additional identity intelligence of the user. For 
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instance, it is envisaged that an intelligent feature that MASP will offer is control dashboard 
where MASP administrators and perhaps the users themselves are able to vision the existing 
system state revolving the user’s device(s) and services. For example, it will be possible to 
determine if two authentication requests are simultaneously made from different locations 
from devices that belong to the owner or otherwise – thus highlighting potential misuse.  
The centralised approach also enables the use of multibiometrics and multi-factor 
authentication – providing a robust framework of authentication models that are stronger than 
any uni-modal or single factor authentication approach. For example, depending upon the 
available authentication approaches (which themselves will be dependent upon the devices 
and technology a user utilises), a variety of multi-instance, multi-algorithmic, and multi-
modal approaches exist that seek to optimise the authentication decision. As illustrated in 
3.6.2, a multi-algorithmic approach would enable a MASP to utilise a range of biometrics 
classification algorithms (each crafted to focus on differing aspects of the problem) and 
combine the result through fusion. Typically, cost, processing and vendor-specific solutions 
have prevented this from happening to date and continue to do so. As a centralised 
authentication service, the MASP, through ISO standards (i.e. ISO 19794, 19785, 19784) will 
be in a position to incorporate any and all approaches – something individual devices would 
never be able to achieve due to prohibitive costs and processing requirements (ISO, 2006a, 
2006b, 2011). 
Figure ‎6-2 illustrates a relatively simple multibiometrics model that incorporates varying 
degrees of multi-algorithmic processing and fusion at differing levels of the biometrics 
process. These models would be unique to the user, varying depending upon which samples 
are present. This approach to the optimisation of authentication confidence will provide a 
very strong indicator as to the authenticity of the user. 
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Figure ‎6-2: A Model for Multibiometrics within Federated Authentication (Clarke, 2011) 
The centralised approach also overcomes another hurdle in the creation of effective 
biometrics classifiers – the availability of impostor data. Many modern classifiers utilise 
approaches that allow them to train the classifier to behave according to the valid or 
authorised user (e.g. neural networks); however, in practical live systems, the lack of 
availability inhibits the performance that can be achieved. Often this data needs to be 
simulated or created rather than being real user data. Moreover, many classifiers utilise full 
sample data, rather than derived statistics (such as a mean and standard deviation), making 
the creation of simulated data very challenging. Within a centralised system, anonymised 
impostor data will be available to all users for both initial enrolment and template refinement; 
ensuring classifiers are optimised. This, in turn, will allow to model the data to understand 
what other users’ usage patterns and distinctive features look like and thus helping to 
generate patterns of anomalies and patterns of life, such as usual attended geolocation(s), 
accessing particular apps/services on regular basis at the same point of time every specific 
day and perhaps at specific geolocations. 
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Therefore, the succeeding sections examine the argument that Cloud Aura would help 
towards building a better user profile and thus improving the security and convenience of the 
technique beyond what a single device can do by itself. 
6.3 Experimental Investigation of Cloud Aura 
With the aim of investigating the Cloud Aura approach, a set of experiments exemplifying 
cloud-based authentication properties was developed in order to determine potential and 
feasible attributes that would provide a better system performance. There is a need to 
investigate whether additional information could be used as a contributing factor to provide a 
more reliable authentication decision-making process. Improvements that can be obtained by 
pushing the solution to the Cloud with regard to security and usability also need further 
exploration.  
Within the limitations of what can be proven practically on the acquired dataset, a couple of 
metrics were identified to be used to help understand whether such information is useful – 
geolocation and multi-devices. It is by no means meant to be the definitive approach but they 
are examples of how additional information would aid enhancing this process. 
In order to practically prove the concept of the proposed solution, the specialised 
mathematical modelling software package MATLAB (R2015b release) was utilised and 
implemented on a Windows 7 Enterprise 64-bit Operating System with Intel Core i5-4310 
CPU, 2.7 GHz and 16 GB RAM. A number of scripts were modelled and implemented 
incorporating all information used in the previous experiments in addition to the information 
of the geolocation and that of other devices of the same participant – to establish its 
feasibility and potential to offer a successful authentication mechanism (Appendix F). Using 
the same dataset collected and discussed in Chapter ‎5, the data of each participant was split 
into two datasets: 60% for training the classifiers and generating the user profile and 40% for 
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validation and testing the performance. Accordingly, the latter was performed considering 
one participant acting as the valid authorised user whilst the remaining other participants as 
imposters. Accordingly, the following sections demonstrate the results. 
6.3.1 Geolocation 
Geolocation is one of the main elements of Cloud Aura. Incorporating the information of 
geolocation (via GPS sensor and/or WiFi signal) at which an application is accessed often – 
and possibly at specific time-frame(s) – can provide additional discriminatory information to 
support identifying users of digital devices. Moreover, defining trusted location(s) by the user 
during the enrolment or at a later stage will play a role on different related aspects, such as 
the required security threshold and degradation function. For instance, the required security 
prompted at home is adaptively less and the degradation function drops less than they do 
when at work or even in a totally unfamiliar location. 
Geolocation, also, can add a further security layer to user authentication and access control 
decision, thereby determining that specified apps/services can only be accessed at specified 
location(s). For example, the user’s home is the only authorised location from which they are 
authorised to access their online banking. The approved locations can be registered as a wider 
geographical zone (e.g. neighbourhood, city, county, and country). This would facilitate 
detecting illicit activities that occur in unusual locations – it would be more apparent when 
users using multiple devices each or one of which is in odd location unlike the other 
device(s). Similar use of geolocation in Cloud Aura can be for the re-enrolment and 
classifiers retraining processes. Specified geolocations can be authorised at which these 
processes are merely conducted, or even excluded from doing so. 
For this experimental investigation purposes, the resulted geolocation EER from the 
preliminary study of section ‎5.3.2 and its associated timestamps were employed as additional 
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input into the same WMVF fusion formula utilised in ‎5.3.3 and ‎5.3.4. The following are the 
updated results after running the tests and settings of both aforementioned sections. 
6.3.1.1 Cloud Aura Integrity Performance - Authorised User 
Table ‎6-1 shows that the average integrity of Cloud Aura model (incorporating only the 
geolocation to the WMVF) achieved better average integrity scores than those of the 
previously reported WMVF in all differing AL/IL timings by an average of 0.2. This 
improvement elevated almost all the integrity averages to above 4 rendering the system to 
non-intrusively grant access to the vast majority of apps/services that reside on the user’s 
device – knowing that a mere smart information (geolocation) is utilised in this calculation.  
Going down to shorter AL/IL, the average integrity went down slightly due to the increasing 
probability of not having samples or even having weak samples at short intervals and thus not 
permitting for keeping or even increasing the integrity while active degradation function. 
Whilst the largest time windows (AL=5, IL=20) attained the highest average integrity of 
4.17, it can be because of the less frequent invocation of the degradation function which 
might in turn be at the expense of exposing the device to un-authorised access before the next 
IL drop. Modifying the eroding degree of the degradation function (from -0.5 to -0.25) on 
AL=2 and IL=10 stemmed a comparable result to that of WMVF which accomplished a 
relative optimisation. Therefore, due care is needed while setting these timings and drop 
degree in order to suite the user requirements and security principles alike. 
Cloud Aura 
Time Windows 
AL 5 min  
IL 5 min 
AL 2 min  
IL 10 min 
AL 5 min  
IL 10 min 
AL 5 min  
IL 20 min 
AL 2 min  
IL 10 min  
(-0.25 Drop) 
Average Integrity 4.11 3.97 4.10 4.17 4.05 
Table ‎6-1: Cloud Aura Average Integrity with Degradation Function (Authorised User) 
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The extreme achieved average integrity levels reveal an additional point supporting the extent 
of enhancement Cloud Aura can offer as presented in Table ‎6-2. Ranging from 2.24 to 4.97, 
the same User 41 scored the worst calculated average integrity throughout all time windows 
whilst 2 different participants (Users 15 and 18) scored the best cases. The improvement in 
the worst cases is notable in comparison to the previously reported WMVF outcome by an 
average increment of more than 1 utter level going past the 2 boundary. Moreover, 80.85 per 
cent of participants experienced an average integrity above 4 with 95.94 per cent over 3, 
allowing the system to un-obtrusively authorise the genuine user access to the vast majority 
of applications with a high level of transparency. 
Cloud Aura 
Time Windows 
AL 5 min  
IL 5 min 
AL 2 min  
IL 10 min 
AL 5 min  
IL 10 min 
AL 5 min  
IL 20 min 
AL 2 min  
IL 10 min  
(-0.25 Drop) 
Worst Case Integrity 
User ID 
2.55 2.40 2.53 2.24 2.49 
41 41 41 41 41 
Best Case Integrity 
User ID 
4.86 4.71 4.84 4.97 4.80 
15 15 15 18 15 
Table ‎6-2: Worst and Best Integrity Cases of Cloud Aura with Degradation Function over Different Time Windows 
(Authorised User) 
When the user interaction level is concerned, a possible correlation existed between it and the 
achieved average integrity across all participants. For instance, the worst 2 cases were from 
high active users (29 and 41) who were the only users achieved an integrity below 3. On the 
other hand, the best cases were from low active ones (15 and 18). In addition, 52% of those 
gained an average integrity below 4.5 were low active users although they represented 40% 
of those above 4.5. Hence, no absolute link can be drawn between the interaction level and 
performance. 
Furthermore, those with more interactions tend to reflect better with shorter windows though 
not for all of them. For example, whilst Users 32, 41, and 47 obtained 4.25, 2.53, and 3.96 
respectively with AL=5 and IL 10, they acquired 4.12, 2.24 and 3.03 respectively with AL=5 
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and IL 20. This can be attributed to the richer available samples while utilising small time 
windows that sustained the integrity by inhibiting the constant degradation. Thus, Cloud Aura 
will have the potential of achieving a desirable integrity level. It is also evident that the 
variability of time windows will vary dependent upon the nature of each and every user’s 
usage and device. 
Cloud Aura without Degradation 
Time Windows AL 2 min  AL 5 min  AL 10 min 
Average Integrity 4.15 4.17 4.13 
Table ‎6-3: Cloud Aura Average Integrity without Degradation Function (Authorised User) 
Table ‎6-3 illustrates the consequence of turning off the degradation function completely. A 
very small enhancement over the WMVF counterparts’ settings and the Cloud Aura with 
degradation is noticed by about half point. Notwithstanding, it can be arguably regarded as a 
high level of security. Digging deeper to gain an understanding of the relationship of these 
performances with the user profiles disclosed that the best integrity recorded  was for User 18 
who had low interactions and conversely the worst integrity recorded was for User 41 who 
had high interactions (as shown in Table ‎6-4). This is analogous with those of activated 
degradation but it is slightly better there.  
Cloud Aura without Degradation 
Time Windows AL 2 min  AL 5 min  AL 10 min 
Worst Case Integrity 
User ID 
1.68 2.24 1.66 
41 41 41 
Best Case Integrity 
User ID 
4.83 4.97 4.81 
18 18 18 
Table ‎6-4: Worst and Best Integrity Cases of Cloud Aura without Degradation Function over Different Time 
Windows (Authorised User) 
It was observed that only 2 participants (Users 29 and 41) – which were high active users – 
were below 3 of average integrity. Moreover, about 40% of those who achieved an average 
integrity above 4.5 were high active users and 54.55% of those with below 4.5 were low 
active users. These percentages are somewhat akin to the original participants’ categories (in 
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terms of interactions) in the dataset. Further investigation within each category demonstrates 
that half of those with less usage encountered an average integrity less than 4.5 (35% of 
which were even below 4). On the contrary, solely one third of those with high usage faced 
less than 4.5 integrity on average (merely 7.5% of them suffered a below 4 integrity). 
That being said, this approach can be considered to have a tendency towards being more 
appropriate for high active users who would have enriched samples to be fused (and 
subsequently an authentication decision be made) every time the AL is generated and/or an 
app is requested. In contrast, the original configuration with the degradation function would 
perhaps be more applicable to low active users who lack the interactions with the device as 
well as the availability of samples, yet they are in need to consider the historical 
samples/decisions. Nevertheless, both methods can perform well with all users’ groups using 
the Cloud Aura model. 
In spite of the evident increase on the average system integrity compared to those of the 
NICA and WMVF, it is worth assessing how quick the impostor would be detected and 
locked out from accessing apps and services of high risk levels.  
6.3.1.2 Cloud Aura Integrity Performance - Imposter User 
The average integrity of the system for an impostor across the varying time windows is seen 
in Table ‎6-5. It is apparent that all averages were fairly high across all AL/IL levels (the 
minimum was -4.75). This means that the user would be able to transparently access most if 
not all applications/services of high risk levels and below. The lower the AL/IL combination 
of the system, the higher the integrity and yet security. 
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AL 5 min  
IL 5 min 
AL 2 min  
IL 10 min 
AL 5 min  
IL 10 min 
AL 5 min  
IL 20 min 
AL 2 min  
IL 10 min  
(-0.25 Drop) 
Average Integrity -4.92 -4.99 -4.90 -4.75 -4.85 
Table ‎6-5: Cloud Aura Average Integrity with Degradation Function (Imposter User) 
The worst and best cases were calculated and demonstrated in Table ‎6-6 together with the 
average time of identifying and locking out the imposter. These cases of imposter were 
proportional to those of authorised user. Interestingly, both worst and best instances were 
with highly interactive participants, confirming that no absolute relation existed between the 
usage level and the performance, making the Cloud Aura works with all cases. 
Cloud Aura 
Time Windows 
AL 5 min  
IL 5 min 
AL 2 min  
IL 10 min 
AL 5 min  
IL 10 min 
AL 5 min  
IL 20 min 
AL 2 min  
IL 10 min  
(-0.25 Drop) 
Worst Case Integrity 
User ID 
-1.99 -2.11 -1.98 -2.26 -2.22 
41 41 41 41 41 
Best Case Integrity 
User ID 
-4.99 -4.82 -4.98 -4.99 -4.92 
40 40 40 7 40 
Average Detection Time (min) 5.077 2.107 5.098 5.004 2.062 
Table ‎6-6: Worst, Best Integrity Cases and Detection Time of Cloud Aura with Degradation Function over Different 
Time Windows (Imposter User) 
Identifying and thwarting the imposter from accessing the applications/services within a few 
minutes in line with the operated AL time were faster than those of the WMVF. These can be 
tolerable dependent upon the user requirements and risk levels of the utilised applications. It 
is also expected that these detection times would be shorter if the imposter immediately 
requests a high risky application higher than the system integrity at the time, at which the 
imposter will have an instant failed authentication leading to a quicker integrity erosion. 
Therefore, there is a clear need to trade-off system security and users’ convenience based 
upon the user requirements and preferences together with the risk nature of the employed 
apps/services. 
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Furthermore, the results of imposter user without the degradation function were proportional 
to those of the authorised user, reaching average integrities very close to the optimum (i.e. -5) 
rendering the system to be very vigorous against misuse (Table ‎6-7). However, whilst this 
might provide a protection baseline from a variety of threat vectors, it would inevitably 
oversight a few cases – e.g. when a colleague/housemate (who has the same usual location of 
the legitimate user) attempts to misuse a device. Therefore, countermeasures need to be put in 
place. Nonetheless, other contributing modalities alongside the other information 
incorporated from other user devices registered under the same user profile (with the MASP 
of Cloud Aura) would certainly offset this shortcoming. 
Cloud Aura without Degradation 
Time Windows AL 2 min  AL 5 min  AL 10 min 
Average Integrity -4.96 -4.99 -4.94 
Table ‎6-7: Cloud Aura Average Integrity without Degradation Function (Imposter User) 
Table ‎6-8 provides a breakdown of these outcomes revealing that the worst cases 
encompassed both high and low active users whilst the best cases were of high active ones, 
leading to the same previous interpretation that the appropriateness of such model is reliant 
upon individuals nature of use, the performance of operating biometrics and their availability 
– not the usage level. Moreover, based upon accomplished enhanced intrusion detection 
times, following this method would offer fewer misuse vulnerabilities and ultimately alleviate 
the un-authorised access probability to apps/services of high risk level.  
Cloud Aura without Degradation 
Time Windows AL 2 min  AL 5 min  AL 10 min 
Worst Case Integrity 
User ID 
-1.80 -2.26 -1.99 
41 41 41 
Best Case Integrity 
User ID 
-4.99 -4.99 -4.99 
12 18 40 
Average Detection Time (min) 2.015 5.012 10.128 
Table ‎6-8: Worst, Best Integrity Cases and Detection Time of Cloud Aura without Degradation Function over 
Different Time Windows (Imposter User) 
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With ordinary activated degradation function, the model will include the recent samples 
within the time window along with the previous integrity which if the device has just been 
taken over will have a number of samples of the authorised user which, as a result, might 
make the process of identifying the imposter be belated. Unlike this, deactivating the 
degradation function and calculating an independent integrity instantly with the app/service 
access request would lead to a low confidence level on user, thereby eliminating the 
probability of including the authorised samples or letting this to be at the minimum. 
Furthermore, if an impostor begins with attempting to access an app of high risk, the system 
will promptly decrease the integrity and then continues to decline and ask for explicit 
authentication until containing this by locking out the imposter from using the device.  
On the other hand, a false rejection at the beginning can be tolerable because the following 
AL decision should eventually recover and correct that. This would, in essence, offer a 
balanced approach between system sturdiness and users’ satisfaction especially with those of 
more interactions. 
6.3.1.3 Cloud Aura Usability Performance 
To gain a more appreciation of the location effect on the performance of Cloud Aura, the 
extent of prompting the lawful user to provide authentication sample(s) was calculated. 
Table ‎6-9 demonstrates the high potential of the device to operate transparently with good 
improvements ranged from 2% to more than 5% in comparison with the WMVF. The least 
percentage of intrusive authentication requests was 6.51% which is quite satisfactory to have 
the desirable trade-off. Equally so, the results of the aforementioned sub-sections support the 
model to reach appropriate levels of integrity in the case of an authorised user and how well it 
establishes security in the event that an impostor tries to access the device assets. 
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AL 5 min  
IL 5 min 
AL 2 min  
IL 10 min 
AL 5 min  
IL 10 min 
AL 5 min  
IL 20 min 
AL 2 min  
IL 10 min  
(-0.25 Drop) 
% of Intrusive 
requests 
% of Intrusive 
requests 
% of Intrusive 
requests 
% of Intrusive 
requests 
% of Intrusive 
requests 
46,254 7.71 10.67 8.05 6.51 8.97 
Table ‎6-9: Cloud Aura Percentage of Intrusive Authentication Requests (with Degradation) 
Further observation into the effect of using Cloud Aura on the various levels of apps risk was 
conducted and summarised in Table ‎6-10. The intrusive requests in levels 1, 2, and 3 are 
almost all under 1% thus minor variance occurred between the differing levels of AL/IL. 
However, the effect became more obvious with higher app risk levels (i.e. 4 and 5) 
accordingly. For the high risk ones, the larger the time window, the less intrusive the Cloud 
Aura – with a reasonable transparency in the middle windows. The potential aim of Cloud 
Aura is to maintain a resilient level of trust on user. However, intrusive authentication 
prompts are expected when high risk apps/services are requested in periods of inactivity or no 
adequate user confidence in existence. 
Cloud Aura 
 
AL 5 min  
IL 5 min 
AL 2 min  
IL 10 min 
AL 5 min  
IL 10 min 
AL 5 min  
IL 20 min 
AL 2 min  













% of Intrusive 
requests 
% of Intrusive 
requests 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0.18 0.24 0.18 0.15 0.20 
2 0.56 0.77 0.58 0.47 0.65 
3 0.81 1.12 0.84 0.68 0.94 
4 1.60 2.21 1.67 1.35 1.86 
5 4.58 6.33 4.78 3.87 5.33 
Worst Case 
User(s) ID 
26.98 38.47 35.06 26.30 37.96 
44 44 44 44 44 
Best Case  
User(s) ID 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2 2 2 2 2 
Table ‎6-10: Cloud Aura Percentage of Intrusive Authentication Requests based on the App Risk Levels, Worst and 
Best Cases (with Degradation) 
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The result of the worst cases underlines the evident consequence of both time windows (AL 
and IL) on system operation. In spite of the fact that the worst percentage of intrusive 
requests looks high (38.47%), avoiding being interrupted by authentication 61.53% (of the 
total assumed intrusive requests without operating this model) is considered a substantial 
enhancement. In addition, the best case of no intrusive requests at all indicated that full 
transparency in specific circumstances can be achieved by Cloud Aura albeit not required. 
It was helpful to extract the 14-day usage for a couple of representative users to show how 
authentication confidence builds, how the interactions are happening, and how the Cloud 
Aura model is enabling fewer of these intrusive requests. For this purpose, User 31 was 
selected to represent those users with low usage profiles and User 4 to represent high usage 
profiles. They had also varied performance on average integrity – the former achieved 7.49% 
and the latter 0.27% of intrusive authentication requests. 
Figure ‎6-3 and Figure ‎6-4 illustrate the interactions of these 2 participants where the red line 
is the system integrity and the green circles and black triangles are the risk levels of accessed 
applications. For clarity, they are depicted in percentage instead of the original configuration 
of 0 to 5 levels. When the application risk level is less than or equal to the system integrity at 
the moment of access request, it is represented as a green circle. On the other hand, it is a 
black triangle if it is otherwise making it an intrusive request. 
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Figure ‎6-3: Intrusive Authentication Requests throughout the 14-day Usage for User 31 (Low Active) 
 
Figure ‎6-4: Intrusive Authentication Requests throughout the 14-day Usage for User 4 (High Active) 
By examining the correlation between the percentage of intrusive authentication requests, the 
extent of use, and the required security of the accessed applications, it is shown that the low 
active users (User 31 in this example) had, on average, more explicit authentication than high 
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inactive for a period of time in order to avert illegitimate access to high risk applications. 
Therefore, if those applications were requested after this idle period, users were required to 
perform an intrusive authentication to confirm their identity and hence raise the confidence 
level again. Overall, the system demonstrated a fair level of maintaining the system integrity 
throughout the variable user interactions and, as a result, user-friendliness was improved 
thereby noticeably reducing the number of intrusive requests. In most cases and with most 
applications, the user was able to be authorised transparently without interruption. 
On the other hand, a considerable improvement of reducing the number of explicit 
authentication requests by utilising Cloud Aura without degradation function is evident as 
shown in Table ‎6-11. The lowest intrusiveness was 6.64% with the AL of 5. 
Cloud Aura without Degradation 
Total Requests 
AL 2 min  AL 5 min  AL 10 min 
% of Intrusive requests % of Intrusive requests % of Intrusive requests 
46,254 7.06 6.64 7.49 
Table ‎6-11: Cloud Aura Percentage of Intrusive Authentication Requests (without Degradation) 
Furthermore, Table ‎6-12 depicts that the system achieved a very low intrusiveness with 
apps/services required lower security (far less than 1% intrusive requests on risk levels 1, 2, 
and 3). Full transparency also occurred (as the best cases) with 26%, 32%, and 23% of 
participants with the ALs of 2, 5, and 10 respectively. Apart from this, this model should not 
require such performance always but rather keeping the required level of user confidence 
when needed to align the risk levels of requested apps/services. Thus, an acceptable number 
of intrusive authentication requests can be endured to safeguard the high risk apps/services. It 
is seen that even in the worst case, the number of intrusive requests has been almost halved 
and hence removes a significant amount of the users’ inconvenience. 
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Cloud Aura without Degradation 
Time Windows 2 min 5 min 10 min 
App Risk Level % of Intrusive requests % of Intrusive requests % of Intrusive requests 
0 0 0 0 
1 0.16 0.15 0.17 
2 0.51 0.48 0.54 
3 0.74 0.69 0.78 
4 1.46 1.38 1.55 
5 4.19 3.94 4.45 
Worst Case 
User(s) ID 
40.04 37.89 43.31 
41 41 41 
Best Case 
User(s) ID 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 10, 13, 14, 
16, 17, 20, 43 
2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 
14, 16, 17, 18, 20, 43 
2, 4, 5, 8, 10, 13, 14, 16, 
17, 20, 43 
Table ‎6-12: Cloud Aura Percentage of Intrusive Authentication Requests based on the App Risk Levels, Worst and 
Best Cases (without Degradation) 
On the one hand, given the mixture of those best cases between high and low active users, 
such approach cannot be recommended for just a specific category of users. Rather, other 
various elements can influence this, such as the multitude of operated devices and their 
capabilities, and performance(s) of the contributing biometrics. 
Based upon all aforementioned results of this section from both authorised and imposter 
participants, it is perceived that the verification time window does play an important role of 
balancing system security and usability. Very repeated user verification would render the user 
undergoes more intrusive authentication requests but, at the same time, recognising an 
imposter would be in a reasonable short period of time. In contrast, the user would be able to 
utilise the device more conveniently with less repeated user verification but, simultaneously, 
recognising an imposter and shutting out the device would take relatively longer period of 
time. 
6.3.2 Multi-devices 
Ideally, in the Cloud Aura approach, a user is able to establish a level of identity confidence 
through the capture of biometric samples on one device and then subsequently use that 
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confidence to access other devices and services. Thus, it can operate across multiple devices 
and services utilised by a user and registered in their Cloud Aura account/profile. The 
proposition of the centralised Cloud Aura solution is the ability to intelligently combine all 
possible provided authentication information from the different devices and techniques. This 
would, as a result, provide an in-depth insight of what the user is doing (in terms of devices 
and services) and in doing so, a more robust identity intelligence is performed. For instance, 
it will be possible to determine whether two authentication requests are concurrently made 
from different locations from devices that belong to the authorised user and thus highlighting 
potential misuse. 
Moreover, when an access request is made to one of the user’s devices, the score of their 
Cloud Aura confidence will determine whether they will be granted access to that device 
spontaneously (and to their other devices accordingly) or be required to carry out an intrusive 
authentication. This score will vary depending upon when and where the user last performed 
a successful authentication. 
Whilst moving to a continuous multi-devices confidence based approach does not eliminate 
identity forgery completely, it does considerably complicate the forgery process – where the 
attacker will have to be able to constantly forge the biometric credentials throughout other 
user’s devices (the supported biometric techniques can also differ across devices). The high 
cost and resources needed to continuously provide forged samples across a range of biometric 
techniques and devices make it a significantly more impracticable task than a targeted attack 
against a single device approach. 
In order to analyse the effect of employing a multitude of devices in Cloud Aura, 5 
participants (Users 1, 3, 11, 17, and 47) were found in the dataset having 11 devices in total 
(2 devices each except User 47 with 3 devices). Despite their limited number that makes it 
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difficult to generalise, it can provide a broad indication about the usefulness of such an 
approach. The average percentage of the intrusive requests on each device of a user were 
added to each other and then averaged to have a combined result. Even though that this 
accumulation can be done in an intelligent way considering, for instance, one of the devices 
as the main device and thus carrying higher contributing weight into the formula, this could 
not be established based on the information available. However, the average can be a 
representative of the neutral outcome where all devices have equal weights. 
User#, Device# Total Apps Usage 
Average Intrusive 
Requests (each device) 
Combined Average 
Intrusive Requests 
User1, D1 502 10.45% 
8.11% 
User1, D2 1000 5.77% 
User3, D1 582 9.55% 
9.95% 
User3, D2 490 10.35% 
User11, D1 362 15.19% 
18.17% 
User11, D2 200 21.15% 
User17, D1 500 13.36% 
18.25% 
User17, D2 433 23.14% 
User47, D1 2322 7.89% 
19.04% User47, D2 754 19.32% 
User47, D3 650 29.92% 
Table ‎6-13: Breakdown of Intrusive Requests of Participants with Multiple Devices 
Table ‎6-13 indicates that unifying the user identity confidence score of the various devices of 
a user’s Cloud Aura would provide a more informing combined authentication decision. It is 
appreciated that the combined average of intrusive authentication requests is less than at least 
one of the participating devices (but not less than all of them). This can be caused by the fact 
that merely one device is being utilised as the primary one whereas the remaining devices are 
left for specific use, task(s), and environment(s). However, these secondary used devices can 
dramatically benefit from the maintained integrity of the main devices thus reducing their 
explicit authentication requests. 
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6.4 Conclusion 
It is perceived that a particular transparent and continuous authentication mechanism would 
have the potential to ensure effective authentication method together with users’ acceptance. 
However, it is paramount to have high level of performance, scalability, and interoperability 
among and with existing and future systems, services and devices. Furthermore, these 
requirements should be implemented and evaluated extensively on real data in order to prove 
that such a system is viable and should be put and deployed in an operational context to 
measure other key factors that are required for successful adoption (such as usability and 
economic benefits of biometrics licencing and processing). 
The experiments showed that it is possible to gather a single user profile from the range of 
devices a single user may use and with the augmentation of information from various smart 
sources (multi-devices and geolocation as examples), it is viable, secure and more convenient 
to authenticate users. The model achieved appropriate levels of integrity in the case of an 
authorised user better than those of unimodal, NICA, and WMVF which accordingly 
established better security (detection time) in the event that an impostor tries to access the 
device assets. Furthermore, it reduces the intrusive authentication requests by 62%-74% (of 
the total assumed intrusive requests without operating this model) in the worst cases. These, 
in turn, demonstrated the added value of incorporating geolocation and multiple devices 
information in a centralised federated authentication using the Cloud that would provide a 
more reliable decision on the authenticity of the user in a high transparent fashion.  
It is also evident that there is a dire need of having a model that is able to adapt according to 
particular usage profiles due to experimental results showing that the security and 
convenience aspects deviate and reflect depending upon what these settings are. 
Notwithstanding, with insufficient data on hand showing that particularly, it is nevertheless 
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arguably envisaged that actually with a larger and better dataset, the advantage of having the 
cloud-based authentication solution would increase beyond what was experimentally shown. 
Building upon the previous experiments and the consequent needed refinements, a novel, 
flexible and scalable Cloud Aura architecture will be proposed and designed. An 
authentication system built upon this would provide a more secure, user-friendly, universal 
and technology independent environment. 
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7 Cloud Aura – System Architecture and Prototype 
7.1 Introduction 
With the aforementioned evolution of authentication mechanisms and of digital devices 
functionalities along with the extensive utilisation of them by users, the necessity for 
transparent, universal and federated authentication approach that can be used across 
technologies and services is becoming more apparent.  
Having established the empirical experimental basis that have enabled showing how Cloud 
Aura would work and presenting the benefits of such an approach, this chapter seeks to 
design a novel information system that would help support those functionalities. Specified 
requirements would, also, be needed in the development of a holistic federated authentication 
platform, taking into account the security, usability, privacy and other related issues. 
Considering the operational aspects, that such a practical high intelligent authentication 
management system would require, is crucial to ensure its robustness, effectiveness and ease 
of use. 
Benefiting from the promising features offered by cloud computing – its universal 
connectivity, scalability and flexibility – would enable a novel opportunity of achieving 
convenient authentication seamlessly in a technology and service independent fashion. The 
approach introduces a new dedicated authentication provider – the Managed Authentication 
Service Provider (MASP) – that is able to provide state-of-the-art centralised verification of 
authenticity. However, relying upon such an environment also introduces a range of 
technology, privacy and trust-related issues that must be considered and overcome. 
An exhaustive description of the system architecture requirements, components, and 
processes is elucidated showing the flexibility of the integration of multibiometric techniques 
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in order to provide a centralised transparent and continuous authentication mechanism for 
multiple devices to access multiple services. Moreover, in order to practically prove that the 
concept of the proposed solution can work in practice, a functional cloud-based prototype is 
designed and developed.  
7.2 Cloud Aura Requirements 
Based upon the thorough analysis of the literature review (Chapter ‎0), the user survey 
(Chapter ‎4), and the results of the set of experiments (Chapter ‎5 and ‎6), and in order to offer 
an effective novel authentication mechanism, Cloud Aura system requirements have to be 
specified prior to the architecture design. 
7.2.1 Essential Requirements 
The following essential system requirements have been empirically established and thus must 
be addressed in the proposed architecture: 
 High security performance through the use of multimodal biometric system 
As proved by Experiment 1 of Chapter 5, utilising a single modality would continue 
in carrying its shortcomings, thus enduring low matching performance, limited 
universality and higher vulnerability to spoofing attacks. Fusing more than one 
biometric (multimodal) can arguably contribute to overcoming or at least alleviating 
these flaws, as seen from Experiment 2 and 3 of Chapter 5. 
 High level of transparent operation  
It is found from the analysis of the literature review of Chapter 3 and the user survey 
of Chapter 4 that it is imperative for the Cloud Aura architecture to operate in a full 
transparent fashion from even the initial login. Integrating any form of intrusive login 
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(i.e. secret or biometric) would lead them to carry the limitations of the secret-
knowledge authentication approach, the single modality, and intrusiveness – thus 
reducing user convenience.  
 Continuous user identity confidence 
The outcome of Chapter 3 shows that performing user verification merely at the 
point-of-entry leaves the system at risk of misuse afterwards. It also focusses upon 
system/service level authentication – rather than actually looking at what the user is 
doing. Therefore, user identity confidence should be maintained throughout the usage 
session(s). 
 Universality and Interoperability 
Comparing the results of the WMVF (Section 5.3.4) with those after using the Cloud 
Aura concept (Section 6.3), it is evident that authentication mechanisms that are 
confined to work in a specific context and/or device are deemed to lack the 
universality and interoperability attribute that enables a seamless technology and 
service independent functioning. Accordingly, a centralised federated authentication 
approach using the Cloud would help towards constructing a better user profile 
encompassing multibiometrics and soft biometric information from their multiple 
devices and thus improving the security and convenience of the technique beyond 
what a single device can do by itself. As such, Cloud Aura should not require any 
additional capturing device or sensor and should be compatible with various 
platforms. 
 Services risk levels aligned with user identity confidence 
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Considering the fluctuation nature of user identity confidence/trust should be mapped 
with the varying risk levels of conducted activities or accessed services, which 
reflects the real use, as shown from the diversity of apps risk levels the participants 
utilised in the experiments of Chapter 5 and 6. 
7.2.2 Desirable Requirements 
In addition to the afore-mentioned essential requirements, the following desirable system 
requirements need to be considered though they have not been validated in this research: 
 Flexibility and adaptability to deploy mixture of biometrics 
Cloud Aura should be flexible, modular, and adaptable to the future of what new 
biometric techniques may emerge thereby using biometrics standards allowing to 
plug/include a new biometric into the system. 
 Work with autonomous service domains and organisations 
The desirable architecture would be able to offer a federated authentication 
mechanism able to manage access control to heterogeneous service providers. 
 Minimal processing and storage overhead on user devices 
Carrying out the feature extraction and classification algorithms for each contributing 
biometric technique on each device would increase processing and storage overhead 
on each incorporated device. Thus, there is a need to maintain an efficient and cost 
effective model for the biometric processing together with low footprint on users’ 
devices with no adverse effect on the performance of the device. 
 Appropriate level of scalability 
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The architecture should be scalable enough in order address the potential enlarging 
use of network and memory resources caused by the amplifying number of subscribed 
users and their interactions with the system.  
 Security and privacy protection  
Measures to secure and manage biometric templates database and biometric samples 
in transient should be put in place to support users’ acceptance of and trust in the 
system that would lead to better adoption. 
The aforementioned requirements can be achieved by utilising the Cloud Aura system 
architecture, which is described in the proceeding section.  
7.3 Cloud Aura Architecture 
Stemming from the abovementioned essential and desirable characteristics and requirements, 
a federated biometric authentication framework is proposed, shifting the burden of both the 
authentication processing and management responsibility to a centralised Managed 
Authentication Service Provider (MASP). Cloud Aura fundamentally works as described in 
section ‎6.2, building upon existing research on transparent and distributed authentication, 
with a view of capitalising upon the benefits that cloud computing provide whereby residing 
in a cloud environment. An authentication system built upon this would provide a more 
secure, user-friendly, universal, adaptable, scalable and technology independent environment 
than a device-centric approach. 
The specialisation of the MASP enables economies of scale with respect to the authentication 
processing algorithms that would not easy be achieved on an individual user basis. However, 
the significant benefit of the centralised approach is the ability to secure a host of devices and 
services that would not themselves be able to utilise strong biometric-level authentication 
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approaches. In a federated authentication approach, a user is able to establish a level of 
identity confidence through the capture of biometric samples on one device and then 
subsequently use that confidence to access other devices and services. 
Figure ‎7-1 demonstrates an architectural Cloud Aura framework encompassing processes and 
elements held within the user device(s) together with those on the Cloud and their 
interconnectivity. The design of the Cloud Aura architecture is built upon the knowledge 
obtained from the conducted experiments of this thesis and the concepts of the Authentication 
Aura (Hocking et al., 2011) and IAMS/NICA (Clarke & Furnell, 2006; Clarke et al., 2009).  
 
Figure ‎7-1: Cloud Aura Architecture 
It incorporates functionalities on the device to capture (by the Capturing Agent) and pre-
process (if necessary) authentication credentials, typically biometrics-based information and 
soft biometrics. This is a continuous process depending upon the device, its capturing 
capabilities and usage – the latter aspect being a key to achieving transparent authentication. 
Beyond capturing, however, (when the typical cloud-based mode is enabled) the 
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Communication Agent sends the pre-processed information to the Cloud Aura Manager (run 
by a MASP in the Cloud) which undertakes all remaining processing and responsibilities, 
removing any unnecessary processing and storage burden from the device. When utilising 
devices that the user does now own, this also serves to minimise privacy implications and the 
local storage of biometrics-based information. 
The Cloud Aura Manager, being the heart of the Cloud Aura architecture, originates the 
Authentication Manager to process the appropriate Biometric Classifier(s) as configured in 
the Cloud Aura Policy. Dependent upon the verification result of the Authentication Manager, 
the Cloud Aura Manager, subsequently, utilises the various information from the Profile 
Storage, Integrity Monitor, Apps Risk Levels, and Federated Service Providers to take the 
appropriate subsequent response(s), such as granting access, requesting intrusive 
authentication, blocking some services, locking down the device(s), sending a security 
notification to the user, re-training the classifier, and updating the template. Furthermore, the 
resultant accumulated user confidence of the Integrity Monitor is disseminated to the other 
Cloud Aura-enabled devices of the user. 
The following sub-sections explain in detail the integral Cloud Aura components required to 
work on the architecture in order to fulfil its requirements thereby maintaining security and 
minimising inconvenience. 
7.3.1 Capturing Agent 
The primary role of the Capturing Agent is to detect and collect biometrical information of a 
user both physiological and behavioural (e.g. fingerprint, face, voice and gait) alongside other 
smart or soft information from sensors of their device(s) (e.g. GPS and gyroscope). Given the 
range of biometric modalities that can be captured by a device and utilised by a user, their 
related agents are put into effect to capture their biometric characteristics simultaneously and 
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transparently at the set intervals. Moreover, the Capturing Agent does monitor and log the 
system activities and store this in the Temporary Storage in order to map the authentication 
and access control decisions to them. 
Due to the unavailability possibility of some samples from some biometric techniques and/or 
sensors at a specific time, all raw samples are stored in the Temporary Storage database for 
future use, such as for pre-processing or by the Communication Agent. The Temporary 
Storage information consists of (but not limited to) the requested application name and its 
risk level, types of captured input data, date and time, besides the quality of the sample.  
The varying quality of the samples in real life usage (as seen in the experiments of this 
research) poses issues of increasing FRR owed to the far mismatch with the templates 
(Clarke, 2011). For instance, face occlusion caused by posturing in front of the camera and 
surrounding noise with voice may lead to low confidence score although being from an 
authorised user. Thus, there should be a method for samples quality check prior to employing 
them for authentication decision. However, defining such a method can be within the design 
of biometric techniques which is not the aim of this research apart from being not vital for 
this system architectural design. 
The architecture permits for a degree of client-side pre-processing of biometric samples in 
order to reduce the volume of data to be transmitted by the Communication Agent to the 
Cloud Aura Manager besides perhaps providing an increased level of privacy. This pre-
processing phase may include extracting biometric features (if it is lightweight) dependent 
upon the concerned biometric technique, upon which it is performed differently and 
converted into feature vector. Both enrolment and verification processes benefit from this. 
During the former, the sample template is created and communicated to the Cloud Aura 
Manager to use and keep in the Profile Storage. However, during the latter process, the 
Chapter ‎7 – Cloud Aura – System Architecture and Prototype 
 
190 | P a g e  
 
sample template is used by the Authentication Manager to verify with the user’s profile. 
These pre-processing and feature extraction processes are optional in the client-side if the 
cloud-based system is activated whilst they become core within the standalone mode. 
Considering the multimodal and interoperability requirements, the system is not limited to 
current technologies of biometrics and sensors, so it can adapt to new modalities. Therefore, 
the architecture is constructed to be flexible, modular, and adaptable looking to the future of 
what new biometric techniques may emerge thereby using biometrics standards. 
Implementing the MASP to accept any current or emerged biometrics as long as it complies 
with ISO standards (i.e. ISO 19794, 19785, 19784) allows for flexibility and modularisation 
of the system – something individual devices would never be able to achieve due to 
prohibitive costs and processing requirements (ISO, 2006a, 2006b, 2011).  Furthermore, 
having the classification and authentication undertaken in the Cloud, a wide range of devices 
can use such a system (e.g. smartphones, tablets, laptops, desktops), which vary in terms of 
their hardware configuration and operating system. This, in turn, enables the architecture to 
be plug in different operating systems being device-independent. Typically, cost, processing 
and vendor-specific solutions have prevented this from happening to date and continue to do 
so. Nonetheless, utilising these standards makes Cloud Aura an interoperable framework 
thereby providing a more rigorous and technology independent authentication approach. 
7.3.2 Communication Agent 
The Communication Agent plays as a communication bridge between the client (device) and 
the host (Cloud). Where the cloud-based mode is in use, the Communication Agent passes the 
captured samples from the device to the MASP so the Cloud Aura Manager works upon them 
accordingly. If the biometric samples were pre-processed, their feature vectors are the ones to 
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be sent. The communication process takes place in a trusted environment to a Trusted Third 
Party (TTP) and via the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) security technology. 
Once the authentication decision is made by the Cloud Aura Manager, the Communication 
Agent will receive the authentication result and the integrity status that enable the users to 
experience the outcome on the device(s) – ranging from granting access, requesting intrusive 
authentication, to locking down the device. Furthermore, in cases where less computationally 
complex functions suffice and/or where the standalone mode is in use, the Communication 
Agent will coordinate to ordain the authentication to be performed within the device by the 
Authentication Agent utilising the offline Profile Storage. The biometrics that can be 
employed in this way are defined in the Cloud Aura Policy. 
7.3.3 Authentication Manager 
The Authentication Manager is controlled by the Cloud Aura Manager, and performs the 
actual uni- and multi-modal authentication. When prompted, the Authentication Manager will 
perform the authentication by retrieving the required captured information set by the 
Communication Agent and supplying it to the appropriate biometric classifier(s), which will 
utilise the corresponding biometric template from the Profile Storage and produce an 
individual authentication decision. Dependent upon the type of captured sample, the 
Authentication Manager will utilise external Biometric Classifier to perform the relevant 
processing (e.g. facial recognition for face images, and voice verification for voice samples). 
The Authentication Manager will then obtain the verification result and inform the Cloud 
Aura Manager accordingly. The Authentication Manager uses the Profile Storage in the 
authentication process and the samples for re-generating or re-training the biometric template 
when needed. If the result of the Authentication Manager is successful, the captured samples 
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and information are kept in the Profile Storage for subsequent re-training and profile re-
generation; otherwise, they are discarded or used to generate patterns of anomalies.  
The initial process of profile template generation of physiological biometrics can be 
straightforward and thus can take effect instantly after the registration and enrolment stages. 
However, it can be a complex task when it comes to behavioural and soft biometrics where 
there is a need for a period of time and a number of samples in order to generate the 
templates.  
As the biometric samples can be captured by one or different biometric techniques, the 
following approaches are implemented so one or a set of them is applied as appropriate 
(elaborated in ‎3.6.1): 
 Multi-Sample approach: deploying multiple inputs of the same modality in order to 
have a more informed identity verification decision and to offset the existence of low 
quality samples. 
 Multimodal approach: deploying a single sample of multiple modalities to alleviate 
the malfunction of some incorporated biometric techniques or sensors. 
 Hybrid approach: dynamically deploying single or multiple samples of multiple 
modalities. This would fine-tune the algorithm in order to achieve a desired 
performance, crafting a more multi-layered method. 
Referring to the review in ‎3.6.2, these samples need to be fused effectively at certain phase of 
the biometric system: sensor, feature, matching score, and/or decision level (Clarke, 2011; 
Ross, 2007; Sim et al., 2007). This objective aims at producing such a scalable, flexible and 
dynamic framework, thereby enabling multiple diverse classification schemes, in order to 
have a more robust authentication decision. 
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In order to produce a balanced decision considering the effect of the inputs from modalities 
of different EERs thus different accuracies, consideration needs also to be given to the weight 
each individual contributing technique has on the fused decision. Given enough time in 
samples, any combination of multibiometric systems could potentially exists. The weights are 
assigned to the individual biometric techniques inversely proportionate to their EERs – the 
lower the EER, the higher the weight than those of high EER. For instance, a fingerprint scan 
would be given a higher weight than that of gait recognition. When authentication fusion is 
performed successfully upon a user, the result score will be returned to the Cloud Aura 
Manager for use in the identity confidence calculation. 
In spite of the fact that an overall successful decision of multibiometrics may contain a 
number of rejected samples, they can be actually of the authorised user, thus utilising them in 
the re-training process would aid having a better insight about the real interactions of the 
user. 
7.3.4 Integrity Monitor 
The Integrity Monitor holds the current and historical system integrity levels – one upon 
which the access control decision is made. The Cloud Aura Manager originates its process at 
the intervals defined in the Cloud Aura Policy. Following the same concept and algorithm 
outlined in Section ‎5.3.3.1, the level of integrity continuously fluctuates based upon the 
biometric samples captured, their authentication decisions, the elapsed time since those last 
decisions, and the current location. That integrity level is subsequently passed to the Cloud 
Aura Manager and accordingly reflected on the privileges to access services and applications 
(passed back to the Communication Agent), enabling the device to deny access to specific 
functionalities and request an intrusive authentication if insufficient confidence exists up until 
locking down the device completely when this status persists or gets deteriorated. 
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Reliant upon the period of inactivity, the Cloud Aura Manager will automatically degrade the 
system integrity according to the concerned settings in the Cloud Aura Policy, i.e. the 
degradation function including its invocation intervals and drop value. Doing so would 
contribute in mitigating the risk of misuse (especially of the high sensitive apps/services) in 
case the device is hijacked when the system integrity is quite high. 
The Integrity Monitor does also provide another function – system integrity’s feedback 
information. It shows the individual authentication results and locations per modality, per 
app/service, per device, and per user’s Cloud Aura. Even though this informational guide 
might not be of use to some users, it offers a potentially useful appreciation about how their 
devices and Cloud Aura are being utilised, thus aiding to identify potential misuse as well as 
refinement  and maintenance needed (e.g. template re-enrolment, classifier re-training, and 
modality disabling). 
7.3.5 Applications Risk Levels 
Intuitively, different apps and services have different risks that should be tied with 
authentication decisions. Other researchers have looked at this issue and identified that 
having different risks for different apps would be useful (Clarke et al., 2011b; Herland, 2015; 
Ledermuller & Clarke, 2011; Shabtai et al., 2010; Theoharidou et al., 2012; Vecchiato et al., 
2016). In terms of defining a single approach to categorise these apps/services and calculate 
their risks, different researchers (including the abovementioned ones) have come up with 
different ideas and it is not the purpose of this work to come up of a new one. These apps 
risks are predefined based upon those models at the initiation of the Cloud Aura and as and 
when a new app is installed; however, the user still has the ability to override and change 
them should they wish to. Thus, in reality there might be variations between the risk level of 
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the same app utilised by different users as every user has their own security perceptions and 
requirements. 
The adopted method in the experimental studies proposed that each mobile application 
category has its distinct associated risk level dependent upon a number of measures, e.g. their 
asset values, threat levels, and vulnerability levels (Ledermuller & Clarke, 2011). Each risk 
level is mapped with their related security requirement levels (i.e. integrity level) – the higher 
the risk level of an application, the higher the associated integrity level. That is, the 
applications/services that are associated with private information or expensive services would 
require a high level of security whereas the normal applications/services would require a low 
level of security. Hence, they are used as the thresholds to feed the algorithms and to compare 
against. If the integrity level (IL) is greater than or equal to the specified associated security 
level, a transparent access is granted, otherwise an intrusive authentication request will be 
required in order to proceed with the service. 
7.3.6 Federated Service Providers 
In order to achieve the aim of granting users access to resources offered by autonomous and 
heterogeneous providers seamlessly, the profiles of the subscribed service providers must be 
recognised and so a trust relationship with the MASP should be established. Since the MASP 
will be the chief controller of the user authentication on behalf of the Federated Service 
Providers (FSP) upon which they undertake the access control decision accordingly, trust 
management between the MASP and the FSP is thus pivotal. It can be dictated by a stringent 
Service Level Agreement (SLA) between them stipulating the minimum security 
requirements of federation clients. This can, for example, include the enforcement of 
adequate authentication measures such as specific biometric technique(s), specific number of 
them, and/or just a minimum integrity level. This data store is responsible for holding these 
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SLAs for all subscribed FSPs to be used by the Cloud Aura Manager in making the 
authentication and the subsequent authorisation decisions.  
Having these different entities, there is a need to ensure the security of these cross-domains 
communications by deploying specialised standards, such as OpenID, WS-Federation, and 
Shibboleth (CSA, 2012; Stihler et al., 2012). Acting as a TTP federated MASP, whilst 
coordinating the authentication process among the member parties of the federation which are 
the service providers, user privacy concerns must be overcome so that the user should have 
the discretion to decide which of their data can be shared, with whom and when, in addition 
to the ability to de-federation.  
7.3.7 Cloud Aura Policy 
In order to achieve a commensurate level of security versus users’ convenience on a given 
device, the architecture enables a Cloud Aura client to define a number of parameters in the 
Cloud Aura Policy. The Cloud Aura Policy holds the fundamental data needed to control the 
creation, operation and maintenance of the system. Upon registering on and activating the 
Cloud Aura, the Cloud Aura Manager will launch the Cloud Aura Policy to prompt the user 
to allocate values to the core parameters (which already have default values). The Cloud Aura 
Manager will use and work upon these parameters throughout regular operation of the Cloud 
Aura and allow the user to review and update them as and when preferred or needed. These 
parameters include: 
 enabling/disabling Cloud Aura of specific device(s); 
 enabling/disabling individual authentication techniques; 
 Temporary Storage retention period; 
 Degradation Function of system integrity; 
 determining the time periods of Alert Level and Integrity Level; 
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 manual template generation/re-training; 
 ranking the subscribed devices; 
 assigning trusted geolocations; 
 assigning the fusion weight to individual authentication techniques; 
 determining what subsequent action(s) should be taken after each possible 
authentication result; 
 determining the processing split (if needed) between the client and the Cloud; 
 determining the authentication technique(s) of the standalone mode; 
 and determining and reviewing subscriptions features with Cloud Aura. 
Most of these parameters are straightforward or have been explained in different places of 
this thesis. The commentary that follows elaborates those that might be somewhat 
sophisticated. 
Subscribed devices information and their ranks are used to control a device’s contribution to 
the Cloud Aura integrity. This can be represented by an integer value indicating which 
devices have high significance and will contribute more to the integrity calculation – in case, 
for instance, a device is utilised as primary and thus always carried with the user whereas 
another device is secondary and sometimes left at home. Knowing that each user’s device 
may have different set of biometric techniques, users are able to disable any of the enabled 
techniques in order to improve users’ convenience, for instance due to frequent failures of 
that technique. Linking the techniques to the device they relate to would allow a user to 
enable a technique (e.g. facial verification) in one device but disable it in the other one for 
hardware issues or others – this may be desirable, in this example, if the camera of the latter 
device is of low resolution. 
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Another parameter that can be determined within the Cloud Aura Policy is the user 
geolocation(s) information. Having established how vital the geolocation information of the 
device is when utilising Cloud Aura authentication mechanism in Chapter ‎6, trusted 
geolocations can be defined and even given specified security requirements. For instance, for 
the sake of convenience, a user may opt to relax the thresholds (risk levels) of all or some 
apps while being at home, as the adversary probability is at minimal. Conversely, elevating 
the thresholds while at alien or even specific geolocations can be applied for the security 
purpose. Manipulating these parameters can reflect on the degradation degree of the system 
integrity over time and thus its transparency level. 
As examined throughout the previous experiments of this research, aiming at mitigating the 
risk of misuse while the device is not being used by the genuine user, the degradation 
function is enforced thereby decreasing the IL periodically by 0.5 (by default but is adjustable) 
every x minutes. If no biometric samples captured for a specified time, the IL is going down 
by specified degrees. Once biometric samples come in, it takes the latest IL (after the last 
degradation) and adds to or subtracts from it based on their recent authentication decision and 
then resets the degradation function’s time counter. For example, if the IL at 19:30 is 4 and 
the user would like to access an app at 20:15, it will not be sensible to give them access 
considering that IL recorded 45 minutes ago because the device might be on imposter’s hands 
by this time. Furthermore, it might be nonsense to disregard that IL (i.e. 4) and start the IL 
from zero when an app is called, especially with infrequent users who rarely have samples 
available for authentication. For example, a genuine user might be eating lunch at these 
elapsed 45 minutes, so when immediately after lunch they want to access an app of high or 
medium risk, there might not be any biometric sample at that time. Thus, it is useful to 
encompass the previous IL but not as is.  
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It is dependent on two variables – elapsed time and the degradation degree. The degradation 
function of the IL (which should be stored on the Integrity Monitor and kept for the following 
IL calculation) should be implemented in x elapsed minutes from the last IL by y degrees if 
there is no biometric samples captured during these x minutes. Therefore, based upon the set 
degradation time (e.g. 10 minutes) and the degradation degree (e.g. 0.5), when an app is 
called, the Cloud Aura Manager will check what was the latest IL (from the Integrity 
Monitor). Then, it will calculate whether it was from more than 10 minutes (the degradation 
time) – if yes, the IL will be decreased by 0.5 (the degradation degree) for every passed 10 
minutes.  Consequently, this updated IL will be the basis of calculating the recent IL and 
hence the authentication decision. 
Having perceived its impact on the number of intrusive authentication requests and that it 
may take many forms, its values vary even among those of the same interaction level, such as 
frequent and infrequent users. Therefore, offering the user with a degree of control, 
adjustability and influence over the confidence degradation would lead to choosing 
appropriate values based on trial. 
Further features available for review and configuration through the Cloud Aura Policy are 
those related to the subscription with the Cloud Aura system. These include (but not limited 
to): SLAs between the client and the MASP, contact or payment details, price models and the 
service capacity and scalability options. 
7.3.8 Cloud Aura Manager 
The Cloud Aura Manager acts as the brain of the Cloud Aura architecture – administering 
and initiating the processes and liaising with and between the data stores as and when 
required. Its principal task is to maintain the level of security required commensurate with the 
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applications provided by the device(s) and services provided by the FSPs. It is hosted in the 
Cloud and conducts the following integral tasks: 
 determining the operational mode; 
 generating and maintaining the system Integrity Level; 
 requesting profile generation and retraining; 
 making authentication requests, both intrusive and non-intrusive; 
 triggering what subsequent action(s) to be taken based upon the authentication result; 
 and determining whether a user has the required system Integrity Level. 
Upon registration, the Cloud Aura Manager guides the user to define system parameters that 
are administered by the Cloud Aura Policy. In addition, when the system is activated and 
functioning, the Cloud Aura Policy is also called to initiate operational parameters for 
ongoing running. During its continuous monitoring fashion, it receives the information 
transmitted by the Communication Agent and then employs the information held within the 
Profile Storage triggering appropriate processing procedures as required. Following the 
parameters set, the Authentication Manager is invoked. The result of the authentication is 
reported to the Cloud Aura Manager, dependent upon which is going to take a subsequent 
response taking into consideration other inputs such as the system integrity from the Integrity 
Monitor, the app risk level and the security requirements of the FSP. 
The remaining responsibilities of the Cloud Aura Manager concern with control (either 
dynamically or by user), such as sending a template generation and re-training request to the 
Authentication Manager to update the biometric profiles and subsequently the Profile Storage.  
Regarding the device-side Authentication Agent, it monitors the network connectivity to the 
Cloud Aura (via the Communication Manager) – should it be lost at any stage, the 
architecture will switch to a standalone mode to conduct independent operation. This could 
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be useful in a number of situations, such as poor network signal and network failure where 
the Authentication Agent will act as the Cloud Aura Manager temporarily with limited 
processes and modalities as configured in the Cloud Aura Policy. As such, it can be 
configured that at least one biometric technique always remains functioning on the device 
with the standalone mode. Quite not very strong level of protection this single technique is 
able to provide; notwithstanding, it would be able to provide a temporary effective means to 
authenticating the user whilst utilising local applications and utilities. Furthermore, in order 
to allow the use’s devices to communicate in the absence of the Cloud connectivity, the 
system will operate the Authentication Aura concept (Hocking et al., 2011) via the NFC 
feature. As soon as the connection reinstated, the mode will revert to the cloud-based and the 
Cloud Aura Manager will re-establish its monitoring working until the device is disconnected 
again or shut down. 
7.4 Correlation and Analysis of Cloud Aura 
The system allows for both device- and service-level authentication. For device-level 
authentication, the user is required to initially install a service that will provide the 
interconnection between the local authentication mechanisms/services and the MASP. Once 
configured at start-up, this becomes a completely transparent process from the user 
perspective – with all future logins only required if sufficient confidence does not exist. For 
example, had the user in the morning, logged into his mobile phone using a strong biometrics 
approach they would, within an appropriate timeframe and proximity as defined by the 
Authentication Aura (Hocking et al., 2011), be automatically logged into his computer or any 
other device he owns.  
The approach can also be utilised on devices the user does not own – providing a web-service 
level of integration. Upon initially connecting to the MASP identity through a web-based 
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biometrically-enabled login, a user will be able to access any of his web-based services 
transparently without having to repeatedly enter his credentials. This can be achieved in one 
of two approaches: 
1) (Preferred) The MASP connects directly to a federated identity system (e.g. 
Shibboleth and OpenID) to provide seamless cross-domains single-sign on. 
2) (Optional) The MASP provides a web-service credential database (i.e. password 
store) and releases the appropriate credentials to the web-service if sufficient 
confidence exists. 
Cloud Aura authentication system works in a distinct way from how conventional 
authentication are carried out typically. Despite its apparent complexity over the existing 
provision, it does offer promising features. Having a cloud-based system would facilitate 
using multibiometrics, some of which require significant processing and storage. There 
would also be a need for single technique licensing and single instances (or at least lighter 
requirements on the licenses). In addition, getting that big trend in mobile computation, the 
use of cloud-based resources to do it would help relieve the mobile device from that. The 
lightweight framework for the mobile devices supports this, as the Cloud hosts the main 
software and no need to roll out all its code locally. 
The Cloud Aura’s control dashboard functionalities would be useful in identifying misuse 
thereby providing an in-depth understanding of what the user is doing (in terms of devices 
and services) and thereby providing additional identity intelligence of the user. For example, 
it will be possible to determine if two authentication requests are simultaneously made from 
different locations from devices that belong to the owner or otherwise – thus highlighting 
potential misuse. For instance, while using multiple devices, one of the devices has been 
stolen and being misused in another location. The dashboard flags it up and sends a message 
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out to the trusted user communication method (email). When the user logins after the 
notification, the dashboard should show something signifying that the Cloud Aura is here 
with these devices while one of them is at a different location and sending abnormal 
information/samples contradicting the normal usage coming from the other sources. 
Furthermore, the dashboard would facilitate the review process of the historical events in 
order to check and see how things are working and reconfigure/respond to the system 
accordingly. For example, if the system is found to ask for intrusive authentication more 
frequently than usual, after checking the dashboard, it is noted that while the face and voice 
recognition always pass, the keystroke dynamics always fails. As a consequent, the user can 
re-train the keystroke classifier or switch off the technique. This would give the user the 
ability to: 
 make an informed decisions about their own use of the system; 
 confirm that the use they see are in fact their own one, i.e. there is no misuse; 
 when the system detects misuse, the dashboard responds accordingly so the user can 
identify that and act accordingly by, for instance, blocking that device to restrict 
access and remotely wipe the device so the Authentication Agent of that system deals 
with that accordingly. 
7.5 Operational Considerations 
Cloud Aura provides a universal approach to identity verification that can be utilised by any 
network-enabled device or service. The introduction of such system architecture meets all set 
essential requirements of Section 7.2.1 (that have been proven experimentally) and considers 
the desirable requirements of Section 7.2.2 theoretically. Thus, it has the foundations for 
solving the authentication problems – both in terms of effective security and convenience. 
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However, it also introduces a range of further issues that need to be resolved in order for the 
system to operate effectively. 
7.5.1 Trust 
First and foremost is the need for users and organisations to trust a third-party provider with 
their authentication services. Fundamentally, to date, this is not a typical expectation and 
there might become a concern over doing so. However, users already trust service providers 
with authentication credentials, albeit not all in one place. Furthermore, federated identity has 
become widely popular and this is based on the use of a single authentication credential. 
Federated authentication that Cloud Aura deploys will offer a range of authentication 
technologies for inclusion within federated identity – extending the concept of federated 
identity but more thoroughly confirming the identity prior to the access control decision that 
is made. It arguably therefore should not be a complete leap in faith of organisations, but 
merely a logical extension of the services that are already being provided. Rigorous 
statements of SLAs and close and constant monitoring upon conforming to it would provide a 
baseline level of trust. This is also supported by the rather promising users’ responses 
regarding storing biometric templates with a TTP as well as having their usage behaviour 
monitored by a TTP (investigated in the user survey of Chapter ‎4). 
7.5.2 Cost 
In spite of the gains offered by Cloud Aura, it does however change the paradigm under 
which authentication will be performed. Rather than a zero-cost solution as is (incorrectly) 
perceived to be cost of many secret-knowledge solutions, a federated authentication provider 
will need to charge at some level for the service it provides (perhaps on a per-authentication, 
per-user, monthly or organisational-basis). However, given the nature and scale of the 
authentication and security problem, the concept of paying to ensure appropriate 
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authentication security should be more than viable. Incurring cost on authentication is not 
strange because some businesses are releasing the true cost of their authentication solutions; 
for example, the financial sector investing in token-based approaches. Bearing in mind cost is 
an important factor, it would not necessarily be suitable to merely utilise more systems but 
rather better manage existing resources. 
Likewise, it is worth noting that without the use of a cloud solution a user would have to buy 
licence for every biometric technique on every single multiple device – in the way which the 
industry works as per licence model making it incredibly expensive to do. However, with the 
idea of a centralised model where there is a centralised server to authentication – although it 
might not get away of just a single licence – there could be a need to obtain a mere single 
licence or at least fewer licences or some form that could be economically far cheaper (cost 
effective). Accordingly, this would allow the MASP (federated Cloud Aura provider) to offer 
their off-the-shelf biometric solutions to their customers to pay only for an instance of them 
instead of many instances. This would indeed offer organisations the opportunity to contract 
out the user identity management and maintenance, thus reducing their in-house cost. 
7.5.3 Scalability and Response Time 
With the technology itself, there are a number of areas that need to be considered 
operationally. Considerations such as the time taken to process and authenticate a sample – in 
particular the lag introduced through the network and the potential bottleneck at the MASP 
need to be given care. The latter can be addressed through the Cloud and successful capacity 
planning. However, adding all the additional time lags introduced in a networked solution 
over a device-centric model might reduce levels of acceptability – so care must be taken to 
ensure this does not have a serious impact. It is not envisaged to be a major problem, as the 
concept of network-based authentication already exists for devices in network domains, and 
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all users already login to remote services with the authentication process occurring on the 
remote server. Furthermore, the process of transparently authenticating individuals means 
that the capture and authentication of those samples will be undertaken continuously 
throughout the use of a service or device, not just at point-of-entry. Therefore, the user should 
not be left waiting. 
Although the Cloud Aura is envisioned to be offered as a Software-as-a-Service (SaaS), 
MASP requirements will be largely dependent upon the number of users subscribed to the 
service, the number of active users and thus the volume of authentication decisions it needs to 
make at any point in time. With such variability in the level of service demand, a flexible and 
highly scalable processing and storage system is essential. Therefore, from the MASP 
perspective, whilst distributed computing paradigms would be a solution, cloud computing 
provides an ideal solution to this requirement. Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) (perhaps 
provisioned from a Cloud Service Provider (CSP)) provides an effective model for 
developing the necessary architecture for a highly scalable and adaptive solution. Such a 
system deployed in a cloud PaaS would be high scalable in terms of computing power and 
storage. It would also provide multi-tenancy at the application level using a shared database 
service and the Implicit Filter Based Access Control Isolation pattern for data isolation so 
tenant-specific operations do not conflict with other tenants’ data (Senk, 2014). Having such 
a modular and flexible system would help thereby load balancing and pushing data across 
these cloud tenants and resources. 
7.5.4 Enrolment and Template Management 
Operationally, consideration needs to be given to effectively managing enrolment and 
template renewal. In TAS systems, they often rely upon many biometrics approaches that are 
behavioural in nature and thus have features that are not time-invariant (as would be ideal). It 
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is therefore necessary to update and renew the template in a timely fashion to ensure it is a 
true reflection of the users current set of features. Knowing when to do this and the 
implications it will have upon the processing infrastructure (as template creation is a far more 
processing and memory intensive task than authentication) is essential to the smooth and 
seamless running of the MASP.  
Dynamic profile update is an example of this, where the template is set to be generated by the 
most samples/behaviour of the last x days given they have passed the authentication with a 
minimum integrity level. Accordingly, all successfully verified logs will be included in the 
periodic template regeneration process at the end of the identified period whilst those rejected 
logs will be used to create imposter data to be utilised for re-training the classifiers. Thus, 
users ensure they are having true reflecting profile comprising their up to date features.  
Furthermore, profile adaptation can be based upon biometrics performance. If the decisions 
out of the fusion process were to be positive with high confidence, the process would 
retrospectively look at each individual fused techniques – if there were negatives, that might 
be a basis for requiring a profile refinement and classifier re-training. Poorly performing 
biometrics can also be an indicator for this. If a biometric technique has not performed well 
across the usage of one or all users (with lots of rejections) but that was among other stronger 
biometrics having successes, it perhaps does not mean it is illegitimate user, but rather that 
particular biometric is not performing well. Therefore, the algorithm could switch it off 
and/or trigger re-training. 
7.5.5 Security and Privacy 
Further issues surround the use of biometrics information. From an end-user perspective, 
privacy is a key factor to consider. The storage, use and communication of biometrics 
samples must be achieved in a manner that minimises the threat of interception and misuse of 
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the information. The MASP architecture must be appropriately designed to provide 
separation and segregation of duties, hashing, and defence against client-side apps to ensure 
the opportunity of accessing the sensitive data is only possible to specific authorised entities. 
Therefore, in order to secure the actual information and its transmission, a range of 
standardised mechanisms can be put in place. A number of studies have been undertaken to 
tackle this issue (Gejibo, 2015; He, et al., 2016; Itani, et al., 2009; Shrishak, et al., 2016). For 
instance, the client-side uses the Pretty Good Privacy (PGP), which is an encryption method 
that offers cryptographic privacy and authentication for data communication. The encrypted 
data will then be sent to the server using the Secure Socket Layer (SSL). Moreover, biometric 
cryptosystems and cancelable biometrics  exemplify a fair level of biometric template 
protection addressing these considerations and hence enhancing users’ acceptance of 
adopting such a system (Rathgeb & Uhl, 2011). 
Stringent SLAs may also ensure a level of privacy-aware countermeasures together with 
related additional regulations. Privacy can also be protected by using and retaining only that 
information which is needed for the authentication process and its accompanying intelligence, 
in addition to enabling users some control over the release of their shared information with 
both the MASP and even the FSPs. 
7.6 Cloud Aura Prototype 
This functional prototype is developed because almost half of the software was already 
developed for the data collection so a number of interfaces to connect that with the dashboard 
have been added. This with the design of the web-based pages helped in visualising and 
understanding better how the architecture would work in practice. Therefore, it is used as a 
useful learning tool in its design being an iterative process. For this purpose, a mobile 
application is developed (using an appropriate open source programming language) as well as 
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a counterpart web-based dashboard – both are connected with a database hosted in a web 
server (cloud) representing the MASP. The mobile application accepts the biometric samples 
from the users and gathers GPS information from their devices. Subsequently, that 
information is stored as templates on the MASP, utilised in making succeeding authentication 
decisions, and facilitated to control provisions to the user.  
Cloud Aura prototype is designed to have a small memory and processing footprint on the 
device. It is capable of monitoring user’s apps usage, face recognition, voice verification, gait 
recognition and GPS information and then verifying the legitimacy of the user accordingly in 
the Cloud.  
As stated in section ‎5.2.5, given Google Android OS has the largest mobile phones market 
share by 87.6% (IDC, 2016) and it is an open source and easy to manipulate (in addition to 
other stated rationales), Android Studio development environment was used for developing 
the mobile app. Native Android was used to develop the Could Aura application; whilst XML 
to design its graphics and user interface; Java for the front-end app development; and SQLite 
as the app database. Additionally, Retrofit library was used for calling web service API; 
Picasso library for displaying server images; and Google Play Services library for capturing 
location. On the other hand, the web coding platforms were: HTML5, CSS3, Jquery and 
Javascript for font-end, in addition to PHP for back-end. 
Enabling the software to capture the aforementioned information was facilitated by 
employing and deploying a number of Android APIs and classes (apart from other 
supplementary basic APIs) as follows: 
 Android Media API – Face Detector  
 Android Hardware Camera2 API 
 Android Media API – Audio Manager 
 Android App Usage API 
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 Android User Availability API 
 Android Hardware API – Sensor Manager 
 Android Location API 
 Android Database File Upload API 
 Activity Manager 
 Broadcast Receiver 
All related capturing packages were encapsulated in one single Android Application Package 
(APK) and uploaded to Google Play while keeping it downloadable by private invitations 
only. 
The design of this app was conducted according to weighted percentage assigned to each 
biometric technique and information inversely proportionate to their EERs considering all 
possible scenarios of their availability. In addition, they can be enabled/disabled. Capturing 
location of a user occurs at the time of app request and saved temporarily at the device-end 
with its associated timestamp. When a user opens any app, the Cloud Aura software detects 
and logs the app name, user’s current location, steps count and walked distance (all with their 
timestamps) and sends them to the server to compare each of them with their historical 
behavioural profiles and stores them. For instance, it compares the current location with other 
historical locations within the same time slot. If the location is within 100 meters, data of 
location is stored and percentage of location is calculated. 
Figure ‎7-2 illustrates an overall view of the Cloud Aura class diagram and the relations 
between the main data stores. 
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Figure ‎7-2: Class Diagram of the Cloud Aura Database 
When a user installs Cloud Aura app for the first time, the registration/enrolment screen is 
prompted asking the user to set an email, password, and enrolling the physiological biometric 
samples (as shown in Figure ‎7-3). At the user registration screen, the user has to input an 
email and a password and capture 3 photos by clicking the camera button. When all details 
entered correctly, the user presses the register button to send all details to the server. It will 
send a confirmation email to the entered email with which the user has to verify their account. 
 
Figure ‎7-3: Cloud Aura App - User Enrolment/Registration 
If the user is already registered, the login screen depicted in Figure ‎7-4 (Left) asks for the 
user credentials including the email, password and a voice sample forming a multi-factor 
Chapter ‎7 – Cloud Aura – System Architecture and Prototype 
 
212 | P a g e  
 
authentication. These credentials will be sent to the server for verification. If the login 
succeeds, the landing page appears (Figure ‎7-4 Right) and after setting the parameters, the 
app will continue working in the background unless the device is shut down or the app is 
disabled or uninstalled. 
 
Figure ‎7-4: Cloud Aura App - User Login (Left) and Landing Page (Right) 
One of the most critical parameter to define after the first login is the apps/services risk levels. 
As seen in Figure ‎7-5, a list of all installed applications and services on the device is 
demonstrated accompanied with three different risk levels (Low, Medium, and High), from 
which the user can select and submit initially and can re-visit at a later stage to update. All 
subsequent authentication decisions will be dependent upon these risks – when the resultant 
confidence is higher than the risk level of the requested app/service, the access is granted, 
otherwise an intrusive authentication is requested by asking for a voice or face sample. 
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Figure ‎7-5: Cloud Aura App - Setting Apps and Services Risk Levels 
The main page of the Cloud Aura app, through which three key functions can be undertaken, 
is exhibited in Figure ‎7-6. The first ON/OFF toggle button permits disabling and enabling the 
software temporarily or permanently from functioning on the device. For any reason, the user 
would prefer to stop the capturing processes. This would, arguably, enhance the users’ 
acceptance and experience, thereby providing them a level of service control unlike the 
concept of a blanket-based opt-in or out completely. The second icon is for generating the 
collected information of that day in spreadsheets, allowing the user to review and monitor 
their data. The third button is to access the setting page, which will be shown in the next 
figure. Finally, a meter showing the current confidence of the device is displayed and can be 
attested by logging to the dashboard where the user can see this for all their registered devices. 
For example, the shown 75% in the figure conveys that this is the accumulated identity 
confidence that might come from a number of user’s devices. In this case, the user will be 
able to access any service/app on their device(s) that have a risk level equivalent to or less 
than 75%.  
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Figure ‎7-6: Cloud Aura App Main Page 
When the user clicks on setting button of the above screen, it opens the enrolment settings 
screen revealing 4 icons; app risks setting, voice samples update setting, face samples setting 
and biometrics/sensors setting to enable/disable them (Figure ‎7-7). It is apparent that via the 
app setting, users can change risk levels of apps. 
 
Figure ‎7-7: Cloud Aura App - Enrolment Settings 
Due to the lack of text-independent voice verification classifiers that are freely available 
and/or open source, text-dependent method was utilised and believed to serve the purpose of 
this prototype. Thus, the user can enrol with up to three voice samples in the app, which can 
Chapter ‎7 – Cloud Aura – System Architecture and Prototype 
 
215 | P a g e  
 
be updated from the setting illustrated in Figure ‎7-8. The collected voice sample is matched 
with the three saved voice templates and its confidence is calculated.  
 
Figure ‎7-8: Cloud Aura App - Voice Enrolment/Re-Enrolment 
Similarly, change face button shows the enrolled face images and the user can update one or 
all of them by capturing new image(s) and saving them on the dashboard (Figure ‎7-9). 
 
Figure ‎7-9: Cloud Aura App - Face Enrolment/Re-Enrolment 
Image confidence calculation is undertaken on the server-side as follows: 
1. Accepting the image (in jpg, png format)  
2. Getting stored images for specific user at the time of registration 
3. Recreating the images with the help of PHP function imagecreatefromjpeg() or 
imagecreatefrompng() 
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4. Resizing the images to 8x8 square 
5. Filtering the images in grayscale 
6. Getting the mean value of colours and the list of all pixel’s colours 
7. Comparing the colours, if the colour is bigger than the mean value, it gives 1 else 
zero 
8. Finding out the hammering (change in shade) distances (between zero to 64) for 
both images and comparing both values to find the resultant value. If value < 9  
images are similar, if value > 8 and value < 17  images are somewhat different, 
and if value > 16  images are completely different. 
The last but not least setting, is related to the control of enabling and disabling specific 
biometrics/sensors, such as GPS, Fingerprint and Face features from being utilised by the 
Cloud Aura app. This can be seen in Figure ‎7-10 and will be reflected on the dashboard. 
 
Figure ‎7-10: Cloud Aura App - Enable/Disable Biometric Capturing 
As illustrated in Figure ‎7-11, a user can access the Cloud Aura’s web dashboard using the 
same registration credentials and carry out some controlling and monitoring activities. 
General information is shown, such as the number of subscribed devices, their overall fused 
confidence, the registered email and the three face template images. Furthermore, there is 
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basic information about each registered device including the device name, the status of each 
of the biometrics and sensors besides the overall confidence of each individual device.  
 
Figure ‎7-11: Cloud Aura Dashboard Main Page 
With regard to the available actions, the red crossed icon allows for removing a device 
completely from the Cloud Aura. Additionally, the information icon displays the device 
location on Google map. By clicking on the detail button in front of a specific device, the 
user will be able to browse various log files (Figure ‎7-12) and review the historical overall 
identity confidence of each device as observed in Figure ‎7-13. These options would provide 
the user with information aiding to have better insight about the benefits of the system as well 
as how they use their devices leading to informed customisation to augment security and 
convenience 
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Figure ‎7-12: Cloud Aura Dashboard - Device Detail 
 
Figure ‎7-13: Cloud Aura Dashboard - Device Fluctuating Identity Confidence 
7.7 Conclusion 
The requirements for achieving a novel Cloud Aura architecture have been established 
followed by a detailed practical architectural specifications designed in a modular and robust 
manner that would support such a system in practice considering the security, usability, 
privacy and other related operational issues. The architecture offers a cloud-based federated 
authentication mechanism accomplished by a Managed Authentication Service Provider 
(MASP) enables a high level of protection, transparency, adaptability, and universality 
seamlessly in a technology and service independent fashion. 
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A comprehensive description of the system architecture agents, components, and 
functionalities have been described. The Cloud Aura architecture has the potential to meet the 
laid requirements to offer the flexibility of the integration of multibiometric techniques in 
order to provide an intelligent centralised transparent and continuous authentication 
mechanism for multiple devices to access multiple services. 
Even though it is not a risk-proof framework, a number of operational considerations have 
been addressed to be taken into account while developing and operating it. Moreover, a 
functional cloud-based prototype has been designed, developed and presented in order to 
practically prove that the concept of the proposed architecture would work in practice.  
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8 Conclusions and Future Work 
This chapter concludes the thesis by outlining the key contributions and achievements of the 
research. This is followed by a summary of the limitations and obstacles encountered during 
it, and finally by an identification of potential areas of further research work. 
8.1 Contributions and Achievements of the Research 
The research has accomplished all the objectives originally stated in Chapter 1, with a series 
of undertaken experimental studies leading to the development of the Cloud Aura architecture. 
The key contributions and achievements of this research are: 
 Investigating the leading authentication technologies provided by various sectors from 
a number of perspectives, including its system components, requirements, techniques, 
performance measures and standards, with a view of examining its potential to be 
incorporated in the research proposal. Building upon this, an exhaustive literature 
survey of the existing research in the domain of multibiometric continuous and 
transparent authentication was achieved. 
 Exploring aspects of the research problem that the literature has not addressed related 
to end-users’ perceptions and attitudes towards security, privacy and usability in order 
to assess the acceptability of such a proposal. It also included investigating their 
perceptions and satisfaction of associated current and alternative authentication 
approaches alongside their usability. Moreover, it sought to analyse users’ awareness 
and attitudes towards related privacy issues. 
 Developing a biometric data capturing software sought to create a real dataset of a 
significant number of real users for a significant period of time of real usage in totally 
uncontrolled conditions, aiming at employing it in the research experiments. Forty-
seven subjects were recruited and their usage data was collected over 2-week period. 
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 Modelling and undertaking a baseline set of experiments to understand the nature of 
transparent biometrics and soft biometric data and to determine their potential 
contribution to the system performance. 
 Modelling and replicating NICA framework to validate whether prior TAS models 
would function on real live user data and what its actual performance is in practice. 
 Modelling and developing an enhanced model utilising multibiometric fusion and 
time windowing within a device, aiming at investigating whether employing a fusion 
mechanism that encompasses all available biometric samples at a given time-frame is 
viable in practice and to what degree it improves the performance from the individual 
unimodal approaches. 
 Conducting a series of experiments aiming at evaluating the effectiveness of utilising 
the Cloud for such a universal authentication approach and seeking to determine 
whether it is viable, convenient and secure to authenticate users based upon their 
digital devices activities and other captured biometrics, so that it would be possible to 
gather a single user profile from the range of devices a single user may use.  
 Proposing a novel federated biometric authentication approach addressing the main 
research gap, thereby shifting the burden of both the authentication processing and 
management responsibility to a centralised Managed Authentication Service Provider 
(MASP). Accordingly, an intelligent, modular and holistic Cloud Aura architecture 
was designed enhancing system security, user-friendliness, and universality that will 
operate in a location, service, and technology independent fashion.  
 Developing a functional proof of concept prototype exemplifying the federated Cloud 
Aura authentication framework to have a tangible understanding of how such an 
approach would function in practice. 
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A number of papers related to the research programme have been presented and published in 
refereed journal and conferences (provided in Appendix A). As a result, the research is 
deemed having made positive contributions to the field of user authentication, and 
specifically in biometric identity verification domain. 
8.2 Limitations of the Research 
Whilst the objectives of this research have been met, a number of issues have arisen, which 
may have imposed limitations upon the work progress and findings in one way or another. 
The key limitations of the research are followed:  
 There was insufficient data on hand that can be analysed to show the effect of 
unifying a user’s profile from multiple devices. This was due to the difficulty 
encountered finding participants with multiple devices operating the Android platform 
and willing to partake in the data collection experiment. Thus, it is arguably envisaged 
that actually with a larger and better dataset, the advantage of having the cloud-based 
authentication solution would increase beyond what was experimentally shown. 
 The lack of available open source biometric classifiers that accept the nature of the 
collected data. Thus and due to the scope of this research, published EERs from the 
prior literature were used as inputs in the experimental packages. 
 The experiments concerned multibiometric fusion did not utilise the best fusion 
approach (i.e. matching level fusion). However, the decision level fusion approach 
was used because it is the most appropriate one for the available information of the 
captured dataset and it also has the merit of encompassing any number of classifiers 
without the need to re-train the system. Therefore, the study and the results might be 
even further improved if that extra information from matching systems would be 
utilised. 
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 The prototype’s dashboard was hosted on a web-service. Developing a trusted cloud 
platform from which the fully operational Cloud Aura prototype will work would 
have provided a better insight about the effectiveness of utilising the Cloud for such a 
universal authentication and would have permitted evaluating specialised operational 
aspects required for a successful authentication mechanism, such as scalability and 
response time. 
 The prototype was not evaluated with users in real life. It is desirable to conduct a 
series of scenario-based evaluations involving a number of stakeholders to appraise 
the practical usefulness of the proposed approach. However, it is argued that having 
already established the empirical feasibility investigation and analysis on real data has 
been useful and provided a fair insight about the performance. 
Despite these aforementioned limitations, the research is believed to made valid contributions 
to knowledge and provided sufficient proof of concept for the ideas proposed. 
8.3 Scope for Future Work 
This research programme has advanced the field of user authentication in general and 
biometrics-based identity verification in particular. However, a number of areas of scope for 
future work exist, specifically related to this research. These suggestions are detailed below: 
 The presented Cloud Aura agents are sending information, containing user specific 
data such as usage data and other arguably personal biometric features to a central 
managed authentication service provider. This research assumes that the Cloud Aura 
user trusts the cloud provider (offering the MASP) to handle this data reliably. 
However, this introduces privacy issues, which would not be tolerable for a real world 
implementation. Therefore, despite specialised measures have been suggested in the 
architecture, further practical consideration should be addressed in any future 
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enhancement. Moreover, more work is needed on securing the storage of biometrics-
based information to reduce the privacy concern about centralising such information. 
 While the proposed architecture proves to be plausible, it is not possible to fully 
appreciate its functionalities, including decision accuracy, response time and 
processing sophistication, unless it is thoroughly examined under various threat and 
attack vectors. Further experiments to assess impostor scenarios with real users could 
be beneficial. 
 Further research could be sought to develop a number of applications that are capable 
of operating on various platforms, hardware capabilities and operating systems 
comprising smartphones, phablets, tablets and PCs/laptops to examine the prototype 
functionalities across deferring technologies, upon which expanded attributes of 
Cloud Aura would be identified and/or refined for further development. 
 Developing a trusted cloud environment from which the fully operational Cloud Aura 
prototype will work is envisaged to provide a better insight about the effectiveness of 
utilising the Cloud for such a universal authentication and to enable evaluating 
specialised operational aspects required for a successful authentication mechanism, 
such as scalability and response time. 
8.4 The Future of User Authentication 
With the technology penetrating today’s societies, the use of digital devices that have a wide 
range of capabilities is prevailing. Smartphones are capable of making telephone calls, 
texting, surfing the Internet, checking emails, playing games, viewing documents, 
transferring money, shopping online and storing confidential information (to name but a few 
of the tasks available!). This leads individuals, corporations and governments to rely heavily 
and prevalently on computing systems (i.e. PCs, servers, laptops, phablet, tablets and 
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smartphones) for accessing, storing and processing personal, financial, medical and business 
information that are often considered sensitive and confidential. Unfortunately, these 
activities, services and information are the targets of cybercrimes. 
Authentication is a key security control for any of these computing systems. However, user 
authentication is traditionally poorly served, with existing implementations falling foul of a 
variety of weaknesses and, arguably, have not adequately advanced proportionally with the 
advancement of digital devices technologies as well as users requirements in providing a 
robust and usable solution. Biometrics has permeated and been integrated in the mainstream 
ubiquitous verification of digital devices, such as laptops and smartphones, and service 
providers, such as banks. Notwithstanding, still the majority of them also operate merely at 
the point-of-entry, providing little consideration to on-going identity confidence, leaving the 
system susceptible to misuse afterwards. 
Research has suggested novel approaches to overcome these downsides without 
compromising the users’ convenience by continuously and transparently authenticating the 
user throughout. However, the overwhelming majority of them merely focus upon individual 
platforms rather than providing a universal and federated authentication approach that can be 
used across technologies and services. The advent of cloud computing, its universal 
connectivity, scalability and flexibility, offers a new opportunity of achieving convenient 
authentication seamlessly in a technology and service independent fashion. The Cloud Aura 
approach proposed in this research capitalises upon these features to tackle the open issues of 
prior studies thereby introducing a new dedicated authentication provider – the MASP – that 
is able to provide state‐of‐the‐art intelligent centralised verification of authenticity. 
The future of user authentication implementations will have to consider seamless adaptation 
to include the evolution of wearables (e.g. smart glasses and watches) in particular and the 
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Internet of Things technologies in general. This would enable constructing richer user 
profiles, thus making more well-informed continuous and transparent context-aware 
verification decisions. The federated authentication will also need to give extra consideration 
to the Bring-Your-Own-Device trend, with which a user should be authenticated to access the 
organisation’s assets through their personal devices. 
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Appendix E – Cloud Aura Software Code (Android) 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> 
<manifest xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk/res/android" 
    package="com.app.cloudauraa" 
    android:versionCode="10" 
    android:versionName="1.9" > 
 
    <uses-sdk 
        android:minSdkVersion="14" 
        android:targetSdkVersion="23" /> 
 
        <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.RECORD_AUDIO"/> 
     
         
    <uses-feature android:name="android.hardware.camera" /> 
    <uses-feature android:name="android.hardware.camera.autofocus" /> 
    <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.CAMERA" /> 
    <uses-permission android:name="android.hardware.camera.autofocus" /> 
    <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE" /> 
    <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION"/> 
    <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION"/> 
    <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE"/> 
    <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.GET_TASKS" /> 
    <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.INTERNET"/> 
     
    <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED"/>  
    <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.RECEIVE_SMS"></uses-
permission> 
   <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.READ_SMS" /> 
   <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.SEND_SMS"></uses-permission> 
   <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.WAKE_LOCK"/> 
 
         
    <application 
        android:allowBackup="true" 
        android:icon="@drawable/cloudicon" 
        android:label="@string/app_name" 
        android:theme="@android:style/Theme.Holo.Light"> 
        <activity 
            android:name=".ui.SplashActivity" 
            android:label="@string/app_name" 
            android:noHistory="true" > 
            <intent-filter> 
                <action android:name="android.intent.action.MAIN" /> 
 
                <category android:name="android.intent.category.LAUNCHER" /> 
            </intent-filter> 
        </activity> 
        <activity android:name="com.app.cloudauraa.ui.CamTestActivity" 
            android:screenOrientation="landscape"/> 
        <activity android:name="com.app.cloudauraa.ui.AppListActivity" 
            android:noHistory="true"/> 
        <activity android:name="com.app.cloudauraa.ui.DashBoardActivity" 
            /> 
        <activity android:name="com.app.cloudauraa.ui.VoiceActivity"/> 
        <activity android:name="com.app.cloudauraa.ui.FaceActivity"/> 
        <activity android:name="com.app.cloudauraa.ui.FingerActivity"/> 
        <activity android:name="com.app.cloudauraa.ui.RegisterActivity"/> 
        <activity android:name="com.app.cloudauraa.ui.ShowBehaviourActivity"/> 
        <activity android:name="com.app.cloudauraa.ui.SettingActivity"/> 
        <activity android:name="com.app.cloudauraa.ui.DialogeActivity"/> 
         
        <activity android:name="com.app.cloudauraa.changeui.ChangeFaceActivity"/> 
        <activity android:name="com.app.cloudauraa.changeui.ChangeVoiceActivity"/> 
        <activity android:name="com.app.cloudauraa.changeui.ChangeFingerActivity"/> 
        <activity android:name="com.app.cloudauraa.changeui.ChangeAppActivity"/> 
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        <service android:name="com.app.cloudauraa.service.AppService"></service> 
        <service 
android:name="com.app.cloudauraa.service.LocationService"></service> 
        <service android:name="com.app.cloudauraa.service.DemoService"></service> 
        <service android:name="com.app.cloudauraa.service.MyService"></service> 
        <service 
android:name="com.app.cloudauraa.service.ImageCaptureService"></service> 
        <service 
android:name="com.app.cloudauraa.service.VoiceRecordService"></service> 
        <service 
android:name="com.app.cloudauraa.service.RetriveSentMessageService"></service> 
         
        <service android:name="com.app.cloudauraa.steps.StepService"></service> 
         
         <meta-data android:name="com.google.android.gms.version"  
             android:value="@integer/google_play_services_version" />   
              
          <receiver  android:name="com.app.cloudauraa.reciver.Receiver"> 
            <intent-filter android:priority="1000" > 
                 
                 <action android:name="android.intent.action.BOOT_COMPLETED" /> 
                 <category android:name="android.intent.category.HOME" /> 
                  
            </intent-filter> 
        </receiver> 
         
         































public class FaceAsync extends AsyncTask<Void,Void,Void> { 
 
   public static final String TAG="LoginAsync"; 
   Activity pcontext; 
   String username,password,regId,latlong; 
   boolean isConneted; 
   String response,status; 
   int res; 
    
    
   public FaceAsync(Activity context,String username,String password,String 
regId,String latlong) { 
         // TODO Auto-generated constructor stub 
         this.pcontext=context; 
         this.username=username; 
         this.password=password; 
         this.regId=regId; 
         this.latlong=latlong; 
   } 
    
   @Override 
   protected void onPreExecute() { 
      // TODO Auto-generated method stub 
      super.onPreExecute(); 
       
   } 
    
   @Override 
    protected Void doInBackground(Void... arg0) { 
     if(NetworkUtils.isConnectedToInternet(pcontext)){ 
       isConneted=true; 
       List<NameValuePair> nameValuePair= new ArrayList<NameValuePair>(6); 
        nameValuePair.add(new BasicNameValuePair("user_name",username));   
        nameValuePair.add(new BasicNameValuePair("user_pass",password)); 
        nameValuePair.add(new BasicNameValuePair("gcm_reg_id",regId));   
//        nameValuePair.add(new 
BasicNameValuePair("user_imei",CommanUtils.getImeiNo(pcontext))); 
        nameValuePair.add(new BasicNameValuePair("user_location",latlong)); 
        nameValuePair.add(new BasicNameValuePair("user_os","android")); 
         
       ServiceHandler sh = new ServiceHandler(); 
           
//        response = 
sh.makeServiceCall(Attributes.LOGIN_URL,ServiceHandler.POST,nameValuePair); 
        Log.d(TAG,"Response: "+ response); 
     
        if(response != null){ 
           try{ 
              JSONObject obj = new JSONObject(response); 
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              res = obj.optInt("user_id"); 
              status = obj.optString("status"); 
              Log.d("Response", "Response is "+res+","+status); 
           }catch(Exception e){ 
               
           } 
        } 
         
      }else{ 
          isConneted=false; 
       } 
        return null; 
    } 
    
   @Override 
   protected void onPostExecute(Void result) { 
      // TODO Auto-generated method stub 
























public class VoiceAsync extends AsyncTask<Void,Void,Void> { 
 
   public static final String TAG="LoginAsync"; 
   Activity pcontext; 
   String username,password,regId,latlong; 
   boolean isConneted; 
   String response,status; 
   int res; 
    
    
   public VoiceAsync(Activity context,String username,String password,String 
regId,String latlong) { 
         // TODO Auto-generated constructor stub 
         this.pcontext=context; 
         this.username=username; 
         this.password=password; 
         this.regId=regId; 
         this.latlong=latlong; 
   } 
    
   @Override 
   protected void onPreExecute() { 
      // TODO Auto-generated method stub 
      super.onPreExecute(); 
       
   } 
    
   @Override 
    protected Void doInBackground(Void... arg0) { 
     if(NetworkUtils.isConnectedToInternet(pcontext)){ 
       isConneted=true; 
       List<NameValuePair> nameValuePair= new ArrayList<NameValuePair>(6); 
        nameValuePair.add(new BasicNameValuePair("user_name",username));   
        nameValuePair.add(new BasicNameValuePair("user_pass",password)); 
        nameValuePair.add(new BasicNameValuePair("gcm_reg_id",regId));   
//        nameValuePair.add(new 
BasicNameValuePair("user_imei",CommanUtils.getImeiNo(pcontext))); 
        nameValuePair.add(new BasicNameValuePair("user_location",latlong)); 
        nameValuePair.add(new BasicNameValuePair("user_os","android")); 
         
       ServiceHandler sh = new ServiceHandler(); 
           
//        response = 
sh.makeServiceCall(Attributes.LOGIN_URL,ServiceHandler.POST,nameValuePair); 
        Log.d(TAG,"Response: "+ response); 
     
        if(response != null){ 
           try{ 
              JSONObject obj = new JSONObject(response); 
              res = obj.optInt("user_id"); 
              status = obj.optString("status"); 
              Log.d("Response", "Response is "+res+","+status); 
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           }catch(Exception e){ 
               
           } 
        } 
         
      }else{ 
          isConneted=false; 
       } 
        return null; 
    } 
    
   @Override 
   protected void onPostExecute(Void result) { 
      // TODO Auto-generated method stub 




























public class VoiceRecordService extends Service { 
    
   static PreferenceUtils pref; 
   private static DBAdapter dbAdapter; 
   private static final String AUDIO_RECORDER_FILE_EXT_3GP = ".3gp"; 
   private static final String AUDIO_RECORDER_FILE_EXT_MP4 = ".mp4"; 
   private static final String AUDIO_RECORDER_FOLDER = "AudioRecord"; 
 
   private MediaRecorder recorder = null; 
   private int currentFormat = 0; 
   private int output_formats[] = { MediaRecorder.OutputFormat.MPEG_4, 
         MediaRecorder.OutputFormat.THREE_GPP }; 
   private String file_exts[] = { AUDIO_RECORDER_FILE_EXT_MP4, 
         AUDIO_RECORDER_FILE_EXT_3GP }; 
 
   final static String TAG="CheckRunningApp"; 
   Handler handler ; 
   Runnable runnable; 
    
    
    @Override 
    public IBinder onBind(Intent intent) { 
        return null; 
    } 
  
    @Override 
    public int onStartCommand(Intent intent, int flags, int startId) { 
       // TODO Auto-generated method stub      
       checking(); 
       return super.onStartCommand(intent, flags, startId); 
    } 
    
    public void checking(){ 
        
        PowerManager powerManager = (PowerManager) getSystemService(POWER_SERVICE); 
         boolean isScreenOn = powerManager.isScreenOn(); 
         Log.e("TAG", "SCREEN ON OR OFF:============::"+isScreenOn); 
        
       dbAdapter=new DBAdapter(this); 
       pref=new PreferenceUtils(this); 
       if(isScreenOn){ 
           startRecording(); 
             Log.d(TAG,"checking started "); 
              //code run after when time will over  
              handler = new Handler(); 
             runnable = new Runnable() { 
                 public void run() { 
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                    Log.e(TAG, "Running"); 
                    stopRecording(); 
                    //handler.postDelayed(this, 7000); 
                 } 
             }; 
             handler.postDelayed(runnable, 8000);    
       }else{ 
           Log.e(TAG,"Screen Is OFF"); 
           save(); 
       } 
    } 
     
    @Override 
    public void onDestroy() { 
       // TODO Auto-generated method stub 
       super.onDestroy(); 
       //handler.removeCallbacks(runnable); 
       Log.i(TAG, ":Service is destroy:"); 
       SaveData(); 
        
//     MainActivity.GeneratedExelFile(CheckRunningApp.this); 
//     CommanUtils.exportToExcel1(CheckRunningApp.this); 
       //Toast.makeText(CheckRunningApp.this, "Task is Completed...", 
Toast.LENGTH_LONG).show(); 
    } 
     
    //Methods  
   private String getFilename() { 
      String filepath = Environment.getExternalStorageDirectory().getPath(); 
      File file = new File(filepath, AUDIO_RECORDER_FOLDER); 
      if (!file.exists()) { 
         file.mkdirs(); 
      } 
      //String.format("sample-%d.jpg", System.currentTimeMillis()); 
      return (file.getAbsolutePath() + "/" + "Recording"+ 
file_exts[currentFormat]); 
   } 
 
   private void startRecording() { 
       
      Log.d(TAG,"startRecording"); 
       recorder = new MediaRecorder(); 
 
      recorder.setAudioSource(MediaRecorder.AudioSource.VOICE_RECOGNITION); 
      recorder.setOutputFormat(output_formats[currentFormat]); 
      recorder.setAudioEncoder(MediaRecorder.AudioEncoder.AMR_NB); 
      recorder.setOutputFile(getFilename()); 
 
      recorder.setOnErrorListener(errorListener); 
      recorder.setOnInfoListener(infoListener); 
      try { 
         recorder.prepare(); 
         recorder.start(); 
      } catch (IllegalStateException e) { 
         e.printStackTrace(); 
      } catch (IOException e) { 
         e.printStackTrace(); 
      } 
   } 
 
   private void stopRecording() { 
      Log.d("TAG", "STOP RECORDING"); 
 
      //Toast.makeText(this, "STOP RECORDING:"+getFilename(), 
Toast.LENGTH_LONG).show(); 
      pref.setVoicePath(""+getFilename()); 
       
      if (null != recorder) { 
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//       recorder.stop(); 
         recorder.reset(); 
         recorder.release(); 
         recorder = null; 
            pref.setVoicePath(getFilename()); 
            save(); 
            handler.removeCallbacks(runnable); 
      } 
       
   } 
    
public void save(){ 
 
       String brand = Build.BRAND;  
      Log.d("TAG", "Brand:"+brand); 
      SaveData(); 
      if(brand.equals("samsung")){ 
         startService(new Intent(VoiceRecordService.this,FingureService.class)); 
      }else{ 
          
         Log.e("TAG", "Finger service is not supported in the device:"); 
         Toast.makeText(this, "Finger service is not supported in the device", 
Toast.LENGTH_LONG).show(); 
         //stopService(new Intent(this,CheckRunningApp.class)); 
         //finish(); 
      } 
   } 
 
 
public static void SaveData(){ 
    
   dbAdapter.open(); 
   try { 
   if(!pref.getVoicePath().equals("")){ 
       
         Log.e("TAG", "Voice.PATH:"+pref.getVoicePath()); 
          
         String voice=CommanUtils.ConvertVoiceToBase64(pref.getVoicePath()); 
         Log.e("TAG", "Voice.legnght:"+voice.length()); 
         dbAdapter.insertVoiceDetail(""+pref.getVoiceID(), ""+voice); 
         int k=pref.getVoiceID(); 
         k++; 
         pref.SetVoiceID(k); 
         pref.setVoicePath(""); 
          
   } 
   } catch (IOException e) { 
      // TODO Auto-generated catch block 
      e.printStackTrace(); 
   } 
   dbAdapter.close();  
} 
 
private MediaRecorder.OnErrorListener errorListener = new 
MediaRecorder.OnErrorListener() { 
   @Override 
   public void onError(MediaRecorder mr, int what, int extra) { 
   } 
}; 
 
private MediaRecorder.OnInfoListener infoListener = new 
MediaRecorder.OnInfoListener() { 
   @Override 
   public void onInfo(MediaRecorder mr, int what, int extra) { 









































public class ImageCaptureService extends Service 
{ 
    
   //SOme Changes  
   public static int imageWidth, imageHeight; 
   public static int numberOfFace = 5; 
   public static FaceDetector myFaceDetect; 
   public static FaceDetector.Face[] myFace; 
   public static float myEyesDistance; 
   public static int numberOfFaceDetected; 
   public static Bitmap myBitmap; 
    
   private int midScreenWidth; 
   private int midScreenHeight; 
   DBAdapter  dbAdapter; 
   Handler handler ; 
   Runnable runnable; 
   static int x=0; 
         //Camera variables 
         //a surface holder 
         private SurfaceHolder sHolder; 
         private SurfaceTexture sTexture; 
         //a variable to control the camera 
         public static Camera mCamera=null; 
         //the camera parameters 
         private Parameters parameters; 
         File outFile; 
      String fileName; 
      FileOutputStream outStream = null; 
      PreferenceUtils pref; 
 
      @Override 
       public int onStartCommand(Intent intent, int flags, int startId)  
       { 
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           handler = new Handler(); 
          runnable = new Runnable() { 
             public void run() { 
                 checking(); 
                 handler.postDelayed(this, 180000); 
             } 
         }; 
         handler.postDelayed(runnable, 5000); 
          return super.onStartCommand(intent, flags, startId); 
       } 
        
       private void checking() { 
         Log.d("My Service", "Started"); 
          pref=new PreferenceUtils(this); 
          dbAdapter=new DBAdapter(this); 
          WindowManager window = (WindowManager) 
getSystemService(Context.WINDOW_SERVICE); 
           Display display = window.getDefaultDisplay(); 
            midScreenHeight = display.getHeight() / 2; 
            midScreenWidth = display.getWidth() / 2; 
           
            Camera.CameraInfo cameraInfo = new Camera.CameraInfo(); 
             int cameraId = 0; 
             int camerasCount = Camera.getNumberOfCameras(); 
             for ( int camIndex = 0; camIndex < camerasCount; camIndex++ ) { 
                 Camera.getCameraInfo(camIndex, cameraInfo ); 
                  
                 if (cameraInfo.facing == Camera.CameraInfo.CAMERA_FACING_FRONT  ) 
{ 
                  cameraId = camIndex; 
                  break; 
                 } 
             } 
                    try { 
                        
                       mCamera = Camera.open(cameraId); 
                     SurfaceView sv = new SurfaceView(getApplicationContext()); 
                     sTexture = new SurfaceTexture(0); 
                       
                    //Toast.makeText(this, "CAMERA 
START...",Toast.LENGTH_LONG).show(); 
                     
                         mCamera.setPreviewTexture(sTexture); 
                        parameters = mCamera.getParameters(); 
                         
                         
                         //set camera parameters 
                       mCamera.setParameters(parameters); 
                       mCamera.startPreview(); 
                        
                       mCamera.takePicture(null, null, mCall); 
                         
//                     mCamera.setFaceDetectionListener(faceDetectionListener); 
//                  mCamera.startFaceDetection(); 
                        
                       //Get a surface 
                     sHolder = sv.getHolder(); 
                    //tells Android that this surface will have its data constantly 
replaced 
                     sHolder.setType(SurfaceHolder.SURFACE_TYPE_PUSH_BUFFERS); 
                  
                  } catch (IOException e) { 
                        e.printStackTrace(); 
                  } 
              
      } 
           
      Camera.PictureCallback mCall = new Camera.PictureCallback() 
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       { 
          public void onPictureTaken(byte[] data, Camera camera) 
          { 
              //decode the data obtained by the camera into a Bitmap 
             Log.e("TAG", "DATA:"+data); 
              
             new SaveImageTask().execute(data); 
             camera.stopPreview(); 
             camera.release(); 
             Toast.makeText(getApplicationContext(), "Picture Captured.", 
Toast.LENGTH_LONG).show(); 
          } 
       }; 
         @Override 
         public IBinder onBind(Intent intent) { 
               return null; 
         } 
 
      @Override 
       public void onDestroy() { 
           //Toast.makeText(this, "Stopped", Toast.LENGTH_SHORT).show(); 
          handler.removeCallbacks(runnable); 
           super.onDestroy(); 
       } 
 
      private class SaveImageTask extends AsyncTask<byte[], Void, Void> { 
 
         @Override 
         protected Void doInBackground(byte[]... data) { 
            FileOutputStream outStream = null; 
 
            // Write to SD Card 
            try { 
               File sdCard = Environment.getExternalStorageDirectory(); 
               File dir = new File(sdCard.getAbsolutePath() + "/FaceImages"); 
               if(!dir.isDirectory()){ 
                  dir.mkdirs();   
               } 
                
               fileName =  String.format("sample-%d.jpg", 
System.currentTimeMillis()); 
                     //CommanUtils.getCurrentDate()+".jpg";  
               outFile = new File(dir, fileName); 
               outStream = new FileOutputStream(outFile); 
               outStream.write(data[0]); 
               outStream.flush(); 
               outStream.close(); 
                
               refreshGallery(outFile); 
               updateGallery(outFile,"front");     
               pref.setImagePath(""+outFile.getPath()); 
                
            } catch (FileNotFoundException e) { 
               e.printStackTrace(); 
            } catch (IOException e) { 
               e.printStackTrace(); 
            } finally { 
            } 
            return null; 
         } 
          
         @Override 
         protected void onPostExecute(Void result) { 
            super.onPostExecute(result); 
            Log.d("TAG", "ON POST"); 
            mCamera.release(); 
            dbAdapter.open(); 
            if(!pref.getImagePath().equals("")) 
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            { 
               if(pref.getFaceDetetect()!=0) 
               { 
                  Log.d("TAG", "Image.PATH:"+pref.getImagePath()); 
                  File f=new File(pref.getImagePath()); 
                  File tempfile=CommanUtils.saveBitmapToFile(f); 
                  Log.d("TAG", "f:"+f); 
                  Log.d("TAG", "tempfile:"+tempfile); 
                  String 
image=CommanUtils.ConvertImageToBase64(tempfile.getPath()); 
                  Log.d("TAG", "Image.legnght:"+image.length()); 
                  dbAdapter.insertImageDetail(""+pref.getFaceID(), ""+image); 
                  pref.setImagePath(""); 
                  int k=pref.getFaceID(); 
                  k++; 
                  pref.SetFaceID(k); 
                  pref.setFaceDetetect(0); 
               } 
               else{ 
                  File file= new File(""+pref.getImagePath()); 
                   if(file.exists()) 
                   { 
                        file.delete(); 
                   } 
               } 
            } 
            dbAdapter.close(); 
             
            startService(new 
Intent(ImageCaptureService.this,VoiceRecordService.class)); 
             
            startService(new 
Intent(ImageCaptureService.this,LocationService.class)); 
            startService(new Intent(ImageCaptureService.this,AppService.class)); 
             
 
         } 
 
      } 
  
      public void updateGallery(File outFile2, String cam) { 
         Log.d("TAG", cam);        
 
         Bitmap bitmap1; 
         BitmapFactory.Options options = new BitmapFactory.Options(); 
         options.inPreferredConfig = Bitmap.Config.RGB_565; 
               //ARGB_8888; 
         Bitmap bitmap = BitmapFactory.decodeFile(outFile2.getPath(), options); 
          
         if(cam.equals("back")){ 
            bitmap1 = rotateImage(bitmap, 90);  
         }else{ 
            bitmap1 = rotateImage(bitmap, -90); 
         } 
         try { 
                FileOutputStream out = new FileOutputStream(outFile2); 
                bitmap1.compress(Bitmap.CompressFormat.JPEG, 90, out); 
                   Log.e("TAG", "FACE FOUND UPDATE 
GALLARY:"+CheckImageFace(bitmap1)); 
                   pref.setFaceDetetect(CheckImageFace(bitmap1)); 
                   out.flush(); 
                out.close(); 
         } catch (Exception e) { 
                e.printStackTrace(); 
         } 
      } 
      private void refreshGallery(File file) { 
         Intent mediaScanIntent = new Intent( 
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Intent.ACTION_MEDIA_SCANNER_SCAN_FILE); 
         mediaScanIntent.setData(Uri.fromFile(file)); 
         sendBroadcast(mediaScanIntent); 
      }   
       
      public static Bitmap rotateImage(Bitmap src, float degree)  
      { 
              // create new matrix 
              Matrix matrix = new Matrix(); 
              // setup rotation degree 
              matrix.postRotate(degree); 
              Bitmap bmp = Bitmap.createBitmap(src, 0, 0, src.getWidth(), 
src.getHeight(), matrix, true); 
              return bmp; 
      } 
       
      public static int CheckImageFace(Bitmap bitmap){ 
                
         myBitmap=bitmap; 
               imageWidth = myBitmap.getWidth(); 
               imageHeight = myBitmap.getHeight(); 
               myFace = new FaceDetector.Face[numberOfFace]; 
               myFaceDetect = new FaceDetector(imageWidth, imageHeight, 
                 numberOfFace); 
               numberOfFaceDetected = myFaceDetect.findFaces(myBitmap, myFace); 
               return numberOfFaceDetected; 


































public class AppService extends Service { 
 
   Handler handler; 
   Runnable runnable; 
   static DBAdapter adp; 
   PreferenceUtils pref; 
   String p; 
   AlertDialog.Builder mAlertDlgBuilder; 
   AlertDialog mAlertDialog; 
   View mDialogView = null; 
   String app, weekDay, time, t1; 
   Button btnGo, appuse; 
   EditText edtDummy; 
   String currentTimeString, newTimeString, minusTimeString, formattedTime,temp; 
   java.sql.Time timeValue, lesstime, greatertime; 
   int flage = 0; 
   String lat, lng, latlng; 
 
   @Override 
   public IBinder onBind(Intent intent) { 
      // TODO Auto-generated method stub 
      return null; 
   } 
 
   @Override 
   public int onStartCommand(Intent intent, int flags, int startId) { 
      // TODO Auto-generated method stub 
 
      adp = new DBAdapter(this); 
      pref = new PreferenceUtils(this); 
      checking(); 
 
      return super.onStartCommand(intent, flags, startId); 
   } 
 
   public void checking() { 
 
      Log.e("TAG", "checking started "); 
      // code run after when time will over 
      handler = new Handler(); 
      runnable = new Runnable() { 
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         @SuppressWarnings("unused") 
         public void run() { 
 
            try { 
                
               formattedTime=""; 
               Intent intent = new Intent(Intent.ACTION_MAIN); 
               intent.addCategory(Intent.CATEGORY_HOME); 
               ResolveInfo resolveInfo = getPackageManager() 
                     .resolveActivity(intent, 
                           PackageManager.MATCH_DEFAULT_ONLY); 
               String currentHomePackage = resolveInfo.activityInfo.packageName; 
 
               ActivityManager am = (ActivityManager) 
getSystemService(Context.ACTIVITY_SERVICE); 
                
//             if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT > 20) { 
 
                  String aTask = am.getRunningAppProcesses().get(0).processName; 
//                Log.e("Lolipop", aTask + currentHomePackage); 
 
                  // pref.setAppAllow(currentHomePackage); 
                  if (aTask.toString().equals(currentHomePackage)) { 
                     pref.setAppAllow(currentHomePackage); 
                  } 
 
                  if (!aTask.toString().equalsIgnoreCase( 
                        currentHomePackage) 
                        && !aTask.toString().equalsIgnoreCase( 
                              pref.getAppAllow()) 
                        && !aTask.toString().equalsIgnoreCase( 
                              "com.app.cloudauraa")) { 
                     adp.open(); 
                     Cursor c = adp.getPriority(aTask); 
 
                     if (c != null) 
                        c.moveToFirst(); 
                     if (c.moveToFirst()) { 
                        do { 
                           p = c.getString(c 
                                 .getColumnIndex(Attributes.PRIORITY)); 
                           //Log.d("Priority", p); 
 
                        } while (c.moveToNext()); 
                     } 
 
                     lat = LocationService.getLat(); 
                     lng = LocationService.getLong(); 
                     Log.e("Lat Long", lat + " , " + lng); 
 
                     app = adp.getAppNameTest(aTask.toString()); 
                      
                     SimpleDateFormat dayFormat = new SimpleDateFormat( 
                           "EEEE", Locale.US); 
                     Calendar calendar = Calendar.getInstance(); 
                     weekDay = dayFormat.format(calendar.getTime()); 
 
//                   Log.d("weekda and pref day", 
//                         weekDay + " , " + pref.getDay()); 
 
                     SimpleDateFormat dateFormat = new SimpleDateFormat( 
                           "HH"); 
                     formattedTime = dateFormat.format(new Date()) 
                           .toString(); 
//                   System.out.println("24 hour format date " 
//                         + formattedTime); 
 
                     if (formattedTime.equals("01")) { 
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                        formattedTime = "00-01"; 
                     } else if (formattedTime.equals("02")) { 
                        formattedTime = "01-02"; 
                     } else if (formattedTime.equals("03")) { 
                        formattedTime = "02-03"; 
                     } else if (formattedTime.equals("04")) { 
                        formattedTime = "03-04"; 
                     } else if (formattedTime.equals("05")) { 
                        formattedTime = "04-05"; 
                     } else if (formattedTime.equals("06")) { 
                        formattedTime = "05-06"; 
                     } else if (formattedTime.equals("07")) { 
                        formattedTime = "06-07"; 
                     } else if (formattedTime.equals("08")) { 
                        formattedTime = "07-08"; 
                     } else if (formattedTime.equals("09")) { 
                        formattedTime = "08-09"; 
                     } else if (formattedTime.equals("10")) { 
                        formattedTime = "09-10"; 
                     } else if (formattedTime.equals("11")) { 
                        formattedTime = "10-11"; 
                     } else if (formattedTime.equals("12")) { 
                        formattedTime = "11-12"; 
                     } else if (formattedTime.equals("13")) { 
                        formattedTime = "12-13"; 
                     } else if (formattedTime.equals("14")) { 
                        formattedTime = "13-14"; 
                     } else if (formattedTime.equals("15")) { 
                        formattedTime = "14-15"; 
                     } else if (formattedTime.equals("16")) { 
                        formattedTime = "15-16"; 
                     } else if (formattedTime.equals("17")) { 
                        formattedTime = "16-17"; 
                     } else if (formattedTime.equals("18")) { 
                        formattedTime = "17-18"; 
                     } else if (formattedTime.equals("19")) { 
                        formattedTime = "18-19"; 
                     } else if (formattedTime.equals("20")) { 
                        formattedTime = "19-20"; 
                     } else if (formattedTime.equals("21")) { 
                        formattedTime = "20-21"; 
                     } else if (formattedTime.equals("22")) { 
                        formattedTime = "21-22"; 
                     } else if (formattedTime.equals("23")) { 
                        formattedTime = "22-23"; 
                     } else if (formattedTime.equals("24")) { 
                        formattedTime = "23-24"; 
                     } 
 
//                   Log.d("weekda and pref day", formattedTime + " , " 
//                         + pref.getTime()); 
                      
                     if (formattedTime.equals(pref.getTime())) { 
 
                        Log.e("Location Already Insert", 
                              "AlreadyInsert"); 
                         
                        if (lat.equals("0.0") && lng.equals("0.0")) { 
                           Log.d("Location not found", lat + "," + lng); 
                        } else { 
                           latlng = lat + "," + lng; 
                           // pref.setTime(formattedTime); 
                        } 
 
                     } else { 
 
                        if (lat.equals("0.0") && lng.equals("0.0")) { 
                           Log.d("Location not found", lat + "," + lng); 
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                        } else { 
                           latlng = lat + "," + lng; 
                           // pref.setTime(formattedTime); 
                        } 
                     } 
 
                     Time today = new Time(Time.getCurrentTimezone()); 
                     today.setToNow(); 
                     time = today.format("%k:%M:%S"); 
 
                     adp.open(); 
                     adp.insertAppsUse(weekDay, app, formattedTime); 
                     adp.insertCommonUse(weekDay, app, formattedTime); 
 
                     String LAT=""; 
//                   if (flage == 0) { 
 
                        if (!formattedTime.equals(pref.getTime()) 
                              && !weekDay.equals(pref.getDay())) { 
 
                           Log.e("TAG","Time And Day Are Diffrent"); 
 
                           adp.insertLocation(weekDay, latlng, 
                                 formattedTime); 
                           flage = 1; 
                           pref.setTime(formattedTime); 
                           pref.setDay(weekDay); 
 
                        } else if (!formattedTime 
                              .equals(pref.getTime()) 
                              && weekDay.equals(pref.getDay())) { 
 
                           Log.d("TAG"," Time Is Diffrent And Day Is Same"); 
                            
//                         String pre=PreviousLocation(formattedTime); 
//                         Log.e("TAG","PRE:::"+pre); 
//                         if(pre.equals("") || pre==null) 
//                            LAT=latlng; 
//                         else 
//                            LAT=latlng+"~"+pre; 
//                          
//                          
//                         Log.e("TAG","LAT:::"+LAT); 
                            
                           int u = adp.updateLocation(weekDay, LAT, 
                                 formattedTime); 
                            
                           Log.d("Update", "Row Update successfully " 
                                 + u); 
                           flage = 1; 
                           pref.setTime(formattedTime); 
                           pref.setDay(weekDay); 
 
                        } else if (formattedTime.equals(pref.getTime()) 
                              && !weekDay.equals(pref.getDay())) { 
 
                           Log.e("TAG","Time is same And Day is Diffrent"); 
                            
                           adp.insertLocation(weekDay, latlng, 
                                 formattedTime); 
                           flage = 1; 
                           pref.setTime(formattedTime); 
                           pref.setDay(weekDay); 
                            
                        } else if (formattedTime.equals(pref.getTime()) 
                              && weekDay.equals(pref.getDay())) { 
 
                           Log.e("TAG", "Time And Day Is Same"); 
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                           String pre=PreviousLocation(formattedTime); 
                           Log.e("TAG","PRE:::"+pre); 
                           if(pre.equals("") || pre==null) 
                              LAT=latlng; 
                           else 
                              LAT=latlng+"~"+pre; 
                            
                           Log.e("TAG","LAT:::"+LAT); 
                            
                           int u = adp.updateLocation(weekDay, LAT, 
                                 formattedTime); 
                            
                           Log.e("Update", "Row Update successfully"+ u); 
                            
                           flage = 1; 
                           pref.setTime(formattedTime); 
                           pref.setDay(weekDay); 
  
                        } 
//                   } 
                     pref.setAppAllow(aTask.toString()); 
                     adp.close(); 
                  } else { 
                     // Log.d("allowed", "allowed"); 
                  } 
 
 
            } catch (Throwable t) { 
//             Log.i("TAG", "Throwable caught:" + t.getMessage(), t); 
               Log.i("TAG", "Throwable caught:"); 
                
                
            } 
            handler.postDelayed(this, 2000); 
         } 
      }; 
      handler.postDelayed(runnable, 2000); 
   } 
 
   @Override 
   public void onDestroy() { 
      // Toast.makeText(this, "Stopped", Toast.LENGTH_SHORT).show(); 
      Log.e("TAG", "APPS SERVICE DESTROY:"); 
      handler.removeCallbacks(runnable); 
      super.onDestroy(); 
   } 
 
   public static String PreviousLocation(String time){ 
       
      Log.e("TAG", "PreviousLocation :LOCATION:"+time); 
       
      String PreLocation=""; 
      Cursor loca = adp.getTestLocation(); 
 
      if (loca != null) 
         loca.moveToFirst(); 
      if (loca.moveToFirst()) { 
         do { 
             
            if(time.equals("00-01")){ 
                
               PreLocation = loca.getString(loca 
                     .getColumnIndex(Attributes.ONE_LOC)); 
                   
            }else if(time.equals("01-02")){ 
               PreLocation = loca.getString(loca 
                     .getColumnIndex(Attributes.TWO_LOC)); 
Appendices 
 
277 | P a g e  
 
          
            }else if(time.equals("02-03")){ 
               PreLocation = loca.getString(loca 
                     .getColumnIndex(Attributes.THREE_LOC)); 
                
            }else if(time.equals("03-04")){ 
               PreLocation = loca.getString(loca 
                     .getColumnIndex(Attributes.FOUR_LOC)); 
                
            }else if(time.equals("04-05")){ 
               PreLocation = loca.getString(loca 
                     .getColumnIndex(Attributes.FIVE_LOC)); 
                
            }else if(time.equals("05-06")){ 
               PreLocation = loca.getString(loca 
                     .getColumnIndex(Attributes.SIX_LOC)); 
                
            }else if(time.equals("06-07")){ 
               PreLocation = loca.getString(loca 
                     .getColumnIndex(Attributes.SEVEN_LOC)); 
                
            }else if(time.equals("07-08")){ 
               PreLocation = loca.getString(loca 
                     .getColumnIndex(Attributes.EIGHT_LOC)); 
                
            }else if(time.equals("08-09")){ 
               PreLocation = loca.getString(loca 
                     .getColumnIndex(Attributes.NINE_LOC)); 
                
            }else if(time.equals("09-10")){ 
               PreLocation = loca.getString(loca 
                     .getColumnIndex(Attributes.TEN_LOC)); 
                
            }else if(time.equals("10-11")){ 
               PreLocation = loca.getString(loca 
                     .getColumnIndex(Attributes.ELEVEN_LOC)); 
          
            }else if(time.equals("11-12")){ 
               PreLocation = loca.getString(loca 
                     .getColumnIndex(Attributes.TWELVE_LOC)); 
                
            }else if(time.equals("12-13")){ 
               PreLocation = loca.getString(loca 
                     .getColumnIndex(Attributes.THIRTEEN_LOC)); 
                
               Log.e("Inside","Inside 13-14"); 
            }else if(time.equals("13-14")){ 
               PreLocation = loca.getString(loca 
                     .getColumnIndex(Attributes.FOURTEEN_LOC)); 
                
            }else if(time.equals("14-15")){ 
               PreLocation = loca.getString(loca 
                     .getColumnIndex(Attributes.FIFTEEN_LOC)); 
                
            }else if(time.equals("15-16")){ 
               PreLocation = loca.getString(loca 
                     .getColumnIndex(Attributes.SIXTEEN_LOC)); 
                
            }else if(time.equals("16-17")){ 
               PreLocation = loca.getString(loca 
                     .getColumnIndex(Attributes.SEVENTEEN_LOC)); 
                
            }else if(time.equals("17-18")){ 
               PreLocation = loca.getString(loca 
                     .getColumnIndex(Attributes.EIGHTEEN_LOC)); 
                
            }else if(time.equals("18-19")){ 
               PreLocation = loca.getString(loca 
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                     .getColumnIndex(Attributes.NINTEEN_LOC)); 
                
            }else if(time.equals("19-20")){ 
               PreLocation = loca.getString(loca 
                     .getColumnIndex(Attributes.TWENTY_LOC)); 
                
            }else if(time.equals("20-21")){ 
               PreLocation = loca.getString(loca 
                     .getColumnIndex(Attributes.TWENTYONE_LOC)); 
                
            }else if(time.equals("21-22")){ 
               PreLocation = loca.getString(loca 
                     .getColumnIndex(Attributes.TWENTYTWO_LOC)); 
                
            }else if(time.equals("22-23")){ 
               PreLocation = loca.getString(loca 
                     .getColumnIndex(Attributes.TWENTYTHREE_LOC)); 
                
            }else if(time.equals("23-24")){ 
               PreLocation = loca.getString(loca 
                     .getColumnIndex(Attributes.TWENTYFOUR_LOC)); 
            } 
             
         } while (loca.moveToNext()); 
      } 
       
       
      Log.e("TAG", "AFTER PreviousLocation :LOCATION:"+PreLocation); 
       
      return PreLocation; 
       
       
       





















public class DBAdapter { 
    
      DBHelper sqLiteHelper; 
       SQLiteDatabase sqLiteDataBase; 
      Context context; 
      String TAG="DBAdapter"; 
      PreferenceUtils pref; 
       
      public DBAdapter(Context context){ 
         this.context=context; 
         pref=new PreferenceUtils(context); 
      } 
       
      public DBAdapter open(){ 
         sqLiteHelper=new DBHelper(context, Attributes.MLOCKALL_DATABASE,null,1); 
         sqLiteDataBase=sqLiteHelper.getWritableDatabase(); 
         pref.setIsOpen(true); 
         return this; 
      } 
       
      public void close(){ 
         if(sqLiteDataBase!=null && sqLiteDataBase.isOpen()) 
            sqLiteDataBase.close(); 
         if(sqLiteHelper!=null) 
            sqLiteHelper.close(); 
         pref.setIsOpen(false); 
      } 
       
       
   //insert apps details 
   public void insertApps(String name,String icon,String pack, String option, 
String high, String medium, String low){ //, Boolean high, Boolean medium) { 
    
            ContentValues contentValues=new ContentValues(); 
         try{ 
             
            contentValues.put(Attributes.NAME,name); 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.ICON, icon); 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.PACKAGE,pack); 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.PRIORITY,option); 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.HIGH,high); 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.MEDIUM,medium); 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.LOW,low); 
             
         }catch(Exception e){ 
      } 
         sqLiteDataBase.insert(Attributes.TABLE_APPS,null,contentValues); 
   } 
 
   public Cursor getCheckedOption() { 
      // TODO Auto-generated method stub 
       Cursor cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from 
"+Attributes.TABLE_APPS, null); 
       return cursor; 
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   } 
 
   public Cursor getNewCheckedOption() { 
      // TODO Auto-generated method stub 
       Cursor cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from 
"+Attributes.TABLE_APPS_NEW, null); 
       return cursor; 
       
   } 
   public Cursor getPriority(String app) { 
      // TODO Auto-generated method stub 
      Cursor cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from 
"+Attributes.TABLE_APPS_NEW+" where "+Attributes.PACKAGE1+" = '" +app+ "'" , null); 
       return cursor; 
   } 
 
   public void insertAppsNew(String name,String icon,String pack, String option) { 
      // TODO Auto-generated method stub 
       
      ContentValues contentValues=new ContentValues(); 
      try{ 
          
         contentValues.put(Attributes.NAME1,name); 
         contentValues.put(Attributes.ICON1, icon); 
         contentValues.put(Attributes.PACKAGE1,pack); 
         contentValues.put(Attributes.PRIORITY1,option); 
          
      }catch(Exception e){ 
   } 
      sqLiteDataBase.insert(Attributes.TABLE_APPS_NEW,null,contentValues); 
       
   } 
 
   public void insertAppsUse(String day, String app, String time) { 
      // TODO Auto-generated method stub 
    
       
      ContentValues contentValues=new ContentValues(); 
      try{ 
          
         contentValues.put(Attributes.DAY, day); 
         contentValues.put(Attributes.APP_NAME,app); 
         contentValues.put(Attributes.TIME,time); 
          
      }catch(Exception e){ 
   } 
      sqLiteDataBase.insert(Attributes.TABLE_APPS_USE,null,contentValues); 
      Log.d("Insert", "Insert App Successfull"); 
       
   } 
 
   public Cursor getData(String app, String weekDay) { 
      // TODO Auto-generated method stub 
      Cursor cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from 
"+Attributes.TABLE_APPS_USE+" where "+Attributes.APP_NAME+" = '" +app+ "'"+" AND "+ 
Attributes.DAY+" = '" +weekDay+ "'", null); 
      return cursor; 
   } 
 
   public Cursor getApp() { 
      // TODO Auto-generated method stub 
      Cursor cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select DISTINCT * from 
"+Attributes.TABLE_APPS_USE, null); 
      return cursor; 
   } 
    
   public Cursor getApp1() { 
      // TODO Auto-generated method stub 
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      Cursor cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select DISTINCT * from 
"+Attributes.TABLE_APPS_NEW, null); 
      return cursor; 
   } 
   public Cursor getCommonApp() { 
      // TODO Auto-generated method stub 
      Cursor cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from 
"+Attributes.TABLE_COMMON, null); 
      return cursor; 
   } 
 
   public Cursor getLocationData() { 
      // TODO Auto-generated method stub 
      Cursor cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from 
"+Attributes.TABLE_LOCATION, null); 
      return cursor; 
   } 
    
   public Cursor getAppTime() { 
      // TODO Auto-generated method stub 
      Cursor cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select "+Attributes.TIME+" from 
"+Attributes.TABLE_APPS_USE/*+" where "+Attributes.APP_NAME+" = '" +name+ "'"*/, 
null); 
      return cursor; 
   } 
 
   public Cursor getAppName(String string) { 
      // TODO Auto-generated method stub 
      Cursor cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select DISTINCT "+Attributes.NAME1+" 
from "+Attributes.TABLE_APPS_NEW+" where "+Attributes.PACKAGE1+" = '" +string+ "'", 
null); 
      return cursor; 
   } 
 
   public Cursor getDay() { 
      // TODO Auto-generated method stub 
      Cursor cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select DISTINCT "+Attributes.DAY+" 
from "+Attributes.TABLE_APPS_USE, null); 
      return cursor; 
   } 
 
   public Cursor getAppNameByTime(String time) { 
      // TODO Auto-generated method stub 
      Cursor cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from 
"+Attributes.TABLE_APPS_USE+" where "+Attributes.TIME+" = '" +time+ "'", null); 
      return cursor; 
   } 
 
   public Cursor getAppTimeByName(String app) { 
      // TODO Auto-generated method stub 
      Cursor cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from 
"+Attributes.TABLE_APPS_USE+" where "+Attributes.APP_NAME+" = '" +app+ "'", null); 
      return cursor; 
   } 
    
    
   //Saim created 
    
   public String getAppNameTest(String app) { 
       
      Log.d("package name", app); 
      String temp=""; 
      // TODO Auto-generated method stub 
      Cursor cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select "+Attributes.NAME1+" from 
"+Attributes.TABLE_APPS_NEW+" where "+Attributes.PACKAGE1+" = '" +app+ "'", null); 
      if(cursor!=null){ 
         cursor.moveToFirst(); 
      if(cursor.moveToFirst()){ 
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         do{ 
            temp=(cursor.getString(cursor.getColumnIndex(Attributes.NAME1))); 
         }while(cursor.moveToNext()); 
      } 
      } 
      Log.d("package temp", temp); 
       
      return temp; 
       
   } 
    
   public String getAppNameTest1(String app) { 
       
      Log.d("package name", app); 
      String temp=""; 
      // TODO Auto-generated method stub 
      Cursor cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select "+Attributes.NAME1+" from 
"+Attributes.TABLE_APPS_NEW+" where "+Attributes.NAME+" = '" +app+ "'", null); 
      if(cursor!=null){ 
         cursor.moveToFirst(); 
      if(cursor.moveToFirst()){ 
         do{ 
            temp=(cursor.getString(cursor.getColumnIndex(Attributes.NAME1))); 
         }while(cursor.moveToNext()); 
      } 
      } 
      return temp; 
   } 
 
   public Cursor getCommonApp(String time, String days) { 
      // TODO Auto-generated method stub 
      Cursor cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from 
"+Attributes.TABLE_APPS_USE+" where "+Attributes.TIME+" = '" +time+ "'"+" AND "+ 
Attributes.DAY+" = '" +days+ "'", null); 
      return cursor; 
   } 
 
    
   //From here new database design... 
    
   public void insertCommonUse(String weekDay, String app, String formattedTime) { 
      // TODO Auto-generated method stub 
 
      Log.e("Inside","Inside Insert Function"); 
      ContentValues contentValues=new ContentValues(); 
      try{ 
         contentValues.put(Attributes.COMMONDAY,weekDay); 
         if(formattedTime.equals("00-01")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.ONE,app);  
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("01-02")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.TWO,app); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("02-03")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.THREE,app); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("03-04")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.FOUR,app); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("04-05")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.FIVE,app); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("05-06")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.SIX,app); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("06-07")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.SEVEN,app); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("07-08")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.EIGHT,app); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("08-09")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.NINE,app); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("09-10")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.TEN,app); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("10-11")){ 
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            contentValues.put(Attributes.ELEVEN,app); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("11-12")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.TWELVE,app); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("12-13")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.THIRTEEN,app); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("13-14")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.FOURTEEN,app); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("14-15")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.FIFTEEN,app); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("15-16")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.SIXTEEN,app); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("16-17")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.SEVENTEEN,app); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("17-18")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.EIGHTEEN,app); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("18-19")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.NINTEEN,app); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("19-20")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.TWENTY,app); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("20-21")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.TWENTYONE,app); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("21-22")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.TWENTYTWO,app); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("22-23")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.TWENTYTHREE,app); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("23-24")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.TWENTYFOUR,app); 
         } 
          
      }catch(Exception e){ 
   } 
      sqLiteDataBase.insert(Attributes.TABLE_COMMON,null,contentValues); 
      Log.e("Insert","Insert successfully"); 
       
   } 
 
   public Cursor getCommonApp(String weekDay) { 
      Cursor cursor = null; 
 
      Log.e("Inside function","Inside Function"); 
      // TODO Auto-generated method stub 
 
         cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from "+Attributes.TABLE_COMMON+" 
where "+Attributes.COMMONDAY+" = '" +weekDay+ "'", null); 
          return cursor; 
   } 
 
   public int updateCommonUse(String weekDay, String app, String formattedTime) { 
      // TODO Auto-generated method stub 
       
      ContentValues contentValues=new ContentValues(); 
      try{ 
          
         if(formattedTime.equals("00-01")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.ONE,app);  
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("01-02")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.TWO,app); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("02-03")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.THREE,app); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("03-04")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.FOUR,app); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("04-05")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.FIVE,app); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("05-06")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.SIX,app); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("06-07")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.SEVEN,app); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("07-08")){ 
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            contentValues.put(Attributes.EIGHT,app); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("08-09")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.NINE,app); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("09-10")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.TEN,app); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("10-11")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.ELEVEN,app); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("11-12")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.TWELVE,app); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("12-13")){ 
            Log.e("Inside","Inside 13-14"); 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.THIRTEEN,app); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("13-14")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.FOURTEEN,app); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("14-15")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.FIFTEEN,app); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("15-16")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.SIXTEEN,app); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("16-17")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.SEVENTEEN,app); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("17-18")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.EIGHTEEN,app); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("18-19")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.NINTEEN,app); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("19-20")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.TWENTY,app); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("20-21")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.TWENTYONE,app); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("21-22")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.TWENTYTWO,app); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("22-23")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.TWENTYTHREE,app); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("23-24")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.TWENTYFOUR,app); 
         } 
          
      }catch(Exception e){ 
   } 
 
      int 
id=sqLiteDataBase.update(Attributes.TABLE_COMMON,contentValues,Attributes.COMMONDAY
+" = '" +weekDay+ "'",null); 
      return id; 
   } 
 
   public Cursor getCommon(String formattedTime) { 
      // TODO Auto-generated method stub 
      Cursor cursor = null; 
       
      if(formattedTime.equals("00-01")){ 
         cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from "+Attributes.TABLE_COMMON, 
null);     
      }else if(formattedTime.equals("01-02")){ 
         cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from "+Attributes.TABLE_COMMON, 
null); 
      }else if(formattedTime.equals("02-03")){ 
         cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from "+Attributes.TABLE_COMMON, 
null); 
      }else if(formattedTime.equals("03-04")){ 
         cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from "+Attributes.TABLE_COMMON, 
null); 
      }else if(formattedTime.equals("04-05")){ 
         cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from "+Attributes.TABLE_COMMON, 
null); 
      }else if(formattedTime.equals("05-06")){ 
         cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from "+Attributes.TABLE_COMMON, 
null); 
      }else if(formattedTime.equals("06-07")){ 
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         cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from "+Attributes.TABLE_COMMON, 
null); 
      }else if(formattedTime.equals("07-08")){ 
         cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from "+Attributes.TABLE_COMMON, 
null); 
      }else if(formattedTime.equals("08-09")){ 
         cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from "+Attributes.TABLE_COMMON, 
null); 
      }else if(formattedTime.equals("09-10")){ 
         cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from "+Attributes.TABLE_COMMON, 
null); 
      }else if(formattedTime.equals("10-11")){ 
         cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from "+Attributes.TABLE_COMMON, 
null); 
      }else if(formattedTime.equals("11-12")){ 
         cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from "+Attributes.TABLE_COMMON, 
null); 
      }else if(formattedTime.equals("12-13")){ 
         Log.e("Inside","Inside 13-14"); 
         cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from "+Attributes.TABLE_COMMON, 
null); 
      }else if(formattedTime.equals("13-14")){ 
         cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from "+Attributes.TABLE_COMMON, 
null); 
      }else if(formattedTime.equals("14-15")){ 
         cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from "+Attributes.TABLE_COMMON, 
null); 
      }else if(formattedTime.equals("15-16")){ 
         cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from "+Attributes.TABLE_COMMON, 
null); 
      }else if(formattedTime.equals("16-17")){ 
         cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from "+Attributes.TABLE_COMMON, 
null); 
      }else if(formattedTime.equals("17-18")){ 
         cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from "+Attributes.TABLE_COMMON, 
null); 
      }else if(formattedTime.equals("18-19")){ 
         cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from "+Attributes.TABLE_COMMON, 
null); 
      }else if(formattedTime.equals("19-20")){ 
         cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from "+Attributes.TABLE_COMMON, 
null); 
      }else if(formattedTime.equals("20-21")){ 
         cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from "+Attributes.TABLE_COMMON, 
null); 
      }else if(formattedTime.equals("21-22")){ 
         cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from "+Attributes.TABLE_COMMON, 
null); 
      }else if(formattedTime.equals("22-23")){ 
         cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from "+Attributes.TABLE_COMMON, 
null); 
      }else if(formattedTime.equals("23-24")){ 
         cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from "+Attributes.TABLE_COMMON, 
null); 
      } 
       
      return cursor; 
   } 
 
   public void insertLocation(String weekDay, String app, String formattedTime) { 
      // TODO Auto-generated method stub 
       
      Log.e("Inside","Inside Insert Function"); 
      ContentValues contentValues=new ContentValues(); 
      try{ 
         contentValues.put(Attributes.LOC_DAY,weekDay); 
         if(formattedTime.equals("00-01")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.ONE_LOC,app);  
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         }else if(formattedTime.equals("01-02")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.TWO_LOC,app); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("02-03")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.THREE_LOC,app); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("03-04")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.FOUR_LOC,app); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("04-05")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.FIVE_LOC,app); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("05-06")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.SIX_LOC,app); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("06-07")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.SEVEN_LOC,app); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("07-08")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.EIGHT_LOC,app); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("08-09")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.NINE_LOC,app); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("09-10")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.TEN_LOC,app); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("10-11")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.ELEVEN_LOC,app); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("11-12")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.TWELVE_LOC,app); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("12-13")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.THIRTEEN_LOC,app); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("13-14")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.FOURTEEN_LOC,app); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("14-15")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.FIFTEEN_LOC,app); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("15-16")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.SIXTEEN_LOC,app); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("16-17")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.SEVENTEEN_LOC,app); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("17-18")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.EIGHTEEN_LOC,app); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("18-19")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.NINTEEN_LOC,app); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("19-20")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.TWENTY_LOC,app); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("20-21")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.TWENTYONE_LOC,app); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("21-22")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.TWENTYTWO_LOC,app); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("22-23")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.TWENTYTHREE_LOC,app); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("23-24")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.TWENTYFOUR_LOC,app); 
         } 
       
      }catch(Exception e){ 
   } 
      sqLiteDataBase.insert(Attributes.TABLE_LOCATION,null,contentValues); 
      Log.e("Insert","Insert Location successfully"); 
       
   } 
 
   public int updateLocation(String weekDay, String latlng, 
         String formattedTime) { 
      // TODO Auto-generated method stub 
       
      ContentValues contentValues=new ContentValues(); 
      try{ 
          
         if(formattedTime.equals("00-01")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.ONE_LOC,latlng);   
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("01-02")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.TWO_LOC,latlng); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("02-03")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.THREE_LOC,latlng); 
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         }else if(formattedTime.equals("03-04")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.FOUR_LOC,latlng); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("04-05")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.FIVE_LOC,latlng); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("05-06")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.SIX_LOC,latlng); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("06-07")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.SEVEN_LOC,latlng); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("07-08")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.EIGHT_LOC,latlng); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("08-09")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.NINE_LOC,latlng); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("09-10")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.TEN_LOC,latlng); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("10-11")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.ELEVEN_LOC,latlng); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("11-12")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.TWELVE_LOC,latlng); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("12-13")){ 
            Log.e("Inside","Inside 13-14"); 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.THIRTEEN_LOC,latlng); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("13-14")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.FOURTEEN_LOC,latlng); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("14-15")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.FIFTEEN_LOC,latlng); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("15-16")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.SIXTEEN_LOC,latlng); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("16-17")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.SEVENTEEN_LOC,latlng); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("17-18")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.EIGHTEEN_LOC,latlng); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("18-19")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.NINTEEN_LOC,latlng); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("19-20")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.TWENTY_LOC,latlng); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("20-21")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.TWENTYONE_LOC,latlng); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("21-22")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.TWENTYTWO_LOC,latlng); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("22-23")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.TWENTYTHREE_LOC,latlng); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("23-24")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.TWENTYFOUR_LOC,latlng); 
         } 
          
      }catch(Exception e){ 
   } 
       
      Log.d("TAG", "WEEK DAY:"+formattedTime); 
      Log.d("TAG", "WEEK DAY:"+weekDay); 
 
      int 
id=sqLiteDataBase.update(Attributes.TABLE_LOCATION,contentValues,Attributes.LOC_DAY
+" = '" +weekDay+ "'",null); 
      return id; 
   } 
 
   public void updateSetepData(String weekDay, String caount, 
         String formattedTime,String distance) { 
      // TODO Auto-generated method stub 
      Log.e("TAG", "FORMATED TIME:================"+formattedTime); 
       
      ContentValues contentValues=new ContentValues(); 
      try{ 
          
         if(formattedTime.equals("00-01")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.ONE_CAUNT,caount);     
            contentValues.put(Attributes.ONE_DISTANCE,distance);    
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         }else if(formattedTime.equals("01-02")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.TWO_CAUNT,caount); 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.TWO_DISTANCE,distance); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("02-03")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.THREE_CAUNT,caount); 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.THREE_DISTANCE,distance); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("03-04")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.FOUR_CAUNT,caount); 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.THREE_DISTANCE,distance); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("04-05")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.FIVE_CAUNT,caount); 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.FIVE_DISTANCE,distance); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("05-06")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.SIX_CAUNT,caount); 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.SIX_DISTANCE,distance); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("06-07")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.SEVEN_CAUNT,caount); 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.SEVEN_DISTANCE,distance); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("07-08")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.EIGHT_CAUNT,caount); 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.EIGHT_DISTANCE,distance); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("08-09")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.NINE_CAUNT,caount); 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.NINE_DISTANCE,distance); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("09-10")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.TEN_CAUNT,caount); 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.TEN_DISTANCE,distance); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("10-11")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.ELEVEN_CAUNT,caount); 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.ELEVEN_DISTANCE,distance); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("11-12")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.TWELVE_CAUNT,caount); 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.TWELVE_DISTANCE,distance); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("12-13")){ 
            Log.e("Inside","Inside 13-14"); 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.THIRTEEN_CAUNT,caount); 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.THIRTEEN_DISTANCE,distance); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("13-14")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.FOURTEEN_CAUNT,caount); 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.FOURTEEN_DISTANCE,distance); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("14-15")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.FIFTEEN_CAUNT,caount); 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.FIFTEEN_DISTANCE,distance); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("15-16")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.SIXTEEN_CAUNT,caount); 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.SIXTEEN_DISTANCE,distance); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("16-17")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.SEVENTEEN_CAUNT,caount); 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.SEVENTEEN_DISTANCE,distance); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("17-18")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.EIGHTEEN_CAUNT,caount); 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.EIGHTEEN_DISTANCE,distance); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("18-19")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.NINTEEN_CAUNT,caount); 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.NINTEEN_DISTANCE,distance); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("19-20")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.TWENTY_CAUNT,caount); 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.TWENTY_DISTANCE,distance); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("20-21")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.TWENTYONE_CAUNT,caount); 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.TWENTYONE_DISTANCE,distance); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("21-22")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.TWENTYTWO_CAUNT,caount); 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.TWENTYTWO_DISTANCE,distance); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("22-23")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.TWENTYTHREE_CAUNT,caount); 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.TWENTYTHREE_DISTANCE,distance); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("23-24")){ 
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            contentValues.put(Attributes.TWENTYFOUR_CAUNT,caount); 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.TWENTYFOUR_DISTANCE,distance); 
         } 
          
      }catch(Exception e){ 
   } 
       
      Log.d("TAG", "WEEK DAY:"+formattedTime); 
      Log.d("TAG", "WEEK DAY:"+weekDay); 
      Log.d("TAG", "UPDATED :"); 
 
      
sqLiteDataBase.update(Attributes.TABLE_WAKING,contentValues,Attributes.WAKING_DAY+" 
= '" +weekDay+ "'",null); 
       
   } 
    
   public Cursor getLocation(String formattedTime) { 
      // TODO Auto-generated method stub 
      Cursor cursor = null; 
 
      if(formattedTime.equals("00-01")){ 
         cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from 
"+Attributes.TABLE_LOCATION+" where "+Attributes.ONE_LOC+" = '" +formattedTime+ 
"'", null);   
      }else if(formattedTime.equals("01-02")){ 
         cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from 
"+Attributes.TABLE_LOCATION+" where "+Attributes.TWO_LOC+" = '" +formattedTime+ 
"'", null); 
      }else if(formattedTime.equals("02-03")){ 
         cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from 
"+Attributes.TABLE_LOCATION+" where "+Attributes.THREE_LOC+" = '" +formattedTime+ 
"'", null); 
      }else if(formattedTime.equals("03-04")){ 
         cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from 
"+Attributes.TABLE_LOCATION+" where "+Attributes.FOUR_LOC+" = '" +formattedTime+ 
"'", null); 
      }else if(formattedTime.equals("04-05")){ 
         cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from 
"+Attributes.TABLE_LOCATION+" where "+Attributes.FIVE_LOC+" = '" +formattedTime+ 
"'", null); 
      }else if(formattedTime.equals("05-06")){ 
         cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from 
"+Attributes.TABLE_LOCATION+" where "+Attributes.SIX_LOC+" = '" +formattedTime+ 
"'", null); 
      }else if(formattedTime.equals("06-07")){ 
         cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from 
"+Attributes.TABLE_LOCATION+" where "+Attributes.SEVEN_LOC+" = '" +formattedTime+ 
"'", null); 
      }else if(formattedTime.equals("07-08")){ 
         cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from 
"+Attributes.TABLE_LOCATION+" where "+Attributes.EIGHT_LOC+" = '" +formattedTime+ 
"'", null); 
      }else if(formattedTime.equals("08-09")){ 
         cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from 
"+Attributes.TABLE_LOCATION+" where "+Attributes.NINE_LOC+" = '" +formattedTime+ 
"'", null); 
      }else if(formattedTime.equals("09-10")){ 
         cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from 
"+Attributes.TABLE_LOCATION+" where "+Attributes.TEN_LOC+" = '" +formattedTime+ 
"'", null); 
      }else if(formattedTime.equals("10-11")){ 
         cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from 
"+Attributes.TABLE_LOCATION+" where "+Attributes.ELEVEN_LOC+" = '" +formattedTime+ 
"'", null); 
      }else if(formattedTime.equals("11-12")){ 
         cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from 
"+Attributes.TABLE_LOCATION+" where "+Attributes.TWELVE_LOC+" = '" +formattedTime+ 
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"'", null); 
      }else if(formattedTime.equals("12-13")){ 
         Log.e("Inside","Inside 13-14"); 
         cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from 
"+Attributes.TABLE_LOCATION+" where "+Attributes.THIRTEEN_LOC+" = '" 
+formattedTime+ "'", null); 
      }else if(formattedTime.equals("13-14")){ 
         cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from 
"+Attributes.TABLE_LOCATION+" where "+Attributes.FOURTEEN_LOC+" = '" 
+formattedTime+ "'", null); 
      }else if(formattedTime.equals("14-15")){ 
         cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from 
"+Attributes.TABLE_LOCATION+" where "+Attributes.FIFTEEN_LOC+" = '" +formattedTime+ 
"'", null); 
      }else if(formattedTime.equals("15-16")){ 
         cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from 
"+Attributes.TABLE_LOCATION+" where "+Attributes.SIXTEEN_LOC+" = '" +formattedTime+ 
"'", null); 
      }else if(formattedTime.equals("16-17")){ 
         cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from 
"+Attributes.TABLE_LOCATION+" where "+Attributes.SEVENTEEN_LOC+" = '" 
+formattedTime+ "'", null); 
      }else if(formattedTime.equals("17-18")){ 
         cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from 
"+Attributes.TABLE_LOCATION+" where "+Attributes.EIGHTEEN_LOC+" = '" 
+formattedTime+ "'", null); 
      }else if(formattedTime.equals("18-19")){ 
         cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from 
"+Attributes.TABLE_LOCATION+" where "+Attributes.NINTEEN_LOC+" = '" +formattedTime+ 
"'", null); 
      }else if(formattedTime.equals("19-20")){ 
         cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from 
"+Attributes.TABLE_LOCATION+" where "+Attributes.TWENTY_LOC+" = '" +formattedTime+ 
"'", null); 
      }else if(formattedTime.equals("20-21")){ 
         cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from 
"+Attributes.TABLE_LOCATION+" where "+Attributes.TWENTYONE_LOC+" = '" 
+formattedTime+ "'", null); 
      }else if(formattedTime.equals("21-22")){ 
         cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from 
"+Attributes.TABLE_LOCATION+" where "+Attributes.TWENTYTWO_LOC+" = '" 
+formattedTime+ "'", null); 
      }else if(formattedTime.equals("22-23")){ 
         cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from 
"+Attributes.TABLE_LOCATION+" where "+Attributes.TWENTYTHREE_LOC+" = '" 
+formattedTime+ "'", null); 
      }else if(formattedTime.equals("23-24")){ 
         cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from 
"+Attributes.TABLE_LOCATION+" where "+Attributes.TWENTYFOUR_LOC+" = '" 
+formattedTime+ "'", null); 
      } 
       return cursor; 
   } 
 
   public Cursor getTestLocation() { 
 
      Cursor cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from 
"+Attributes.TABLE_LOCATION , null);   
       return cursor; 
       
   } 
 
   public int updateApps(String name, String option) { 
      // TODO Auto-generated method stub 
       
      Log.e("Apps Updated", name); 
      ContentValues contentValues=new ContentValues(); 
      try{ 
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         contentValues.put(Attributes.PRIORITY1,option); 
      }catch(Exception e){ 
   } 
 
      int 
id=sqLiteDataBase.update(Attributes.TABLE_APPS_NEW,contentValues,Attributes.NAME1+" 
= '" +name+ "'",null); 
      return id; 
   } 
    
   //saim code 
   public void insertImageDetail(String id,String base64)  
   { 
         ContentValues contentValues=new ContentValues(); 
      try{ 
         contentValues.put(Attributes.IMGID,id); 
         contentValues.put(Attributes.IMAGE_BASE64, base64); 
                   
      }catch(Exception e){ 
   } 
      Log.d(TAG,"Data is Inserted"); 
       sqLiteDataBase.insert(Attributes.TABLE_IMAGE,null,contentValues); 
   } 
    
   public void insertVoiceDetail(String id,String voicebase64)  
   { 
         ContentValues contentValues=new ContentValues(); 
      try{ 
         contentValues.put(Attributes.VOICEID,id); 
         contentValues.put(Attributes.VOICE_BASE64, voicebase64); 
                   
      }catch(Exception e){ 
   } 
      Log.e(TAG,"VOICE Data is Inserted"); 
       sqLiteDataBase.insert(Attributes.TABLE_VOICE,null,contentValues); 
   } 
 
//===============get Methods=================== //  
 
//get all deta  
   public Cursor getImageDetails(){ 
      Cursor cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from 
"+Attributes.TABLE_IMAGE+ " order by "+Attributes.IMGID+ " asc ", null); 
      return cursor; 
   } 
    
   public Cursor getVoiceDetails(){ 
      Cursor cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from 
"+Attributes.TABLE_VOICE+ " order by "+Attributes.VOICEID+ " asc ", null); 
      return cursor; 
   } 
    
   public void insertFingureDetail(String id,String urdutype) { 
      ContentValues contentValues=new ContentValues(); 
      try{ 
         contentValues.put(Attributes.FACE_ID,id); 
         contentValues.put(Attributes.FACE_INDEX, urdutype); 
      }catch(Exception e){ 
   } 
   Log.d(TAG,"Data is Inserted"); 
   sqLiteDataBase.insert(Attributes.TABLE_FINGURE,null,contentValues); 
    
} 
 
//===============get Methods=================== //  
 
 
   public Cursor getFingureDetails(){ 
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      Cursor cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from 
"+Attributes.TABLE_FINGURE+ " order by "+Attributes.FACE_ID+ " desc ", null); 
      return cursor; 
   } 
    
    
   //SMS Function Methoods 
    
      public void inserttextsmsData(String id,String value,String text) { 
            ContentValues contentValues=new ContentValues(); 
         try{ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.TEXTSMS_ID,id); 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.TEXTSMS_VALUE, value); 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.TEXTSMS_TEXT, text); 
             
                      
         }catch(Exception e){ 
      } 
         sqLiteDataBase.insert(Attributes.TABLE_TEXTSMS,null,contentValues); 
   } 
    
public Cursor gettextsmsData() { 
   // TODO Auto-generated method stub 
   Cursor cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from 
"+Attributes.TABLE_TEXTSMS+" ORDER BY "+Attributes.TEXTSMS_ID+" DESC " , null); 
   return cursor; 
    
} 
 
public void insertsentsmsData(String number,String content) { 
    ContentValues contentValues=new ContentValues(); 
   try{ 
      contentValues.put(Attributes.SMS_NUMBER,number); 
      contentValues.put(Attributes.SMS_CONTENT, content); 
                
   }catch(Exception e){ 
} 
   sqLiteDataBase.insert(Attributes.TABLE_SENTSMS,null,contentValues); 
} 
 
public Cursor getsentsmsData() { 
// TODO Auto-generated method stub 
Cursor cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from "+Attributes.TABLE_SENTSMS+" 




    
public boolean getCheckTextSmsId(String text){ 
    
   boolean isvalid=false; 
   ArrayList<String> textvalue=new ArrayList<String>(); 
   Cursor cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from "+Attributes.TABLE_TEXTSMS 
, null); 
   if(cursor!=null) 
    cursor.moveToFirst(); 
   if(cursor.moveToFirst()){ 
    do{ 
         
textvalue.add(cursor.getString(cursor.getColumnIndex(Attributes.TEXTSMS_VALUE))); 
       }while(cursor.moveToNext()); 
   }cursor.close(); 
    
   for(int i=0;i < textvalue.size();i++){ 
    if(text.equals(textvalue.get(i))){ 
     Log.d(TAG,"id is already exists"); 
     isvalid=true; 
     break; 
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    } 
   } 
    return isvalid; 
   } 
 
 
public boolean getCheckSentSmsContent(String text){ 
    
   boolean isvalid=false; 
   ArrayList<String> textvalue=new ArrayList<String>(); 
   Cursor cursor=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from "+Attributes.TABLE_SENTSMS 
, null); 
   if(cursor!=null) 
    cursor.moveToFirst(); 
   if(cursor.moveToFirst()){ 
    do{ 
         
textvalue.add(cursor.getString(cursor.getColumnIndex(Attributes.SMS_CONTENT))); 
       }while(cursor.moveToNext()); 
   }cursor.close(); 
    
   for(int i=0;i < textvalue.size();i++){ 
    if(text.equals(textvalue.get(i))){ 
     Log.d(TAG,"id is already exists"); 
     isvalid=true; 
     break; 
    } 
   } 
    return isvalid; 
   } 
 
public String getallSMSNumber(String content){ 
    
   Log.e("TAG", "DB Contnt"+content); 
// content=content.replaceAll("'","\'"); 
    
   String number=""; 
   Cursor cursor1=sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from 
"+Attributes.TABLE_TEXTSMS+ " where "+Attributes.TEXTSMS_VALUE+" = '"+content+"'" , 
null); 
   Log.d(TAG,"cursor1 caount == "+cursor1.getCount()); 
   if(cursor1!=null) 
      cursor1.moveToFirst(); 
        if(cursor1.moveToFirst()){ 
         do{ 
    
         number=cursor1.getString(cursor1.getColumnIndex(Attributes.TEXTSMS_ID)); 
       
          }while(cursor1.moveToNext()); 
      } 
    cursor1.close(); 
    Log.e("TAG", "DB number"+number); 
   return number; 
} 
 
   public void insertWalkingStepCaunt(String caount,  
         String distance, 
//       String distance, String distanceperhour, 
         String formattedTime,String formattedDay) { 
 
      ContentValues contentValues = new ContentValues(); 
      try { 
          
         contentValues.put(Attributes.WAKING_DAY, formattedDay); 
          
         if(formattedTime.equals("00-01")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.ONE_CAUNT,caount);     
            contentValues.put(Attributes.ONE_DISTANCE,distance);    
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         }else if(formattedTime.equals("01-02")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.TWO_CAUNT,caount); 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.TWO_DISTANCE,distance); 
             
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("02-03")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.THREE_CAUNT,caount); 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.THREE_DISTANCE,distance); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("03-04")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.FOUR_CAUNT,caount); 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.FOUR_DISTANCE,distance); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("04-05")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.FIVE_CAUNT,caount); 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.FIVE_DISTANCE,distance); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("05-06")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.SIX_CAUNT,caount); 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.SIX_DISTANCE,distance); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("06-07")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.SEVEN_CAUNT,caount); 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.SEVEN_DISTANCE,distance); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("07-08")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.EIGHT_CAUNT,caount); 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.EIGHT_DISTANCE,distance); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("08-09")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.NINE_CAUNT,caount); 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.NINE_DISTANCE,distance); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("09-10")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.TEN_CAUNT,caount); 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.TEN_DISTANCE,distance); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("10-11")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.ELEVEN_CAUNT,caount); 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.ELEVEN_DISTANCE,distance); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("11-12")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.TWELVE_CAUNT,caount); 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.TWELVE_DISTANCE,distance); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("12-13")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.THIRTEEN_CAUNT,caount); 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.THIRTEEN_DISTANCE,distance); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("13-14")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.FOURTEEN_CAUNT,caount); 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.FOURTEEN_DISTANCE,distance); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("14-15")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.FIFTEEN_CAUNT,caount); 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.FIFTEEN_DISTANCE,distance); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("15-16")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.SIXTEEN_CAUNT,caount); 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.SIXTEEN_DISTANCE,distance); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("16-17")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.SEVENTEEN_CAUNT,caount); 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.SEVENTEEN_DISTANCE,distance); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("17-18")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.EIGHTEEN_CAUNT,caount); 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.EIGHTEEN_DISTANCE,distance); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("18-19")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.NINTEEN_CAUNT,caount); 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.NINTEEN_DISTANCE,distance); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("19-20")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.TWENTY_CAUNT,caount); 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.TWENTY_DISTANCE,distance); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("20-21")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.TWENTYONE_CAUNT,caount); 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.TWENTYONE_DISTANCE,distance); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("21-22")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.TWENTYTWO_CAUNT,caount); 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.TWENTYTWO_DISTANCE,distance); 
         }else if(formattedTime.equals("22-23")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.TWENTYTHREE_CAUNT,caount); 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.TWENTYTHREE_DISTANCE,distance); 
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         }else if(formattedTime.equals("23-24")){ 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.TWENTYFOUR_CAUNT,caount); 
            contentValues.put(Attributes.TWENTYFOUR_DISTANCE,distance); 
         } 
    
      } catch (Exception e) { 
      } 
      Log.e("TAG", "WAKING DATA IS INSERT"); 
      sqLiteDataBase.insert(Attributes.TABLE_WAKING, null, contentValues); 
   } 
 
   public Cursor getWalkingStepCaunt() { 
      // TODO Auto-generated method stub 
      Cursor cursor = sqLiteDataBase.rawQuery("select * from " 
            + Attributes.TABLE_WAKING, null); 
      return cursor; 
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Appendix F – Experimental Analysis Scripts (MATLAB) 
clear y; 
% Enter the folder path below in colons that contains data 
dirName = 'C:\Users\aalabdulwahid\OneDrive\OneDrive - University of 















    %file 
    rawData=[]; 
    cell=strfind(file,'TotalAppsUsage'); 
    if ~isempty(cell{1,1}) 
      [~,~,rawData] = xlsread(fullfile(char(file))); 
      addressTAU(ctr)=file; 
      ctr=ctr+1; 
      appUsage=[appUsage,rawData.']; 
    end 
    rawData=[]; 
    cell=strfind(file,'StepDetectCount'); 
    if ~isempty(cell{1,1}) 
      [~,~,rawData] = xlsread(fullfile(char(file))); 
      addressSC(ctr1)=file; 
      ctr1=ctr1+1; 
      if (size(rawData)==[2,50]) 
          stepCount=[stepCount,rawData.']; 
      else 
          stepCount=[stepCount,y.']; 
      end 
    end 
    rawData=[]; 
    cell=strfind(file,'StepDetectDistance'); 
    if ~isempty(cell{1,1}) 
      [~,~,rawData] = xlsread(fullfile(char(file))); 
      addressSD(ctr2)=file; 
      ctr2=ctr2+1; 
      if (size(rawData)==[2,50]) 
          stepDistance=[stepDistance,rawData.']; 
      else 
          stepDistance=[stepDistance,y.']; 
      end 









    for j=3:2:a(1) 
        if isempty(stepCount{j,i}) || ~(ischar(stepCount{j,i})) 
||isempty(str2num(stepCount{j,i})) 
            sc(row,col)=0; 
            row=row+1; 
        else 
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            sc(row,col)=str2num(stepCount{j,i}); 
            row=row+1; 
        end 
    end 
    col=col+1; 








    for j=3:2:a(1) 
        if isempty(stepDistance{j,i}) || ~(ischar(stepDistance{j,i})) 
||isempty(str2num(stepDistance{j,i})) 
            sd(row,col)=0; 
            row=row+1; 
        else 
            sd(row,col)=str2num(stepDistance{j,i}); 
            row=row+1; 
        end 
    end 
    col=col+1; 






    if ~isempty(regexp(char(ad),' (\d+) ','match')) 
        temp=char(regexp(char(ad),' (\d+) ','match')); 
        addresstau=[addresstau,str2num(temp(2:(length(temp)-1)))]; 
    else 
        temp=(regexp(char(ad),' (\d+)\','match')); 
        temp=char(temp(1)); 
        addresstau=[addresstau,str2num(temp(2:(length(temp)-1)))]; 





    if ~isempty(regexp(char(ad),' (\d+) ','match')) 
        temp=char(regexp(char(ad),' (\d+) ','match')); 
        addresssd=[addresssd,str2num(temp(2:(length(temp)-1)))]; 
    else 
        temp=(regexp(char(ad),' (\d+)\','match')); 
        temp=char(temp(1)); 
        addresssd=[addresssd,str2num(temp(2:(length(temp)-1)))]; 





    if ~isempty(regexp(char(ad),' (\d+) ','match')) 
        temp=char(regexp(char(ad),' (\d+) ','match')); 
        addresssc=[addresssc,str2num(temp(2:(length(temp)-1)))]; 
    else 
        temp=(regexp(char(ad),' (\d+)\','match')); 
        temp=char(temp(1)); 
        addresssc=[addresssc,str2num(temp(2:(length(temp)-1)))]; 





































    if ~strcmp(appUsage{1,i},'APP Name') 
        temp=[temp,appUsage(:,i)]; 
        appUsage{6,i}=num2str(addresstau(ctr)); 
    else 
        ctr=ctr+1; 
        appUsage{6,i}=num2str(addresstau(ctr)); 
        if user~=addresstau(ctr) 
            appEER=[appEER,userappEER(temp)]; 
            temp={}; 
            appusers=[appusers,user]; 
            user=addresstau(ctr); 
        end 
    end 
    if i==s(2) 
        appUsage{6,i}=num2str(addresstau(ctr)); 
        appEER=[appEER,userappEER(temp)]; 
        appusers=[appusers,user]; 









%dirName = 'D:\biometric analysis\Sample of BioData\Sample of 






    rawData=[]; 
    cell=strfind(file,'Location'); 
    if ~isempty(cell{1,1}) 
        try 
          [~,~,rawData] = xlsread(fullfile(char(file))); 
          s=size(rawData); 
          for i=3:2:s(2) 
              if ~isempty(rawData{2,i}) 
                  Mat(ctr)=rawData(2,i); 
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              else 
                  Mat(ctr)={'0,0'}; 
              end 
              ctr=ctr+1; 
          end 
          if ~isempty(regexp(char(file),' (\d+) ','match')) 
              temp=char(regexp(char(file),' (\d+) ','match')); 
              Mat(ctr)={(temp(2:(length(temp)-1)))}; 
          else 
              temp=(regexp(char(file),' (\d+)\','match')); 
              temp=char(temp(1)); 
              Mat(ctr)={(temp(2:(length(temp)-1)))}; 
          end 
          ctr=1; 
          locMat=[locMat,Mat.']; 
          Mat={}; 
        catch 
        end 






    for j=1:s(2) 
        temp=strsplit(locMat{i,j},'~'); 
        locMat(i,j)=temp(1); 








    if locMat{25,i}==user 
        temp=[temp,locMat(:,i)]; 
    else 
        try 
            s1=size(temp); 
            compare(1)=1; 
            compare(2)=2; 
            compare(3)=vectdist(temp(:,1),temp(:,2)); 
            for j=1:s1(2) 
                for k=j+1:s1(2) 
                    if vectdist(temp(:,j),temp(:,k)) < compare(3) 
                        compare(1)=j; 
                        compare(2)=k; 
                        compare(3)=vectdist(temp(:,j),temp(:,k)); 
                    end 
                end 
            end 
            
usereer=1/(nonZero(temp)/(nonZero(temp(:,compare(1)))+nonZero(temp(:,compare(2))))); 
            locEERmatrix=[locEERmatrix,[usereer;str2num(user)]]; 
        catch 
        end 
            temp={}; 
            temp=[temp,locMat(:,i)]; 
            user=locMat{25,i}; 
    end 
    if i==s(2) 
        try 
            s1=size(temp); 
            compare(1)=1; 
            compare(2)=2; 
            compare(3)=vectdist(temp(:,1),temp(:,2)); 
            for j=1:s1(2) 
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                for k=j+1:s1(2) 
                    if vectdist(temp(:,j),temp(:,k)) < compare(1) 
                        compare(1)=j; 
                        compare(2)=k; 
                        compare(3)=vectdist(temp(:,j),temp(:,k)); 
                    end 
                end 
            end 
            
usereer=1/(nonZero(temp)/(nonZero(temp(:,compare(1)))+nonZero(temp(:,compare(2))))); 
            locEERmatrix=[locEERmatrix,[usereer;str2num(user)]]; 
        catch 
        end 





    locEERmatrixperuser(1:24,i)=locEERmatrix(1,i); 



















%Face,Finger Print, GPS,Voice, App Usage, Gait. ! is for Yes and 0 is for No 












%3D the overall fused authentication confidence, App usage timeline and 
%their risk levels 





    if ~strcmp(appUsage{1,i},'APP Name') 
        try 
            temp=appUsage(:,i); 
            z=temp{3}; 
            hour=strsplit(z,'-'); 
            hour=hour{1}; 
            hour=str2num(hour); 
        catch 
            hour=1; 
        end 
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eer=([imageEER(hour),fingerprintEER(hour),locEER(hour),voiceEER(hour),appEER(hour),
gaitEER(hour)]).'; 
        eeroa=100*([1 1 1 1 1 1]-eer.'); 
  
        for j= 1:8 
            if isequal(availability,conditions(j,:)) 
                fusedEER=weights(j,:)*eer; 
            end 
        end 
        eer=zeros(1,6); 
        ac=100-fusedEER; 
        appUsage{7,i}=num2str(ac); 
        user=str2num(appUsage{6,i}); 
        for j=imageEERperuser 
            if user==j(25) 
                eer(1)=j(hour); 
            end 
        end 
        eer(2)=fingerprintEER(hour); 
        for j=locEERmatrixperuser 
            if user==j(25) 
                eer(3)=j(hour); 
            end 
        end 
        eer(4)=voiceEER(hour); 
        for j=appEERperuser 
            if user==j(25) 
                eer(5)=j(hour); 
            end 
        end 
        for j=gaitPerUser 
            if user==j(25) 
                eer(6)=j(hour); 
            end 
        end 
        eer=eer.'; 
        for j= 1:8 
            if isequal(availability,conditions(j,:)) 
                fusedEER=weights(j,:)*eer; 
            end 
        end 
        ac=100-fusedEER; 
        appUsage{8,i}=num2str(ac); 
        eer=100*([1 1 1 1 1 1]-eer.'); 
        for j=9:14 
            appUsage{j,i}=num2str(eer(j-8)); 
        end 
        for j=15:20 
            appUsage{j,i}=num2str(eeroa(j-14)); 
        end 






%overall,individual,(Face,Finger Print, GPS,Voice, App Usage, Gait)*individual, 
(")*overall. 
for i=2:s(2) 
    if  ~strcmp(appUsage{1,i},'APP Name') 
        matrix=[matrix,appUsage(:,i)]; 
        temp=[temp,appUsage(:,i)]; 
    elseif ~strcmp(appUsage{6,i-1},appUsage{6,i+1}) 
        [dat,used]=vis(temp,2); 
        t=strcat('authentification confidence per app for user number:',temp{6,1}); 
        figure(j) 
        boxplot(dat,used) 
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        xlabel('App Name') 
        ylabel('Authentification confidence') 
        title(t) 
         
        [dat,used]=vis(temp,3); 
        t=strcat('authentification confidence(face) per app for user 
number:',temp{6,1}); 
        figure(j+1) 
        boxplot(dat,used) 
        xlabel('App Name') 
        ylabel('Authentification confidence') 
        title(t) 
         
        [dat,used]=vis(temp,4); 
        t=strcat('authentification confidence(finger print) per app for user 
number:',temp{6,1}); 
        figure(j+2) 
        boxplot(dat,used) 
        xlabel('App Name') 
        ylabel('Authentification confidence') 
        title(t) 
         
        [dat,used]=vis(temp,5); 
        t=strcat('authentification confidence(gps) per app for user 
number:',temp{6,1}); 
        figure(j+3) 
        boxplot(dat,used) 
        xlabel('App Name') 
        ylabel('Authentification confidence') 
        title(t) 
         
        [dat,used]=vis(temp,6); 
        t=strcat('authentification confidence(voice) per app for user 
number:',temp{6,1}); 
        figure(j+4) 
        boxplot(dat,used) 
        xlabel('App Name') 
        ylabel('Authentification confidence') 
        title(t) 
         
        [dat,used]=vis(temp,7); 
        t=strcat('authentification confidence(app usage) per app for user 
number:',temp{6,1}); 
        figure(j+5) 
        boxplot(dat,used) 
        xlabel('App Name') 
        ylabel('Authentification confidence') 
        title(t) 
         
        [dat,used]=vis(temp,8); 
        t=strcat('authentification confidence(gait) per app for user 
number:',temp{6,1}); 
        figure(j+6) 
        boxplot(dat,used) 
        xlabel('App Name') 
        ylabel('Authentification confidence') 
        title(t) 
        j=j+7; 
        temp={}; 
    end 
    if i==s(2) 
        [dat,used]=vis(temp,2); 
        t=strcat('authentification confidence per app for user number:',temp{6,1}); 
        figure(j) 
        boxplot(dat,used) 
        xlabel('App Name') 
        ylabel('Authentification confidence') 
        title(t) 
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        [dat,used]=vis(temp,3); 
        t=strcat('authentification confidence(face) per app for user 
number:',temp{6,1}); 
        figure(j+1) 
        boxplot(dat,used) 
        xlabel('App Name') 
        ylabel('Authentification confidence') 
        title(t) 
         
        [dat,used]=vis(temp,4); 
        t=strcat('authentification confidence(finger print) per app for user 
number:',temp{6,1}); 
        figure(j+2) 
        boxplot(dat,used) 
        xlabel('App Name') 
        ylabel('Authentification confidence') 
        title(t) 
         
        [dat,used]=vis(temp,5); 
        t=strcat('authentification confidence(gps) per app for user 
number:',temp{6,1}); 
        figure(j+3) 
        boxplot(dat,used) 
        xlabel('App Name') 
        ylabel('Authentification confidence') 
        title(t) 
         
        [dat,used]=vis(temp,6); 
        t=strcat('authentification confidence(voice) per app for user 
number:',temp{6,1}); 
        figure(j+4) 
        boxplot(dat,used) 
        xlabel('App Name') 
        ylabel('Authentification confidence') 
        title(t) 
         
        [dat,used]=vis(temp,7); 
        t=strcat('authentification confidence(app usage) per app for user 
number:',temp{6,1}); 
        figure(j+5) 
        boxplot(dat,used) 
        xlabel('App Name') 
        ylabel('Authentification confidence') 
        title(t) 
         
        [dat,used]=vis(temp,8); 
        t=strcat('authentification confidence(gait) per app for user 
number:',temp{6,1}); 
        figure(j+6) 
        boxplot(dat,used) 
        xlabel('App Name') 
        ylabel('Authentification confidence') 
        title(t) 
        j=j+7; 
    end 
end 
  
%overall,individual,(Face,Finger Print, GPS,Voice, App Usage, Gait)*individual, 
(")*overall 
[dat,used]=vis(matrix,1); 
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[dat,used]=vis(matrix,9); 














































j=j+7;         
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function [ used, dat ] = intrutionctr( mat,flag,level ) 
%Window type without degradation. 











    used=[used,count]; 
    for l=1:s(2) 
        z=strsplit(mat{5,l},' '); 
        z=strsplit(z{5},':'); 
        z=str2num(z{1})+str2num(z{2})/60 + str2num(z{3})/360; 
%         member(1)=z; 
%         member(2)=day; 
        if z<count*(window/60) && z>=(count-1)*(window/60) 
            temp=[temp,mat(:,l)]; 
        end 
    end 
             
            for j=1:size(temp,2) 
%                 if strcmp(mat{1,i},mat{1,j}); 
                for k=1:t(1) 
                    if strcmp(level{k,1},temp{1,j}) && 
str2num(temp{6+flag,j})<level{k,2} 
                        sum=sum+1; 
                    end 
                end 
%                 end 
            end 
            dat=[dat,sum]; 
            sum=0; 
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% change the path at line 3 to destination saving folder. 
clear 












table={'User ID','Total Requests','Intrusive requests'}; 
%overall,individual,(Face,Finger Print, GPS,Voice, App Usage, Gait)*individual, 
(")*overall. 
for i=2:s(2) 
    if  ~strcmp(appUsage{1,i},'APP Name') 
        matrix=[matrix,appUsage(:,i)]; 
        temp=[temp,appUsage(:,i)]; 
    elseif ~strcmp(appUsage{6,i-1},appUsage{6,i}) 
        [window,count]=intrutionctr(temp,2,level); 
        t=strcat('intrution attempts per app for user number-',num2str(temp{6,1})); 
        a=figure; 
        scatter(window,count) 
        xlabel('Window') 
        ylabel('no of intrusive authentication requests') 
        title(t) 
        saveas(a,strcat(pwd,t,'.fig')) 
        close all 
         
        allUserID=[allUserID,{num2str(temp{6,1})}]; 
%         total=[total,sum(window)]; 
        
table=[table;{num2str(temp{6,1}),num2str(size(temp,2)),num2str(sum(count))}]; 
        temp={}; 
         
    end 
    if i==s(2) 
        [window,count]=intrutionctr(temp,2,level); 
        t=strcat('intrution attempts per app for user number-',num2str(temp{6,1})); 
        a=figure; 
        scatter(window,count) 
        xlabel('Window') 
        ylabel('no of intrusive authentication requests') 
        title(t) 
        saveas(a,strcat(pwd,t,'.fig')) 
        close all 
        allUserID=[allUserID,{num2str(temp{6,1})}]; 
%         total=[total,sum(window)]; 
        
table=[table;{num2str(temp{6,1}),num2str(size(temp,2)),num2str(sum(count))}]; 
        temp={}; 
  



















xlswrite(' Request Table.xls',table) 
  




%overall,individual,(Face,Finger Print, GPS,Voice, App Usage, Gait)*individual, 
(")*overall. 
for i=2:s(2) 
    if  ~strcmp(appUsage{1,i},'APP Name') 
        matrix=[matrix,appUsage(:,i)]; 
        temp=[temp,appUsage(:,i)]; 
    elseif strcmp(appUsage{6,i-1},appUsage{6,i}) 
        [window,dat]=intrutionctr(temp,2,level); 
        %t=strcat('intrution attempts per app for user number-',num2str(temp{6,1})); 
        %j=j+1; 
        total=[total,sum(dat)]; 
        day=[day,j]; 
        table=[table;{num2str(j),num2str(size(temp,2)),num2str(sum(dat))}]; 
        j=j+1; 
        temp={}; 
         
    elseif ~strcmp(appUsage{6,i-1},appUsage{6,i}) 
        [window,dat]=intrutionctr(temp,2,level); 
        total=[total,sum(dat)]; 
        day=[day,j]; 
        table=[table;{num2str(j),num2str(size(temp,2)),num2str(sum(dat))}]; 
        temp={}; 
        t=strcat('intrution attempts per day for user number-',num2str(temp{6,1})); 
        a=figure; 
        scatter(day,total) 
        xlabel('Day') 
        ylabel('Count') 
        title(t) 
        saveas(a,strcat(pwd,t,'.fig')) 
        close all 
        xlswrite(strcat(t,'.xls'),table) 
        total=[]; 
        day=[]; 
        table={'Day','Total Requests','Intrusive requests'}; 
        j=1; 
    end 
         
    if i==s(2) 
        [window,dat]=intrutionctr(temp,2,level); 
        total=[total,sum(dat)]; 
        day=[day,j]; 
        table=[table;{num2str(j),num2str(size(temp,2)),num2str(sum(dat))}]; 
        temp={}; 
        t=strcat('intrution attempts per day for user number-',num2str(temp{6,1})); 
        a=figure; 
        scatter(day,total) 
        xlabel('Day') 
        ylabel('Count') 
        title(t) 
        saveas(a,strcat(pwd,t,'.fig')) 
        close all 
        xlswrite(strcat(t,'.xls'),table) 
        total=[]; 
        day=[]; 
        table={'Day','Total Requests','Intrusive requests'}; 
        j=1; 
  
    end 
end 
function savefig(fname, varargin) 
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    op_dbg=     false;                                              % Default value. 
     
    % Compression 
    compr=          [' -dUseFlateCompression=true -dLZWEncodePages=true -
dCompatibilityLevel=1.6' ... 
                     ' -dAutoFilterColorImages=false -dAutoFilterGrayImages=false 
' ... 
                     ' -dColorImageFilter=%s -dGrayImageFilter=%s'];    % 
Compression. 
    lossless=       sprintf (compr, '/FlateEncode', '/FlateEncode'); 
    lossy=          sprintf (compr, '/DCTEncode',   '/DCTEncode'  ); 
    lossy=          [lossy ' -c ".setpdfwrite << /ColorImageDict << /QFactor %g 
' ... 
                     '/Blend 1 /HSample [%s] /VSample [%s] >> >> 
setdistillerparams"']; 
     
    % Create gs command. 
    cmdEnd=         ' -sDEVICE=%s -sOutputFile="%s"';                   % Essential. 
    epsCmd=         ''; 
    epsCmd= [epsCmd ' -dSubsetFonts=true -dNOPLATFONTS'];               % Future 
support? 
    epsCmd= [epsCmd ' -dUseCIEColor=true -
dColorConversionStrategy=/UseDeviceIndependentColor']; 
    epsCmd= [epsCmd ' -dProcessColorModel=/%s'];                        % Color 
conversion. 
    pdfCmd= [epsCmd ' -dAntiAliasColorImages=false' cmdEnd]; 
    epsCmd= [epsCmd cmdEnd]; 
     
    % Get file name. 
    if((nargin < 1) || isempty(fname) || ~ischar(fname))                % Check 
file name. 
        error('No file name specified.'); 
    end 
    [pathstr, namestr] = fileparts(fname); 
    if(isempty(pathstr)), fname= fullfile(cd, namestr); end 
     
    % Get handle. 
    fighdl=     get(0, 'CurrentFigure'); % See gcf.                     % Get 
figure handle. 
    if((nargin >= 2) && (numel(varargin{1}) == 1) && isnumeric(varargin{1})) 
        fighdl=     varargin{1}; 
        varargin=   {varargin{2:end}}; 
    end 
    if(isempty(fighdl)), error('There is no figure to save!?'); end 
    set(fighdl, 'Units', 'centimeters')                                 % Set paper 
stuff. 
    sz=         get(fighdl, 'Position'); 
    sz(1:2)=    0; 
    set(fighdl, 'PaperUnits', 'centimeters', 'PaperSize', sz(3:4), 'PaperPosition', 
sz); 
     
    % Set up the various devices. 
    % Those commented out are not yet supported by gs (nor by savefig). 
    % pdf-cmyk works due to the Matlab '-cmyk' export being carried over from eps 
to pdf. 
    device.eps.rgb=     sprintf(epsCmd, 'DeviceRGB',    'epswrite', [fname '.eps']); 
    device.jpeg.rgb=    sprintf(cmdEnd, 'jpeg',                     [fname 
'.jpeg']); 
%   device.jpeg.cmyk=   sprintf(cmdEnd, 'jpegcmyk',                 [fname 
'.jpeg']); 
    device.jpeg.gray=   sprintf(cmdEnd, 'jpeggray',                 [fname 
'.jpeg']); 
    device.pdf.rgb=     sprintf(pdfCmd, 'DeviceRGB',    'pdfwrite', [fname '.pdf']); 
    device.pdf.cmyk=    sprintf(pdfCmd, 'DeviceCMYK',   'pdfwrite', [fname '.pdf']); 
    device.pdf.gray=    sprintf(pdfCmd, 'DeviceGray',   'pdfwrite', [fname '.pdf']); 
    device.png.rgb=     sprintf(cmdEnd, 'png16m',                   [fname '.png']); 
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%   device.png.cmyk=    sprintf(cmdEnd, 'png???',                   [fname '.png']); 
    device.png.gray=    sprintf(cmdEnd, 'pnggray',                  [fname '.png']); 
    device.tiff.rgb=    sprintf(cmdEnd, 'tiff24nc',                 [fname 
'.tiff']); 
    device.tiff.cmyk=   sprintf(cmdEnd, 'tiff32nc',                 [fname 
'.tiff']); 
    device.tiff.gray=   sprintf(cmdEnd, 'tiffgray',                 [fname 
'.tiff']); 
     
    % Get options. 
    global savefig_defaults;                                            % Add 
global defaults. 
    if( iscellstr(savefig_defaults)), varargin= {savefig_defaults{:}, varargin{:}}; 
    elseif(ischar(savefig_defaults)), varargin= {savefig_defaults, varargin{:}}; 
    end 
    varargin=   {'-r300', '-lossless', '-rgb', varargin{:}};            % Add 
defaults. 
    res=        ''; 
    types=      {}; 
    fonts=      'false'; 
    crop=       false; 
    for n= 1:length(varargin)                                           % Read 
options. 
        if(ischar(varargin{n})) 
            switch(lower(varargin{n})) 
            case {'eps','jpeg','pdf','png','tiff'},     types{end+1}=   
lower(varargin{n}); 
            case '-rgb',                color=  'rgb';  deps= {'-depsc2'}; 
            case '-cmyk',               color=  'cmyk'; deps= {'-depsc2', '-cmyk'}; 
            case '-gray',               color=  'gray'; deps= {'-deps2'}; 
            case '-fonts',              fonts=          'true'; 
            case '-lossless',           comp=           0; 
            case '-crop',               crop=           true; 
            case '-dbg',                op_dbg=         true; 
            otherwise 
                if(regexp(varargin{n}, '^\-r[0-9]+$')),      res=  varargin{n}; 
                elseif(regexp(varargin{n}, '^\-c[0-9.]+$')), comp= 
str2double(varargin{n}(3:end)); 
                else    warning('pax:savefig:inputError', 'Unknown option in 
argument: ''%s''.', varargin{n}); 
                end 
            end 
        else 
            warning('pax:savefig:inputError', 'Wrong type of argument: ''%s''.', 
class(varargin{n})); 
        end 
    end 
    types=      unique(types); 
    if(isempty(types)), error('No output format given.');   end 
     
    if (comp == 0)                                                      % Lossless 
compression 
        gsCompr=        lossless; 
    elseif (comp <= 0.1)                                                % High 
quality lossy 
        gsCompr=        sprintf(lossy, comp, '1 1 1 1', '1 1 1 1'); 
    else                                                                % Normal 
lossy 
        gsCompr=        sprintf(lossy, comp, '2 1 1 2', '2 1 1 2'); 
    end 
     
    % Generate the gs command. 
    switch(computer)                                                    % Get gs 
command. 
        case {'MAC','MACI'},            gs= '/usr/local/bin/gs'; 
        case {'PCWIN','PCWIN64'},       gs= 'gswin32c.exe'; 
        otherwise,                      gs= 'gs'; 
    end 
Appendices 
 
310 | P a g e  
 
    gs=     [gs     ' -q -dNOPAUSE -dBATCH -dEPSCrop'];                 % Essential. 
    gs=     [gs     ' -dPDFSETTINGS=/prepress -dEmbedAllFonts=' fonts]; % Must be 
first? 
    gs=     [gs     ' -dUseFlateCompression=true'];                     % Useful 
stuff. 
    gs=     [gs     ' -dAutoRotatePages=/None'];                        % Probably 
good. 
    gs=     [gs     ' -dHaveTrueTypes'];                                % Probably 
good. 
    gs=     [gs     ' ' res];                                           % Add 
resolution to cmd. 
     
    if(crop && ismember(types, {'eps', 'pdf'}))                         % Crop the 
figure. 
        fighdl= do_crop(fighdl); 
    end 
     
    % Output eps from Matlab. 
    renderer=   ['-' lower(get(fighdl, 'Renderer'))];                   % Use same 
as in figure. 
    if(strcmpi(renderer, '-none')), renderer=   '-painters';    end     % We need a 
valid renderer. 
    print(fighdl, deps{:}, '-noui', renderer, res, [fname '-temp']);    % Output 
the eps. 
     
    % Convert to other formats. 
    for n= 1:length(types)                                              % Output 
them. 
        if(isfield(device.(types{n}), color)) 
            cmd=        device.(types{n}).(color);                      % Colour 
model exists. 
        else 
            cmd=        device.(types{n}).rgb;                          % Use 
alternative. 
            if(~strcmp(types{n}, 'eps'))    % It works anyways for eps (VERY 
SHAKY!). 
                warning('pax:savefig:deviceError', ... 
                        'No device for %s using %s. Using rgb instead.', types{n}, 
color); 
            end 
        end 
        cmp=    lossless; 
        if (strcmp(types{n}, 'pdf')),   cmp= gsCompr;       end         % Lossy 
compr only for pdf. 
        if (strcmp(types{n}, 'eps')),   cmp= '';            end         % eps can't 
use lossless. 
        cmd=    sprintf('%s %s %s -f "%s-temp.eps"', gs, cmd, cmp, fname);% Add up. 
            status= system(cmd);                                        % Run 
Ghostscript. 
            if (op_dbg || status),      display (cmd),      end 
    end 




function fig= do_crop(fig) 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%   Remove line segments that are outside the view. 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
     
    haxes=  findobj(fig, 'Type', 'axes', '-and', 'Tag', ''); 
    for n=1:length(haxes) 
        xl=     get(haxes(n), 'XLim'); 
        yl=     get(haxes(n), 'YLim'); 
        lines=  findobj(haxes(n), 'Type', 'line'); 
        for m=1:length(lines) 
            x=              get(lines(m), 'XData'); 
            y=              get(lines(m), 'YData'); 
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            inx=            (xl(1) <= x) & (x <= xl(2));    % Within the x borders. 
            iny=            (yl(1) <= y) & (y <= yl(2));    % Within the y borders. 
            keep=           inx & iny;                      % Within the box. 
             
            if(~strcmp(get(lines(m), 'LineStyle'), 'none')) 
                crossx=     ((x(1:end-1) < xl(1)) & (xl(1) < x(2:end))) ... % 
Crossing border x1. 
                        |   ((x(1:end-1) < xl(2)) & (xl(2) < x(2:end))) ... % 
Crossing border x2. 
                        |   ((x(1:end-1) > xl(1)) & (xl(1) > x(2:end))) ... % 
Crossing border x1. 
                        |   ((x(1:end-1) > xl(2)) & (xl(2) > x(2:end)));    % 
Crossing border x2. 
                crossy=     ((y(1:end-1) < yl(1)) & (yl(1) < y(2:end))) ... % 
Crossing border y1. 
                        |   ((y(1:end-1) < yl(2)) & (yl(2) < y(2:end))) ... % 
Crossing border y2. 
                        |   ((y(1:end-1) > yl(1)) & (yl(1) > y(2:end))) ... % 
Crossing border y1. 
                        |   ((y(1:end-1) > yl(2)) & (yl(2) > y(2:end)));    % 
Crossing border y2. 
                crossp= [(  (crossx & iny(1:end-1) & iny(2:end)) ...    % Crossing 
a x border within y limits. 
                        |   (crossy & inx(1:end-1) & inx(2:end)) ...    % Crossing 
a y border within x limits. 
                        |   crossx & crossy ...                         % Crossing 
a x and a y border (corner). 
                         ), false ... 
                        ]; 
                crossp(2:end)=  crossp(2:end) | crossp(1:end-1);        % Add line 
segment's secont end point. 
             
                keep=           keep | crossp; 
            end 
            set(lines(m), 'XData', x(keep)) 
            set(lines(m), 'YData', y(keep)) 
        end 














%overall,individual,(Face,Finger Print, GPS,Voice, App Usage, Gait)*individual, 
(")*overall. 
for i=2:s(2) 
    if  ~strcmp(appUsage{1,i},'APP Name') 
        matrix=[matrix,appUsage(:,i)]; 
    end 
    if  ~strcmp(appUsage{1,i},'APP Name') && i~=s(2) 
        temp=[temp,appUsage(:,i)]; 
    else 
        confiMat=confiPerUserPerDay(temp); 
        a=figure; 
        scatter(confiMat(1,:),confiMat(4,:)) 
        xlabel('Time') 
        ylabel('Authentication confidence') 
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        saveas(a,strcat(path,'Authentication confidence for user ID-',temp{6,1},' 
on ',temp{2,1},'.fig')) 
        xlswrite(strcat('Authentication confidence for user ID-',temp{6,1},' on 
',temp{2,1},'.xlsx'),([confiMat(1,:);confiMat(4,:)]).') 
        close all 
         
        a=figure; 
        scatter(confiMat(1,:),confiMat(5,:)) 
        xlabel('Time') 
        ylabel('Authentication confidence') 
        title(strcat('Authentication confidence(Face) for user ID:',temp{6,1},' on 
',temp{2,1})) 
        saveas(a,strcat(path,'Authentication confidence(Face) for user ID-
',temp{6,1},' on ',temp{2,1},'.fig')) 
        xlswrite(strcat('Authentication confidence(Face) for user ID-',temp{6,1},' 
on ',temp{2,1},'.xlsx'),([confiMat(1,:);confiMat(5,:)]).') 
        close all 
        a=figure; 
        scatter(confiMat(1,:),confiMat(6,:)) 
        xlabel('Time') 
        ylabel('Authentication confidence') 
        title(strcat('Authentication confidence(Finger) for user ID:',temp{6,1},' 
on ',temp{2,1})) 
        saveas(a,strcat(path,'Authentication confidence(Finger) for user ID-
',temp{6,1},' on ',temp{2,1},'.fig')) 
        xlswrite(strcat('Authentication confidence(Finger) for user ID-
',temp{6,1},' on ',temp{2,1},'.xlsx'),([confiMat(1,:);confiMat(6,:)]).') 
        close all 
        a=figure; 
        scatter(confiMat(1,:),confiMat(7,:)) 
        xlabel('Time') 
        ylabel('Authentication confidence') 
        title(strcat('Authentication confidence(GPS) for user ID:',temp{6,1},' on 
',temp{2,1})) 
        saveas(a,strcat(path,'Authentication confidence(GPS) for user ID-
',temp{6,1},' on ',temp{2,1},'.fig')) 
        xlswrite(strcat('Authentication confidence(GPS) for user ID-',temp{6,1},' 
on ',temp{2,1},'.xlsx'),([confiMat(1,:);confiMat(7,:)]).') 
        close all 
        a=figure; 
        scatter(confiMat(1,:),confiMat(8,:)) 
        xlabel('Time') 
        ylabel('Authentication confidence') 
        title(strcat('Authentication confidence(Voice) for user ID:',temp{6,1},' on 
',temp{2,1})) 
        saveas(a,strcat(path,'Authentication confidence(Voice) for user ID-
',temp{6,1},' on ',temp{2,1},'.fig')) 
        xlswrite(strcat('Authentication confidence(Voice) for user ID-',temp{6,1},' 
on ',temp{2,1},'.xlsx'),([confiMat(1,:);confiMat(8,:)]).') 
        close all 
        a=figure; 
        scatter(confiMat(1,:),confiMat(9,:)) 
        xlabel('Time') 
        ylabel('Authentication confidence') 
        title(strcat('Authentication confidence(App  Usage) for user 
ID:',temp{6,1},' on ',temp{2,1})) 
        saveas(a,strcat(path,'Authentication confidence(App  Usage) for user ID-
',temp{6,1},' on ',temp{2,1},'.fig')) 
        xlswrite(strcat('Authentication confidence(App Usage) for user ID-
',temp{6,1},' on ',temp{2,1},'.xlsx'),([confiMat(1,:);confiMat(9,:)]).') 
        close all 
        a=figure; 
        scatter(confiMat(1,:),confiMat(10,:)) 
        xlabel('Time') 
        ylabel('Authentication confidence') 
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        saveas(a,strcat(path,'Authentication confidence(Gait) for user ID-
',temp{6,1},' on ',temp{2,1},'.fig')) 
        xlswrite(strcat('Authentication confidence(Gait) for user ID-',temp{6,1},' 
on ',temp{2,1},'.xlsx'),([confiMat(1,:);confiMat(10,:)]).') 
        close all 
        temp={}; 








title('Overall Authentication confidence') 








title('Overall Authentication confidence(face)') 








title('Overall Authentication confidence(finger)') 








title('Overall Authentication confidence(GPS)') 








title('Overall Authentication confidence(voice)') 








saveas(a,strcat(path,'Overall Authentication confidence(App Usage).fig')) 







title('Overall Authentication confidence(Gait)') 
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dirName = 'D:\biometric analysis\Sample of BioData\Sample of 





    rawData=[]; 
    cell=strfind(file,'Image'); 
    if ~isempty(cell{1,1}) 
        try 
          [~,~,rawData] = xlsread(fullfile(char(file))); 
          s=size(rawData); 
          for i=2:s(1) 
              if ~isempty(rawData{i,2})&& ~isempty(rawData{i,3}) 
                  imageMat(1,ctr)=rawData(i,2); 
                  imageMat(2,ctr)=rawData(i,3); 
                  if ~isempty(regexp(char(file),' (\d+) ','match')) 
                      temp=char(regexp(char(file),' (\d+) ','match')); 
                      imageMat(3,ctr)={(temp(2:(length(temp)-1)))}; 
                  else 
                      temp=(regexp(char(file),' (\d+)\','match')); 
                      temp=char(temp(1)); 
                      imageMat(3,ctr)={(temp(2:(length(temp)-1)))}; 
                  end 
                  ctr=ctr+1; 
              end 
          end 
        catch 
        end 








    if imageMat{3,i}==user 
        temp(ctr)=imageMat(1,i); 
        ctr=ctr+1; 
    else 
        imat=[]; 
        t=size(temp); 
        for j=1:t(2) 
            for k=1:t(2) 
                try 
                    imat(j,k)=ssim(base64decode(temp{j}),base64decode(temp{k})); 
                catch 
                    imat(j,k)=0; 
                end 
            end 
        end 
        imat=mean(imat); 
        imatall=[imatall,imat]; 
        temp={}; 
        ctr=1; 
        temp(ctr)=imageMat(1,i); 
        ctr=ctr+1; 
        user=imageMat{3,i}; 
    end 
    if i==s(2) 
        imat=[]; 
        t=size(temp); 
        for j=1:t(2) 
            for k=1:t(2) 
                try 
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                    imat(j,k)=ssim(base64decode(temp{j}),base64decode(temp{k})); 
                catch 
                    imat(j,k)=0; 
                end 
            end 
        end 
        imat=mean(imat); 
        imatall=[imatall,imat]; 





    try 
        z=strsplit(imageMat{2,i},' '); 
        z=strsplit(z{5},':'); 
        y=str2num(z{1})+1; 
        imageEER(1,y)=imageEER(1,y)+imatall(i); 
        imageEER(2,y)=imageEER(2,y)+1; 
    catch 
    end 
end 
for i=1:24 
    if imageEER(2,i)~=0 
        imageEER(1,i)=imageEER(1,i)/imageEER(2,i); 








    if strcmp(imageMat{3,i},user) 
        temp=[temp,imageMat(:,i)]; 
        tempeer=[tempeer,imatall(i)]; 
    else 
        
imageEERperuser=[imageEERperuser,imageIndividualEER(temp,tempeer,str2num(user))]; 
        temp={}; 
        tempeer=[]; 
        temp=[temp,imageMat(:,i)]; 
        tempeer=[tempeer,imatall(i)]; 
        user=imageMat{3,i}; 
    end 
    if i==s(2) 
        
imageEERperuser=[imageEERperuser,imageIndividualEER(temp,tempeer,str2num(user))]; 
    end 
end 
         
xlswrite('imageEER.xls',imageEER) 
xlswrite('imageEERperuser.xls',imageEERperuser) 
 
 
